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reafon to fuppofe he has renounced the pretention.

The drefs of the women Nio is far from being difagreeable. They wear only a plain waistcoat which thews their fhape without any conftraint; and their petticoats are fort enough to bring their modely in question, if this circumitance is not confidered as an indication of the purity of their manners: but though they are not able to indulge much in the article of drefs, they nevertheless do not violate the general rules of decency

The regular manners and behaviour of thefeiflanders one among another, with their kind treatment of trangers, revives an idea of the fimplicity of the primitive ages. Men, women, and children appear eager to do any good offices for travellers, without permitting their fervants to share in their diligence This benevolent di polition is without any mixture of impertinent cu

riofity or interest, but is the genuine remains of ancient hofpitality. An ingenious Gentleman who was lately on the ifland experienced the truth of this reprefentation. He could not prevail on any of them to accept the leaft pecuniary recompence for their trouble; they only required an atteftation of the welcome he received, their character in this respect feeming to be what thefe honest people chiefly prided themfelves in. It may be truly affirmed that hofpitality is the point of honour in the Eaft; and that this virtue is conftitutional in the Greeks: fince we find it in modern, as well as in remote times, under their tyrannical Government as well as in their Republican ages; under the Chriftian and Mahometan Faiths, as well as under Paganifm. The Greeks inherit hospitality from their ancellors; the Turks derive it from their religion.

COOL THOUGHTS on the Confequences to GREAT BRITAIN of AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE, &c.

ROM the local and peculiar circum

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#tances of Great Britain, from the effets of Colonization, from the nature of commerce, and from the fluctuating nature of foreign, and the great fecurity of colonial trade, the author of this tract has fhewn that the lofs of that country will involve the decay, if not the ruin of the best fources of wealth and ftrength in the poffeffion of the British empire, in the following paffages:

IT is impoffible for a pe fon who is acquainted with the commercial history of Europe, and will trace the progreffive rife of the different focieties from poverty to opulence, and from weakness to ftrength, not to acknowledge thefe truths, or not to fee what must have been the fate of this ifland, had not the wifdom of our ancestors promoted the fettlement of Colonies, and acquired foreign dominions. The power of France and Spain would have been conftantly growing to their prefent magnitude and importance, and would even have exceeded what it is at prefent. France, in particular, would have been in poffeffion of all North-America, the East and Weft Indies. The numbers of her people-the extent of her dominions-her refources of commerce and wealth and her naval power, would have been immenfely increafed, while thofe of Great Britain muft, at least, have remained nearly in the state they were in two hundred years ago; and if her fovereignty, as an independent ftate,

fhould have been maintained, he would now be no more than a DWARF among NATIONS, dependent on the will and power of others for her exiflence.

Indeed it is impoffible to say where the confequences might have ended, had Great Britain fuffered the neighbouring States to extend their dominions by the fertleinent of Colonies, without purfuing the fame policy. The univerfal Monarchy of Europe has been long the favourite object of French ambition. Attempts to obtain it have been repeatedly made. Great Britain, by the Arength derived, in a great meature, from her Plantations, has been enabled to fruftrate them. Had thefe Plantations been in the poffeffion of France, with the advantages arifing from their commerce, wealth, and naval force, it is not an improbable conjecture, that she would have fucceeded in her defign; nor is it lefs probable, that fhould France and America bereafter have

it in their power to establish an offenfive and defenfive alliance, however the former may have hitherto failed in her grand scheme of univerfal Monarchy, this connection may, at fome future, and not very diftant period, enable her to accomplish it. Such treaties will naturally coincide with their fever 1 views and interefts, as foon as American Independence fhall be acknowledged by the Powers in Europe. America will naturally wish, while the is rifing from her infant tute into opulence and power, to cover her dominions under the protection of France; F

and

and France will find new refources of ftrength in American commerce, armies, and naval force,

The recovery of America from the difafters and diftreffes of war will be rapid and fudden. Very unlike an old country, whole population is full, and whofe cultivation, commerce, and firength, have arrived at their height, the multiplication of her numbers, and the increase of her power, will furpass all expectation. If her fudden growth has already exceeded the most fanguine ideas, it is certain that the increase of her ftrength, when fupported and affitted by France, and pushed forward by the powerful motives arifing from her feparate intereft, her own prefervation, and the profpect of her own rifing glory and importance among nations, will far outrun any idea we have had of her late popula tion.

Nor will it be the intereft of America to check the ambition of France, while confined to Europe. Her diftance, and the fafety arifing from it, will render her regardless of the fate of nations on this fide of the Atlantic, as foon as her own strength fhall be eftablished. The profperity or ruin of kingdoms, from whofe power the can have nothing to fear, and whofe af fistance he can never want, will be matters of equal indifference. She can with for no other connection with Europe, than that of commerce; and this will be betier fecured in the hands of an ally, than in thofe with whom he holds no other connection; fo that it will be of little moment to her, whether Great Britain, Spain, Holland, Germany, or Ruffia, shall be ruled by one or more Monarchs. From thefe confiderations, her interference to deftroy the balance of power in Europe, and to promote the fcheme of univerfal Monarchy in her ally, is rather to be expected, than to fupport the one or to check the other. Should this be the cafe, it is impoffible to forefee how far the ruinous effects of Bourbon ambition may be extended in Europe.

