that cross the just end of the command or law, and that either more or less, as it is more or less hurtful to others, or against the common good for then the matter will become sinful in itself.

6. Whether perjury, or the unwilling violation of human laws be the greater sin, and which in a doubtful case should be most feared and avoided, it is easy to discern.

Rule XXVII. A vow may be consequently made null or void, 1. By cessation of the matter, or any thing essential to it, (of which before,) or by a dispensation or dissolution of it by God to whom we are obliged.' No doubt it is in God's power to disoblige a man from his vow; but how he ever doth such a thing is all the doubt: extraordinary revelations being ceased, there is this way yet ordinary, viz. by bringing the matter which I vowed to do, under some prohibition of a general law, by the changes of his providence.

Rule XXVIII. As to the power of man to dispense with oaths and vows, there is a great and most remarkable difference between those oaths and vows where man is the only party that we are primarily bound to, and God is only appealed to as witness or judge, as to the keeping of my word to man; and those oaths or vows where God is also made (either only or conjunct with man) the party to whom I primarily oblige myself.' For in the first case man can dispense with my oath or vow, by remitting his own right, and releasing me from my promise; but in the second case no created power can do it. As e. g. if I promise to pay a man a sum of money, or to do him service, and swear that I will perform it faithfully; if upon some after bargain or consideration he release me of that promise, God releaseth me also, as the witnesses and judge have nothing against a man, whom the creditor hath discharged. But if I swear or vow that I will amend my life, or reform my family of some great abuse, or that I will give so much to the poor, or that I will give up myself to the work of the Gospel, or that I will never marry, or never drink wine, or never consent to Popery or error, &c.; no man can dispense with my vow, nor directly disoblige me in any such case; because no man can give away God's right; all that man can do in any such case is, to become an occasion of God's disobliging me; if he can

so change the case, or my condition, as to bring me under some law of God, which commandeth me the contrary to my vow, then God disobligeth me, or maketh it unlawful to keep that vow. And here because a vow is commonly taken for such a promise to God, in which we directly bind ourselves to him, therefore we say, that a vow (thus strictly taken) cannot be dispensed with by man; though in the sense aforesaid, an oath sometimes may.

The Papists deal most perversely in this point of dispensing with oaths and vows: for they give that power to the pope over all the Christian world, who is an usurper, and none of our governor, which they deny to princes and parents that are our undoubted governors: the pope may disoblige vassals from their oaths of allegiance to their princes (as the council of Lateran before cited,) but no king or parent may disoblige a man from his oath to the pope: nay, if a child vow a monastical life, and depart from his parents, they allow not the parents to disoblige him.

Rule XXIX In the determining of controversies about the obligation of oaths and vows, it is safest to mark what Scripture saith, and not to presume, upon uncertain pretences of reason, to release ourselves, where we are not sure that God releaseth us.'

Rule xxx. That observable chapter, Numb. xxx. about dispensations, hath many things in it that are plain for the decision of divers great and useful doubts; but many things which some do collect and conclude as consequential or implied, are doubtful and controverted among the most judicious expositors and casuists.'

1. It is certain that this chapter speaketh not of a total nullity of vows ab initio,' but of a relaxation, or disanulling of them by superiors. For, 1. Bare silence (which is no efficient cause) doth prove them to be in force. 2. It is not said, 'She is bound, or not bound;' but Her vow and bond shall stand,' ver. 4. 7. 9. 11.: or 'shall not stand,' ver. 5. 12. and He shall make it of none effect,' ver. 8. The Hebrew, ver. 5. signifieth, Quia annihilavit pater ejus illud.' And ver. 8. Et si in die audire virum ejus, annihilaverit illud, et infregerit votum ejus .'-— 3. It is expressly said, that she had bound her soul' before the dis

And si infringendo infregerit ea vir ejus. v. 12. Vir ejus infregit ea. v. 13.

solution. 4. It is said, 'The Lord shall forgive her,' ver. 5. 8. 12. which signifieth a relaxation of a former bond. Or at the most, the parent's silence is a confirmation, and his disowning it hindereth only the confirmation. So the Chaldee paraphrase, the Samaritan and Arabic Non erunt confirmata,' the Syriac Rata vel irrita erunt.'

2. It is certain that a father hath the power of relaxation here mentioned as to an unmarried daughter, in her youth living in his house, and a husband over his wife; for it is the express words of the text.

3. It is certain that this power extendeth to vows about all things in which the inferior is not 'sui juris,' but is under the superior's care and oversight, and cannot perform it (in case there had been no vow) without the superior's con

sent.

4. It is certain that it extendeth not only to matters concerning the governors themselves, but concerning vows to God, as they are good or hurtful to the inferiors.

