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as existing in Matter, before it was arranged by God; but it had a beginning, and was produced by God, if considered with reference to the powers, which were given to it by God. The same solution will apply to the question of Matter itself being produced or unproduced.

With a similar inattention to the language and sentiments of Plato, some of his later followers represented him as saying, that the world was eternali; whereas he only said, that the Matter, out of which the world was formed, was eternalk. It was thus that the later Platonists departed in many instances from the real tenets of their leader and if we take the opinions of Plato from the writings of Proclus, Plotinus, Jamblichus, &c. we shall be led into perpetual mistakes, or we shall falsely accuse Plato of contradicting himself. There can be little doubt that the rapid increase of Christianity led the later Platonists to alter their master's doctrine, and to make him appear to agree with the Christian notion of Matter being created by God: but I was anxious to establish the fact that Plato believed in the eternity of Matter, because the Gnostics held this doctrine, and I have supposed Platonism to be the principal or fundamental source of Gnosticism. Irenæus says plainly, "As to their assertion that the Creator made "the world out of subject Matter, Anaxagoras, Empedo"cles, and Plato held the same doctrine before them." Valentinus, who was one of the most celebrated Gnostics in the second century, undoubtedly held this notion: and we have his sentiments expressed by one of his adherents in the following manner: "I conceive that there exists, to"gether with God, that which is called Matter, out of "which he created all things, separating them by a wise "contrivance, and arranging them properly; out of which "also Evil seems to come; for Matter being without qua

i See Cudworth, IV. 14. vol. I. p. 368. 36. p. 867. Atticus, a Platonist of the second century, mentions this misrepresentation. (Eus. Præp. Evang. XV. 6.) Baltus considered the opinion of Plato upon this point to be doubtful; but he is certainly mistaken. Défense des Saints Peres, III. 11. p. 334

k Aristotle is said to have been the first person who believed the world to be eternal: (de Cœlo, I. 10.) i. e. he was the first who held the eternity of the one identical world which we now see: for other philosophers, Ocellus, Parmenides, Xenophanes, &c. had held the eternity of the world, i. e. of a succession of worlds, before the time of Aristotle. See Philo Judæus, de Mundi Incorruptibilitate, p. 489: and Mosheim's Annotations upon Cudworth, IV. 14. p. 366. note °.

Some excellent remarks upon this subject will be found in Beausobre, vol. II. p. 176. and Mosheim's Notes to Cudworth, IV. 14. vol. I. p. 352. note: his Dissertation de Creatione ex nihilo, 29. p. 994. and De Rebus ante Const. Cent. II. 29. See also Brucker, vol. I. p. 680.

m II. 14. 4. p. 134.

66

66

66

"lity and form, and also carried about without any order, "and requiring the skill of the Deity, he did not refuse to apply it, nor did he leave it to be always carried about in "that manner; but he began to create, and wished to separate the best parts of it from the worst, and thus he "created: but the dregs which came from it during the process, these he left as they were, being without any ar"rangement for the purposes of creation, and of no use to "him: from which it appears to me, that the present evils "of mankind arisen." Such was the opinion of the Gnostics in the second century: and it is plain, that this was borrowed from Grecian philosophy. We may learn the same from the treatise of Tertullian against Hermogenes, who appears to have been at first a Christian, but to have adopted Gnosticism: "Turning," as Tertullian says, " from the "Christians to the Philosophers, from the Church to the "Academy and the Portico, he has learnt from the Stoics "to place Matter on a level with God, as if it had always "existed; neither born, nor made, nor having any begin"ning nor end, out of which God afterwards made all "things." The whole treatise may be read with advantage upon this subject: and it will be seen that Tertullian, as in this passage, deduces the eternity of Matter from the Stoics, rather than the Platonists P. The real opinion of Plato concerning the origin of evil, has led to many dissensions in ancient and modern times: and I would refer the reader, who wishes to investigate this subject, to Mosheim's Annotations upon Cudworth, IV. 13. p. 312. note k; and Brucker, vol. I. p. 684. The fact seems to be, that Plato did not express himself clearly upon this subject: but it is equally certain, that he believed a principle of evil to be inherent in Matter; and that if he did not say in direct terms that Matter was the cause of evil, it flowed as a necessary consequence from his theory 9. The question was never suffered to rest, either in the Academy or in the other Schools: and I have already observed more than once, that it was this interminable discussion which led finally to Gnosticism. Tertullian, as we

