of this nature? Nay, can we determine that we are rational agents, and not on a level with the cabbages in our gardens, unless we will step a little way, at least, into this region of metaphysicks; or, to use language less offensive, into the region of spiritual and moral inquiry? Fie, then, upon the loud cry, metaphysicks! Awake, ye sons of carelessness, to inquiry. If your adversary be ignorant, instruct him. he reason erringly, detect his fallacies. But against ingenuity which you cannot equal, or demonstration which you cannot disprove, do not, if you would respect your characters, cry out, metaphysicks!"

If

Containing remarks upon the fourth section of the Essay. p. 51-57.

One would think that Mr. A. had lately reviewed his divinity, as well as his metaphysicks, upon reading the first paragraph of his fourth section, which contains this sweeping sentence: "A vast proportion of the most boasted reasonings of men on divinity, are (is) a vain and pernicious philosophism." If it be indeed so, it would be useless and dangerous for young men, preparing for the sacred office, to read much of what has been written on divinity: and it need not appear so strange, as some have thought it, that a student, in six weeks after leaving College, should have read enough to receive license to preach. But, it is some consolation to know, that, vain and pernicious as Mr. A. esteems most of the boasted reasonings of men on divinity, he "regards many of the writings of New-England divines, with respect and honor," and has read them with " delight and profit" on almost all points except a few, which Dr. Griffin saw fit to denounce, as "foreign to godliness."

In the section before us, Mr. A. proposes to show, that the doctrine, which he opposes, is unphilosophical. And if it be so in reality, we should suppose he would like it the better on that account; for he says, p. 121, “If it be

A

philosophy, we must beware of it." But, let us see how he proves the doctrine in question to be unphilosophical.

First. He says, "It is contrary to analogy." And, what if it is? Can nothing be philosophical, but what is agreeable to analogy? A Swedenborgian might be expected to say so. But, how does Mr. A. make it appear, that the doctrine in question, is contrary to analogy? He says "it is quite different from the common train of human reasoning in cases which bear a strong analogy to this." And what if it is? Is it certain that the common train of human reasoning in such cases, is always agreeable to sound philosophy? The only case mentioned by Mr. A. as analogous to that of wicked men, is that of a ferocious tyger, with a lamb before him. Now, suppose it were admitted, which it is not, that the tyger, thirsting for blood, might leap upon the lamb, without being "moved by a special divine power :" the analogy. in this case, however strong, would only prove, that men "disposed to nothing but sin" might, without any special divine influence, commit some overt act of wickedness, such as robbery or murder. But, in deciding the question before us, we are to account, not merely for the overt acts of wicked men, but for their disposi tion to s'n, their ev l affections and volitions, from which their external actions flow, and in which all their moral ev l lies. Here Mr. A.'s strong analogy is very weak. He assumes the tyger, with his ferocious thirst for blood, just as he did human nature in its state of awful depravi

ty; i. e. he assumes the existence of the very thing, for which he ought to assign an adequate cause. Because divine power may be necessary to restrain the ferocity of the tyger and the wrath of man; does it hence follow, that a divine agency is not the efficient cause of the ferocity of the one and the wrath of the other? 'Would not a philosopher, who should reason in this way, make himself ridiculous?'

Secondly. To make it still more clearly appear, that the doctrine of divine efficiency is unphilosophical, Mr. A. says, "It annihilates the whole system of second causes in the moral world." This is a broad and bold asertion, and as destitute of truth, as it is of candour.

Are

second causes annihilated, unless they are allowed to be efficient causes, and as such, to usurp the place and perform the work of the First Cause? What if no "second cause, or created agent" can "move the mind of man to the least inclination or choice ?" Does it hence follow, that, in moving the minds of men to choose and will, God may not make use of second causes, means, motives, and created agents? Mr. A. admits, that all holy exercises in the hearts of men, are produced by the immediate agency of God. And does he, then, mean to annihilate all the means of grace? Nothing can be more unphilosophical and uncandid, than to insist, as Mr. A. does, throughout his Essay, that the doctrine of the efficient agency of God in the production of human volitions, excludes the use and subordinate agency of means, me. tives and instruments,

Thirdly. As additional evidence, that the doctrine of divine efficiency is unphilosophical, Mr. A. says, "This theory is doing violence to the universal opinion of mankind and the dictates of common sense." Mr. A. is here a little too fast, in using the term universal; for no violence is done to the opinion of Dr. Emmons, or of Mr. Weeks, or of thousands besides, by the theory in question. But, perhaps, these men have been so long plunged in "metaphysical deeps," as to have lost their common sense. Mr. A. adds, "To make this appear, we will state a case." The case is that of a man, with his hand in a kettle of boiling lead. That the agency of God should be necessary to cause in this man a desire or volition to pull out his hand, Mr. A. says, "shocks all common sense." How does this appear? Why should it be more shocking to common sense, to say that this man's volition to withdraw his hand, is caused by divine agency; than to say that the fall of a sparrow or the ascent of vapours is thus caused? If a man, in such a predicament, should not have a desire to withdraw his hand, it would, indeed, shock common sense; because it would be contrary to common observation. But, if to sup: pose that the desire, in such a case, as well as others, has a cause, and that the cause is the agency of God, shocks common sense; then common sense is shocked with the doctrine of the Bible, which teaches us, that men are not suffic ent of themselves even to think a thought; that by God they are moved; and that God workc'h all in all. But, suppose the doctrine of di,