5. It is certain that there are some vows so necessary and clearly for the inferior's good, that in them he is 'sui juris,' and no superior can suspend his vows: as to have the Lord for his God; and not to commit idolatry, murder, theft, &c. No superior can disoblige us here; for the power of superiors is only for the inferior's indemnity and good.

6. It is certain that the superior's recal must be speedy or in time, before silence can signify consent, and make a confirmation of the vow.

7. It is certain that if the superior have once ratified it by silence or consent, he cannot afterwards disannul it.

8. It is agreed, that if he awhile dissent and disannul it, and afterwards both inferior and superior consent again, that it remaineth ratified.

9. It is agreed that the superior that can discharge the vow of the inferior, cannot release himself from his own VOWS. If the pope could release all men, who shall release him?

2. But in these points following there is no such certainty or agreement of judgments, because the text seemeth silent about them, and men conjecture variously as they are prepared. 1. It is uncertain whether any but women may be released by virtue of this text: (1.) Because the text ex

pressly distinguishing between a man and a woman doth first say, 'Si vir- If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an oath to bind his soul with a bond; he shall not break his word; he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.' And 2. Because women are only instanced in, when Scripture usually speaketh of them in the masculine gender, when it includeth both sexes, or extendeth it to both. 3. And in the recapitulation in the end, it is said by way of recital of the contents, ver. 16. "These are the statutes which the Lord commanded Moses between a man and his wife; between the father and his daughter in her youth in her father's house:" as if he would caution us against extending it any further. And though many good expositors think that it extendeth equally to sons as to daughters, in their minority, because there is a parity of reason, yet this is an uncertain conjecture. 1. Because God seemeth by the expression to bound the sense. 2. Because God acquainteth not man with all the reasons of his laws. 3. Because there may be special reasons for an indulgence to the weaker sex in such a weighty case. And though still there is a probability it may extend to sons, it is good keeping to certainties in matters of such dreadful importance as oaths and vows to God.

2. It is uncertain whether this power of disannulling vows do belong also to other superiors', to princes, to inferior magistrates, to pastors, masters, to commanders, as to their soldiers, as well as to parents and husbands: some think it doth, because there is, say they, a parity of reason. Others think it is dangerous disannulling oaths and vows upon pretences of parity of reason, when it is uncertain whether we know all God's reasons: and they think there is not a parity, and that it extendeth not to others. 1. Be

Dr. Sanderson Prælect. 4. sect. 5. pp. 104, 105. limiteth it to 'De his rebus in quibus subest' in those same things in which one is under another's government: adding sect. 6. a double exception: Of which one respecteth the person of the swearer, the other the consent of the superior:' the first is that 'As to the person of the swearer, there is scarce any one that hath the use of reason, that is so fully under another's power, but that in some things he is sui juris,' at his own power: and there every one may do as pleases himself, without consulting his superior, so as that by his own act, without his superior's licence, he may bind himself. 2. As to the consent of a superior.' A tacit consent, antecedent or consequent, sufficeth. Quasi diceret, si dissensum suum vel uno die dissimulet, votum in perpetuum stabilivit.

cause parents and husbands are so emphatically named in. the contents in the end, ver. 16. 2. Because it had been as easy to God to name the rest. 3. Because, there is no instance in Scripture of the exercise of such a power, when there was much occasion for it. 4. Because else vows signify no more in a kingdom than the king please, and in an army than the general and officers please; and among servants than the master please, which is thought a dangerous doctrine. 5. Because there will be an utter uncertainty when a vow bindeth and when it doth not to almost all the people in the world; for one superior may contradict it, and another or a hundred may be silent: the king and most of the magistrates through distance will be silent, when a master, or a justice, or a captain that is, at hand may disannul it one officer may be for it, and another against it: a master or a pastor may be for it, and the magistrate against it and so perjury will become the most controverted sin, and a matter of jest. 6. Because public magistrates and commanders, and pastors have not the near and natural interest in their inferiors as parents and husbands have in their children and wives; and therefore parents have not only a restraining power (as husbands here also have); but also a disposing power of the relation of their infant children, and may enter them in baptism into the vow and covenant of Christianity, the will and acts of the parents standing for the child's till he come to age; but if you say that upon a parity of reason, all princes, and rulers, and pastors may do so with all that are their inferiors, it will seem incredible to most Christians. 7. Because public magistrates are justly supposed to be so distant from almost all their individual subjects, as not to be capable of so speedy a disowning their personal vows. Whatever this text doth, it is certain that other texts enough forbid covenants and combinations against the persons, or power, or rights of our governors, and not only against them, but without them, in cases, where our place and calling alloweth us not to act without them. But it is certain that God who commanded all Israel to be entered successively into the covenant of circumcision with him, would not have held them guiltless for refusing that covenant, if the prince had been against it. And few divines think that a subject, or soldier, or servant