"Dialogus de recta in Deum Fide, Sect. IV. inter op. Origen. vol. I. p. 841. See also Irenæus II. 10. 2. p. 126, 127.

P. 233.

P So again at p. 204. De Præscript. c. 7. he says, "Et ubi materia cum "Deo æquatur, Zenonis disciplina est."

4 Chalcidius expressly says, that Plato agreed with Pythagoras in making Matter the source of evil. §. 294. p. 387. §. 295, 296. p. 388. He also informs us that Numenius, another Platonist, interpreted Plato's doctrine in the same way. For Plato's own sentiments concerning God not being the cause of evil, see Republ. II. p. 379. III. p. 391. X. p.617.

have seen, made the Stoics the authors of the opinion, that Matter is the cause of evil: and there can be no doubt that this doctrine was taught much more openly, and in a more systematic form, by the followers of Zeno than by those of Plato. The Stoics made God act upon Matter, not voluntarily, as Plato thought, but from necessity: and hence it was a more natural consequence of their theory, that there was something in Matter which God could not controul. This was the principle of evil: and we therefore may add the stoical philosophy to the other ingredients which formed the compound of Gnosticism'. But if it be said that the Gnostics took their notion of Matter and of Evil from Zeno rather than from Plato, it is merely meant that Zeno taught more openly and explicitly that doctrine, which was equally contained by implication in the hypotheses of Platos.

NOTE 19.-See Lecture III. p. 59.

I am aware that Mosheim considered the philosophy of Orpheus, and of the ancient Theogonies, to be founded upon a system of emanation: that Matter, or Chaos, proceeded eternally from God'. Brucker is also inclined to adopt the same opinion". But we must remember, that others have traced in the ancient Theogonies a system like that of Spinoza, which confounded the world with God, and in fact only made God a modification of Matter. The point therefore must at least be considered uncertain: and, at all events, Plato, and the philosophers after his day, considered Matter to have an eternal existence independent of God: from which I should rather infer, that they did not look upon the philosophy of Orpheus as founded upon a system of emanations and certainly the opening of Ovid's Metamorphoses may apply as well to the theory of Plato, as to the more ancient notions of Chaos.

A Dissertation, which I have not seen, was published at Erfurdt in 1806, on the "System of Emanation and Pan"theism of the Eastern Nations of Antiquity."

For the doctrine of the Stoics concerning the origin of evil, see Cudworth IV. 13. Brucker, vol. I. p. 934. Lipsius, Physiolog. Stoic. I. Diss. 14. The difficulty felt by the Stoics in deciding this question seems to have been caused by their attributing so much influence to fate. They wished to represent Matter as neither good nor evil in itself. v. Chalcid. §. 295. p. 387.

• The agreement between the Platonic and Stoic philosophies is shewn by Mangey in his preface to Philo Judæus, p. viii. See also Wolfius, Manicheismus ante Manichæos, II. 36. p. 149. Neumannus, de Christianismo Steico. In Cudworth, IV. 17. vol. I. p. 457. note m. Vol. I. p. 389. 417.

NOTE 20.-See Lecture III. p. 60.

