habitual notions of the rectitude of actions, they went by it. When they fell in with such cases as those mentioned in the sixth chapter, they took leave of their guide, and resorted to the honestum. The only account they could give of the matter was, that these actions might be useful; but, because they were not at the same time honesta, they were by no means to be deemed just or right.

From the principles delivered in this and the two preceding chapters, a maxim may be explained, which is in every man's mouth, and in most men's without meaning, viz. "not to do evil, that good may come:" that is, let us not violate a general rule, for the sake of any particular good consequence we may expect. Which is for the most part a salutary caution, the advantage seldom compensating for the violation of the rule. Strictly speaking, that cannot be "evil," from which " good comes;" but in this way, and with a view to the distinction between particular and general consequences, it may.

We will conclude this subject of conséquences with the following reflection. A man may imagine, that any action of his,

with respect to the public, must be inconsiderable so also is the agent. If his crime produce but a small effect upon the universal interest, his punishment or destruction bears a small proportion to the sum of happiness and misery in the creation.

CHAPTER IX.

OF RIGHT.

RIGHT and obligation are reciprocal; that is, wherever there is a right in one person, there is a corresponding obligation others. If one man has a upon others. right" to an estate; others are "obliged" to abstain from it:-If parents have a "right" to reverence from their children; children are" obliged" to reverence their parents:— and so in all other instances.

Now, because moral obligation depends, as we have seen, upon the will of God; right, which is correlative to it, must depend upon the same. Right therefore signifies, consistency with the will of God.

But if the Divine will determine the distinction of right and wrong, what else is it

but an identical proposition, to say of God, that he acts right? or how is it possible to conceive even that he should act wrong? Yet these assertions are intelligible and significant. The case is this: By virtue of the two principles, that God wills the happiness of his creatures, and that the will of God is the measure of right and wrong, we arrive at certain conclusions; which conclusions become rules; and we soon learn to pronounce actions right or wrong, according as they agree or disagree with our rules, without looking any farther: and when the habit is once established of stopping at the rules, we can go back and compare with these rules even the Divine conduct itself; and yet it may be true (only not observed by us at the time) that the rules themselves are deduced from the Divine will.

Right is a quality of persons or of actions. Of persons; as when we say, such a one has a "right" to this estate; parents have a right" to reverence from their children; the king to allegiance from his subjects; masters have a 66 right" to their servants' labour; a man has not a "right" over his own life.

Of actions; as in such expressions as the

66

following: it is "right" to punish murder with death; his behaviour on that occasion was "right;" it is not right" to send an unfortunate debtor to gaol; he did or acted right," who gave up his place, rather than vote against his judgement.

66

In this latter set of expressions, you may substitute the definition of right above given, for the term itself; e. g. it is "con-

sistent with the will of God" to punish murder with death;-his behaviour on that occasion was "consistent with the will of "God;" it is not "consistent with the will "of God" to send an unfortunate debtor to gaol; he did, or acted, consistently "with the will of God," who gave up his place rather than vote against his judge

ment.

66

66

In the former set, you must vary the construction a little, when you introduce the definition instead of the term. Such a one has a right" to this estate, that is, it is "consistent with the will of God" that such a one should have it ;-parents have a "right" to reverence from their children,. that is, it is "consistent with the will of "God" that children should reverence their parents; and the same of the rest..

CHAPTER X.

THE DIVISION OF RIGHTS.

RIGHTS, when applied to persons, are
Natural or adventitious:

Alienable or unalienable:
Perfect or imperfect.

I. Rights are natural or adventitious. Natural rights are such as would belong to a man, although there subsisted in the world no civil government whatever.

Adventitious rights are such as would not. Natural rights are, a man's right to his life, limbs, and liberty; his right to the produce of his personal labour; to the use, in common with others, of air, light, water. If a thousand different persons, from a thousand different corners of the world, were cast together upon a desert island, they would from the first be every one entitled to these rights.

Adventitious rights are, the right of a king over his subjects; of a general over his soldiers; of a judge over the life and liberty of a prisoner; a right to elect or appoint magistrates, to impose taxes, decide dis