able with any mischief from the example; nor does his punishment seem necessary, in order to save the authority of any general rule. In the first place, those who reason in this manner do not observe, that they are setting up a general rule, of all others the least to be endured; namely, that secrecy, whenever secrecy is practicable, will justify any action. Were such a rule admitted, for instance, in the case above produced; is there not reason to fear that people would be disappearing perpetually? In the next place, I would wish them to be well satisfied about the points proposed in the following queries: 1. Whether the Scriptures do not teach us to expect that, at the general judgement of the world, the most secret actions will be brought to light*? 2. For what purpose can this be, but to make them the objects of reward and punishment? *"In the day when God shall judge the secrets of "men by Jesus Christ." Rom. xi. 16.-"Judge nothing "before the time, until the Lord come, who will bring to "light the hidden things of darkness, and will make "manifest the counsels of the heart." 1 Cor. iv. 5. 3. Whether, being so brought to light, they will not fall under the operation of those equal and impartial rules, by which God will deal with his creatures? They will then become examples, whatever they be now; and require the same treatment from the judge and governor of the moral world, as if they had been detected from the first. CHAPTER VIII. THE CONSIDERATION OF GENERAL CONSEQUENCES PURSUED. THE general consequence of any action may be estimated, by asking what would be the consequence, if the same sort of actions were generally permitted.-But suppose they were, and a thousand such actions perpetrated under this permission; is it just to charge a single action with the collected guilt and mischief of the whole thousand? I answer, that the reason for prohibiting and punishing an action (and this reason may be called the guilt of the action, if you please) will always be in proportion to the whole mischief that would arise from the general impunity and tole ration of actions of the same sort. "Whatever is expedient, is right." But then it must be expedient on the whole, at the long run, in all its effects collateral and remote, as well as in those which are immediate and direct; as it is obvious, that, in computing consequences, it makes no difference in what way or at what distance they ensue. To impress this doctrine on the minds of young readers, and to teach them to extend their views beyond the immediate mischief of a crime, I shall here subjoin a string of instances, in which the particular consequence is comparatively insignificant; and where the malignity of the crime, and the severity with which human laws pursue it, is almost entirely founded upon the general consequence. The particular consequence of coining is, the loss of a guinea, or of half a guinea, to the person who receives the counterfeit money: the general consequence (by which I mean the consequence that would ensue, if the same practice were generally permitted) is, to abolish the use of money. The particular consequence of forgery is, a damage of twenty or thirty pounds to the man who accepts the forged bill: the general consequence is, the stoppage of currency. paper The particular consequence of sheepstealing, or horse-stealing, is, a loss to the owner, to the amount of the value of the sheep or horse stolen: the general consequence is, that the land could not be occupied, nor the market supplied, with this kind of stock. The particular consequence of breaking into a house empty of inhabitants, is, the loss of a pair of silver candlesticks, or a few spoons: the general consequence is, that nobody could leave their house empty. The particular consequence of smuggling may be a deduction from the national fund too minute for computation: the general consequence is, the destruction of one entire branch of public revenue; a proportionable increase of the burthen upon other branches; and the ruin of all fair and open trade in the article smuggled. The particular consequence of an officer's breaking his parole is, the loss of a prisoner, who was possibly not worth keeping: the general consequence is, that this miti gation of captivity would be refused to all others. And what proves incontestably the superior importance of general consequences is, that crimes are the same, and treated in the same manner, though the particular consequence be very different. The crime and fate of the housebreaker is the same, whether his booty be five pounds or fifty. And the reason is, that the general consequence is the same. The want of this distinction between particular and general consequences, or rather, the not sufficiently attending to the latter, is the cause of that perplexity which we meet with in ancient moralists. On the one hand, they were sensible of the absurdity of pronouncing actions good or evil, without regard to the good or evil they produced. On the other hand, they were startled at the conclusions to which a steady adherence to consequences seemed sometimes to conduct them. To relieve this difficulty they contrived the rò gETOV, or the honestum, by which terms they meant to constitute a measure of right, distinct from utility. Whilst the utile served them, that is, whilst it corresponded with their πρέπον, |