good or evil, and become objects of a distinct SER M. affection, that, like others, is a fpring of ac- I. tion, influencing and directing our practice. It is this that makes us moral agents, which is the most important part of our conftitution. It implies not only intelligence, free agency, and direct affections to other beings, but affections arifing from our reflecting upon characters, affections, and actions morally distinguished, that is, appearing good or evil to our minds, according to a certain invariable standard planted in them. Our highest enjoyment arifes from felf-approbation, or a consciousness of intire moral affection, and a course of morally good action, fo far as human nature can attain to it. And our most intense affection to other beings, accompanied with the greatest, the pureft, the most rational pleasure we know, terminates on the fame characters in them, manifested by their works. Now, if the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly feen, being understood by the things that are made; if from the powers and capacities of the creatures we justly infer his existence and perfections; particularly, if the confcious intelligence and active powers of fome beings formed by him, be a proof of his own felf-original intelligence SER M. and activity, may we not in like manner I. from the moral powers he has given to mankind and other rational creatures infer his moral agency? especially fince this character neceffarily appears to our minds the most excellent and amiable, and of all others the most important to a rational happiness. Is it poffible for any man who believes God to be the father, the designing cause of spirits, of their intelligence, liberty, and all their other rational faculties and enjoyments, to doubt whether he himself is poffefsed of intelligence, liberty, and rational enjoyment? Whether fince he has indued them with a power of self-reflection, particularly, of reviewing their own affections and actions, and judging concerning their rectitude, his own actions and the principles from which they proceed, be not the object of his own underftanding and attention? Whether having annexed the highest enjoyment to their self-approbation upon this review, and made their principal happiness to depend upon it, he poffeffes the like, or a more exalted enjoyment in the approbation of his own actions and principles of action? And this being the fum of what we mean by moral-agency, can we doubt whether God be a moral agent? Another Another way of apprehending this fubject, SER M. will lead us to the fame conclufion. It has I. been proved, * and must here be supposed, that God is the designing cause, the preferver and governor of the world, and all things in it; and from the relations and correfpondencies of things which he has made, and continues to uphold, we difcern his particular ends. Now this implies a Character or a Will, a permanent principle determining him to act after one particular manner, rather than another. But it has been alfo proved † that morality is an eminent part of the human constitution; that is, the mind of man is fo framed, as when it attains to the full exercife of its rational powers, to be neceffarily fenfible of moral obligations, and to have all the determination to fatisfy them, which is confiftent with the nature of such a being, and the nature of virtue itself, i. e. with free-agency in an imperfect ftate: That morality is of the greatest moment to the perfection and happinefs of every individual, and the whole collective body of mankind: And therefore it must be attributed to our intelligent Creator as the true cause of it, thereby intending thofe very ends, the perfection and happiness of our nature, which it is naturally apt to ferve. * Vol, I, A 3 I. SERM. ferve. If it be fo, it must then, I think, be allowed a juft confequence, that it is the will of God, man should practise virtue and abftain from vice, or that he approves the one, and difapproves the other. Is it poffible to conceive that he should not be pleased with his intelligent creatures acting agreeably to his own designs, voluntarily fulfilling the law of their nature; and difpleafed with their wilfully rebelling against it? Since he has made them capable of difcerning the end of his conftitution, and of acting freely either in purfuance of it, or in oppofition to it, to fuppofe that he is indifferent to the choice and to their courfe of action, is abfurdly to fuppofe that he is indifferent to the intention of his own works; indeed, to fuppofe fuch confufion and inconfiftency in his counfels, as cannot be reconciled to any notions of wisdom. Inanimate things are altogether paffive in fulfilling his purposes; that is, they are moved and difpofed of merely by his fovereign irrefiftible Will. As they can never be the objects of his dislike, all the complacency he can be supposed to have in them, is properly no more than felf-enjoyment, which arifes from the exercife and manifeftation of his own attributes, and which in proportion to the degree of its perfections, muft belong to I. every intelligent nature in a natural and SER M. happy state. But free agents are the proper objects of his approbation or disapprobation, according as they do or do not actively comply with his will made known to them, and with that eternal invariable reafon by which his whole administration is conducted, I believe it is scarcely in our power when we think seriously, to imagine that the most perfectly wife Being is not pleased with his creatures choofing to conform themselves to the wifdom of his counfels, and displeased with such as obftinately set themselves in oppofition to his will, though we ought never to impute to him any thing like that paffion, which in our weak minds accompanies refentment or averfion. But it may be faid, that by the fame reasoning, our natural actions, fuch as eating and fleeping, are agreeable to the will of God; because they are the means he has appointed us to use for preserving our lives. Be it fo. As natural governor of mankind, it is his will we should use the neceffary means for the preservation of our lives; as governor of moral agents, it is his will they should conduct themselves with a regard to moral deficiencies*. Therefore as the governor of fuch agents, (which relation is to us most important and comprehenfive, and in it our A 4 highest *Mr. A. here means, moral rectitude, as well as Deficiency. 赢 |