the one hand, and death on the other. And that too, when the state, disposition and inclination of her heart were altogether against this weaker motive, and wholly in favour of the stronger one. Which leads me to observe,

2. That no motive, whether weak or strong, ever produces a corresponding volition, unless the heart be previously disposed or inclined towards it. By the heart is meant here, not a dormant taste, ppetite or principle, but the affections, in distinction from volitions, the immanent, in distinction from the emanent exercises of the will. While the heart, understood in this sense, remains holy, all motives to the exercise of a sinful volition, are spurned; and while the heart remains sinful, all motives to the exercise of a holy volition, are equally spurned. Supposing Satan to have been the first sinner, while his heart remained pure and benevolent, he rejected, indignantly, every motive, which could come into the view of his mind, to excite him to rebellion against his Maker. And while the hearts of our first parents, remained uncorrupt, they rejected, with disdain, every motive, which the arch tempter set before them. to excite them to eat the forbidden fruit. And so, on the other hand, while the hearts of fallen men, remain "full of evil," they reject all the motives, which can be set before them to "cease to do evil and learn to do well." This proves, not that "means are absolutely nothing; and that motives are no means of moving rational creatures to act;" but it does prove, and we think, demonstrably, that motives have no "efficiency" in them to pro

duce the volitions of the will; or, that the will of a rational creature, is, in no case, governed or determined by motives. Motives are means, as they always intervene between the efficient cause and volition, and every voluntary act. Motives

are second causes, i. e. causes sine qua non, or without which the will never acts. But, they are not efficient causes of voluntary exercises. These can be produced only by the direct operation of some intelligent, voluntary agent, moving the will itself. It follows, from what has been advanced,

3. That, if the wills of men were governed by motives, their actions would be as uniform as the operation of the elements in the natural world. God governs the natural world by general laws; from which he never deviates, except in the case of miracles, to attest the special revelations of his will: In the system of nature, therefore, as soon as we learn the properties and combinations of second causes, in any particu. lar instance, we may conclude, with certainty, what will be the result. From what has been, we may accurately calculate what will be.

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would be the same in the moral world, if motives governed the will. Upon this supposition, volition would follow the exhibition of motives, as invariably, as fire consumes wood, or water runs down a declivity. And this Mr. A. believes now to be the fact. He says, p. 37, "we do certainly know how men in general will act in any given case, if we can first discover what motives will there be brought to operate on the mind, or be presented to its view. There is no

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other cause and effect in nature, between which the connexion is more evident and certain; whether we judge as philosophers, or as men of common discernment and prudence." But, whether there be such uniformity in the volitions and actions of men; whether they as invariably act according to the motives presented to the view of their minds, as the laws of nature produce their effects; we are willing to submit to the decision of any politician, of any moralist, of any man of" common discernment and pru dence," and, with the single exception of Mr. A. of any "philosopher."

SECTION V.

Containing remarks upon the latter part of the third section of the Essay, p. 38-50.

We come now to the "other position," which Mr. A. calls the other main "pillar" of the doc. trine which he opposes; and which is derived from "most express and solemn declarations of scripture." This is, indeed, the main pillar of the doctrine of Divine Agency, in the production of moral evil; and, in Mr. A.'s opinion, sufficient, if it will stand, for ever to support the doctrine. He says, p. 38, "If the scriptures taught any such doctrine as this, the question would be decided, and here we ought to stop and be silent for ever." Let us, then "to the law, and to the testimony."

Mr. A. quotes six passages, which, he says, are some of the most plain and forcible texts, which ascribe the production of moral evil to a divine agency." He might, perhaps, have quo ted as many hundreds, all equally "plain and forcible;" and some of them more so. The doctrine of Divine Agency upon the active powers of men, causing them to choose and refuse, love and hate, will and do, in view of the various motives presented to their minds, runs through the whole Bible. It is presumed, that no person of common understanding, can read the scriptures through in course, with a candid, unprejudiced mind, without a deep conviction

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of the truth, that God governs the moral, as well as the natural world; that all creatures and things are as dependant upon Him for their motions and actions, as for their existence; that his hand brings to pass whatever his counsel designed; and that his agency is not more im. mediately concerned in producing any effect whatever, than it is in forming the hearts and characters of men, and moving their wills in all their conduct, whether good or bad.

"Mr. Weeks, says Mr. A., has produced a very long list of texts of this description." The list is, indeed, long, too long to be quoted here. The reader is requested, before he proceeds, to peruse this list, in the volume of Nine Sermons on the Decrees and Agency of God, by William R. Weeks, p. 43-68. "But what, says Mr. A., is all this to his purpose?" Whether all this be any thing to Mr. Weeks's purpose, the intelligent reader will judge for himself. But, why is all this nothing to his purpose? Because, continues Mr. A. "he has still to prove, that these texts relate, not to the providential government of God, but to an immediate divine agency upon the hearts of sinners." In order, then, to prove, that these texts relate to an immediate or positive agency upon the minds of sinners, must Mr. W. prove, that they do not relate to the providential government of God? Is there such an opposition between the provi dential government and the agency of God, that they reciprocally exclude each other? What would the Providence of God be, without his Agency? Would it be any thing more than