constant operation of the same power that created them at first.

tem.

Secondly. Mr. A. asks whether it "does not follow from this mode of reasoning, that though 1 God may always be creating, yet he cannot form in his own mind the plan of any particular system, bring it into being, and cause that very system to continue in being, through a succession of ages?" We answer, that does not follow, if the continued exercise of creative power does not destroy the identity of the sysThat the system remains the same, and has a permanent existence, is not denied. But, the question is-What causes it to be the same; what gives it a permanent, continued existence? Is it a power of independent existence imparted to it; or, the constant agency of the Creator? Mr. A. here quotes Psalm xxxiii. 9. "For he spake, and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast." His argument from this passage. we suppose to be this: "If the created system be done, and stand fast, then how can it be dependant upon the constant exercise of divine power, for its continuance in being?" This reminds one of an argument, found in Carylls's exposition of the book of Job. In ch. ix. v. 6, of that book, we read, "Which shaketh the earth out of her place, and the pillars thereof tremble." "Here, says Mr. Caryll, it is expressly declared, that the earth stands upon pillars; and who, then, will have the temerity to say, that it turns round upon its axis?"

Thirdly To overthrow President Edwards's doctrine, that preservation is creation continued,

Mr. A. advances this position: "It requires as great power to annihilate, as to create." But, is this position tenable? If it is; then, should the Deity cease to be, as well as cease to operate. the created system would remain for ever. Hence it follows, that the created system, having once gained existence, is no longer dependant upon God: But, is not independent exist. ence one of the incommunicable attributes of Divinity? We admit, that it would require as great a power to annihilate the world, as it did to create it, and even a greater power, so long as God shall exert his power to preserve it. But we do not believe, that, if God should withdraw his upholding, almighty hand, the world would exist a moment longer. No power is necessary to annihilate a created, dependant being this must ever follow the cessation of cre. ative power.

We are glad Mr. A. proposes "to quote but one example more," as we are as heartily tired as he, or our readers can be, of "speculations so profound." The example is from Dr. Stephen West; who says, "Moral agency consists in spontaneous, voluntary exertion." Upon this definition, Mr. A. in the first place, has a quibble. If, says he, spontaneous and voluntary are perfectly synonymous, then one of them is superfluous. This may be true, upon supposition that synonymous terms are always superfluous. But we question the correctness of such a supposition. Two synonymous terms may often be joined, with propriety and advantage, to il lustrate each other, as one of them may be bet

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ter understood, by some readers, than the other. Examples of this use of synonymes, might be found in the Essay under review. In the second place, Mr. A. asks, Does not moral agency consist in a power or capacity to put forth moral action ?" We may be incorrect; but we have ever thought, that agency was ac tion. And if it be so, then to say that moral agency consists in a power or capacity to put forth moral action, is the same as to say, that moral agency consists in a power or capacity to put forth moral agency. Such a proposition we must consider as identical, whether it be superfluous or not. We agree with Mr. A. that "voluntary exertion may do for the definition of moral action" and, of course, we think it will do for the definition of moral agency; for, says Mr. Walker," Agency is the quality of acting; the state of being in action." Dr. West therefore, it would seem, has not "entirely mistaken the point." But, Mr. A. seems to have mistaken the point; and. instead of showing in what moral agency consists, he has only attempted to show in what a moral agent consists. I only add, that Mr. A does Dr. West great injustice, in representing him as saying, that the soul of man consists in voluntary exertion." That very acute, learned, and pious divine, has not advanced, nor is it believed that he entertained such an absurd sentiment.

We close our review of this section, with congratulating our author upon his happy escape from "metaphysical deeps," and with expressing our desire, that he would not plunge

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into them again, until he has again and more critically reviewed some of these speculations, with which the young student in divinity is so liable to be charmed."*

*It may, perhaps, be proper and useful, to drop a word here respecting the science of Metaphysicks. It has not been uncommon for those who have found themselves foiled by close and cogent reasoning, to raise the cry of " Metaphysicks," to the no small terror of many, who know not the meaning of the word. To show that a doctrine ought not to be preached, or that a book ought not to be read, it bas been thought sufficient to say, it is metaphysical. But, what is metaphysicks? Mr. Walker defines it to be," the doctrine of the general affections of beings." According to this definition, the questions, whether a being exists or not, whether it be material or immaterial, whether it be caused or uncaused, mutable or immutable, like or unlike other things, limited or universal, temporary or eternal, are all metaphysical questions. All the properties of spirits, all the laws by which they are governed, and all the changes which they undergo and relations which they sustain to each other, belong to the science of metaphysicks. There is no other science so comprehensive. Almost the whole of our knowledge and of our reasoning, is necessarily metaphysical. Without some acquaintance with this science, it is impossible to go a step in the investigation of any subject, or the demonstration of any truth.

If, with some modern writers, we limit Metaphysicks to spiritual substances, and define it to be "the science of mind;" still it will be more comprehensive, as well as more important, useful and sublime, than any other science. Thus defined, Metaphysicks will comprehend every truth, relating to the being, perfection, character and designs of God, to the existence, properties and character of angels, and to the nature, faculties, operations, relations and duties of the human soul. Hence, it is easy to see, that almost all the doctrines of the Bible, are metaphysical.

That eminent divine and christian philosopher, President Edwards, writes, in bis Enquiry on the Will, p. iv. sec. xiii. "If it be made an objection against the foregoing rea

suning, that it is metaphysical, or may be properly reduced to the science of metaphysicks, it is a very impertinent objection whether it be so or no, is not worthy of any dispute or controversy. If the reasoning be good, it is as frivolous to inquire what science it is properly reduced to, as what language it is delivered in: and for a man to go about to confute the arugments of his opponent, by telling him his arguments are metaphysical, would be as weak as to tell him, his arguments could not be substantial, because they were written in French or Latin. The question is not, whether what is said be metaphysicks, physicks, logick, or mathematicks, Latin, French, English, or Mohawk? But, whether the reasoning be good, and the arguments truly conclusive-It is by metaphysical arguments only we are able to prove, that the rational soul is not corporeal; that lead or sand cannot think; that thoughts are not square or round, or do not weigh a pound. The arguments by which we prove the being of God, if handled closely and distinctly, so as to show their clear and demonstrative evidence, must be metaphysically treated. It is by metaphysicks only, that we can demonstrate, that God is not limited to a place, or is not mutable: that he is not ignorant or forgetful; that it is impossible for him to lie, or be unjust; and that there is one God only, and not hundreds or thousands. And, indeed, we have no strict demonstration of any thing, excepting mathematical truths, but by metaphysicks. We can have no proof that is properly demonstrative, of any one proposition, relating to the being and nature of God, his creation of the world, the dependance of all things on him, the nature of bodies and spirits, the nature of our own souls, or any of the great truths of morality and natural religion, but what is metaphysical."

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A writer in the Theological Magazine, vol. iii. p. 199, has these pertinent observations: Metaphysicks stands for that species of investigation, discussion, or science, which extends beyond the narrow circle of weights and measures, the composition and decomposition of matter, squares and cubes; and respects moral relations, moral causes and effects, spiritual substances, intelligent agents, and the moral plan of divine government. Now, it is here to be asked, is it worth while to value ourselves upon the idea that we are rational creatures, if we withdraw our inquiries from objects