I may perhaps appear to have spoken slightingly of the philosophy of Plato: and after a diligent perusal of his works, I cannot but consider many of his conceptions to be crude, irrational, and absurd. I am willing to allow, that much of this arose from his having no guide but human reason and had he been assisted by revelation, he would probably never have had recourse to the wretched expedient, by which he rescues God from being the author of evil. The following passage, which explains his notions upon this subject, is taken from the Timæus. When God had produced the intellectual beings who are sometimes called Dæmons, and sometimes Gods, he addresses to them a speech, of which I have already quoted a part at p. 311: he then continues, "There still remain three races of mortals, which "are not yet produced. If these are not brought into ex"istence, the worldy will be incomplete: for it will not "have in it all the kinds of living beings; and yet it ought, "if it is to be properly perfect. If these were to be pro"duced, and to receive their life from me, they would be "equal to Gods. In order therefore that they may be "mortal, and yet that this universe may have its proper "existence, do you betake yourselves in the natural course "to the creation of living beings, imitating the power which "I exerted when you yourselves were produced. And as "to that part in them, which ought to be like in name to "immortals, which is called divine, and which will be the "ruling principle with those among them, who are always "anxious to be obedient to justice and to you, I will give "it, having sown the seed and made a beginning. As to "the rest, do you unite the mortal to the immortal; form "and produce these living beings; supply them with food, "that they may increase; and when they decay, receive "them again." The intellectual beings executed the work committed to them: "In imitation of God, they took from "him the immortal principle of the soul, and formed round "it the mortal body, and gave it the whole vehicle of the "body, and placed in it, by way of addition, another spe"cies of soul, the mortal, which contained in itself grievous

* See Mosheim, Instit. Maj. I. 28. p. 66.

It must be remembered, that Plato used gavòs and xérues as synonymous. ὁ δὴ πᾶς οὐρανὸς ἢ κόσμος, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο, ὅ τί ποτε ονομαζόμενος μάλιστ ̓ ἂν déxoto, Toût' hiv roμdow. Timæus, p. 28. See also the last sentence of the Dialogue. "Ον δὲ οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον ἐπωνομάκαμεν, κ.τ.λ. Politic. p. 269.

= P. 41.

"and necessary passions; first, pleasure, the greatest en"ticement of evil; then pain; then courage and fear, &c. "&c.a" The remark of Chalcidius upon this passage is as followsb: "Plato made God the Creator of the souls them"selves but the office and department of those things, "which are appendages to the soul, was committed to other “and inferior divine powers: so that the pure souls, un"polluted, vigorous, and adorned with reason, should be "the work of God: but the creation of the vicious parts of "the soul should be ascribed to those powers, to whom "such an office was committed by God the Creator." Such was the expedient devised by this great philosopher to extricate God from being the cause of evil: and a more unphilosophical or more clumsy artifice was never probably imagined. If we were to speak of any human potentate, who held the language, and acted on the principle of Plato's God, we could only despise the mean equivocation, and the gross evasion of responsibility, which marked his conduct.

NOTE 21.-See Lecture III. p. 60.

I have not made this remark unadvisedly, nor without authority. The dictum, which I have quoted from Lucretius, and which Persius has expressed by saying

.... gigni

De nihilo nihilum, in nihilum nil posse reverti,

III. 84

was universally received and acknowledged by the philosophers of old and it is the remark of Chalcidius, "that it "is the common doctrine of all philosophers, that neither is "any thing made out of nothing, nor does it perish and be"come nothing." I am aware that Cudworth would wish us to understand this saying as only implying, that nothing is produced without an efficient caused. But I can neither follow his reasoning, nor admit his conclusion. At all events this efficient cause was not necessarily God: and the dictum of De nihilo, &c. was certainly held by some who denied an intelligent, external, moving Cause, and who made the world to be God. Plutarch appears to represent the meaning of the ancients much more correctly, when, speaking of Plato's theory, that "the substance and matter, out

b §. 184. p. 346.

P. 69. §. 291. p. 386. It is given as the fundamental principle of Xenophanes, Epicurus, and Metrodorus, by Plutarch apud Eus. Præp. Evang. I. 8.

I. 28. vol. I. p. 53. V. sect. 2. vol. II. p. 232. ed. Mosheim. See Wolfius, Manichæismus ante Manichæos, I. 4. p. 22.

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