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And there can be no doubt, but the views of ambition, and a defire to extend their dominions, will equally prevail in the confederated Colonies. The mines of gold and filver, in South America, will be objects of irresistible temptation. fifted by the power of France, or even without it, they will be able, in no great fpace of time, to reduce the Brazils, Mexico, Chili, and Peru, and to acquire univerfal dominion over all America. However conjectural these researches into futurity may be, they are far from being

unnatural: and although they are delivered with that diffidence which becomes a perfon looking into future events, which may be defeated by a variety of accidental and unforeseen causes, yet I cannot help thinking they deserve, at the present conjuncture, the ferious confideration not only of Great Britain, but of the other Powers in Europe.

ους.

The foreign trade of all countries ever was, and must be, fluctuating and precariWe have formerly feen a balance of 500,000l. annually returned in our trade with Turky; but this trade has been to affected by the intrigues of France, and other accidental circumftances, that it is difficult to fay on which fide the balance prevails. The trade to Portugal was lately a favourite and profitable one; infomuch that we have not only defended it, but Portugal itself, with our fleets and armies; and yet that Court, forgetting the protection it has received, and regardless of its treaties with Great Britain, has erected tribunals and companies inconfiftent with thofe treaties, under which the British merchants have been defrauded of their capita's, and our commerce with that country is languishing into decay. Innumerable inflances might be adduced to thew the uncertainty and fluctuating nature of commerce, depending upon the caprice and pleasure of a foreign State; but these will fuffice to prove, that nations are not bound by the obligations of gratitude; that there are no ties held facred between them which are not founded in intereft; and that no treaties are longer binding than that intereft prevails. The factions, or change in the circumftances of a foreign country, whether real or imaginary, the intrigues of our enemies, the jealoufy and unprovoked enmity of our allies, the death of a King, or change of a Minier, are so many cirsumftances upon which the security of our foreign trade muft ever depend. Any one of them may suddenly blast it. The direct reverse is true in refpect to our Colonial or Plantation trade. It depends not on the changes or caprice of foreign Councils, nor upon the intrigues of our enemies, nor upon the alteration of the circumstances of a country. It is our own, nor can it be wrested from us but by arms. It is maintained against foreign invafion by our power, and fecured by the laws and political ties of our own fociety, founded on the mutual benefit of both countries, and the united advantage of the whole empire.

The carriage of our Plantation trade is

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alfo onr own. It is made in our own bottoms, which are built by our own carpenters, and navigated by our own mariners. and confequently forms many nurseries of feamen for the fupport of our navy. But our foreign carriage mutt be divided be tween us and the countries with which we trade. If they admit our vefels into their ports, we must return the civility, or lofe

the commerce.

No human ties are fo binding as thofe, founded on intereft. These will unite wil our regulations in fecuring the Plantation trade to this country. Great Britain, from a variety of circumftances, can manufacture and supply America to much greater advantage than America can manufacture for herself; and America, in every relpect, is calculated to raise and furnith Great Britain with thofe raw materials which are neceffary to carry on, to extent and perfection, thofe manufactures.

The Plantations, before the commencement of the rebellion, took off nearly s much of the manufactures of this kingdom as all the world befides; and their confumption will constantly increase, in proportion to the number of their people and to their wealth; nor will they, while dependent on Great Britain, ever be able to manufacture for themselves. Until the country is ful ly fettled, land becomes dear, and labour cheap, it will be impoffib'e. Men will expend their money and labour in that branch of business which is most profitable; and while the man of property can make a greater annual profit, and the labourer can receive greater wages by cultivating the earth, they will never manufacture at a certain lofs: moreover Government will, as heretofore, by judicious restrictions and reafonable encouragement, apply the labour and industry of each country to their proper and most beneficial objects.'

The author of this tract having pointed out the motives which led the Powers in Europe to fettle colonies, and thewn that our commerce with North- America is nearly equal to one half of the whole foreign trade of Great Britain, and, when that of the Weft-Indies is added, to nine four teenths, he proceeds to prove, by a variety of arguments, the dangerous consequences of American independence. He contends, that the British islands in the Weft-Indies muft fall of courfe. The fame power that can compel Great Britain to yield up Ame rica, will compel her to give up the WeltIndies. They are evidently the immediate objects of France, while the looks forward to the advantages which mult accrue from

thefe acquifitions, and the independence of America, viz. the fovereignty of the British feas, if not of G eat Britain itfelf. But if France should fail to obtain the Weft-Indies in the prefent war, America having recovered and increafed her frength, confirmed her confederacy, made her people unanimous, established her navy, and fettled her foreign alliances, all which the may accomplish in a few years, they must be come a part of her union. Nature has planted them in her vicinity. They are as much her appendages, as the Isle of Man or the Orcades are thofe of Great Britain. Befides, the Wett-Indies cannot well fubfift without America. Their supplies of provifions must be obtained from thence and America ilands in equal neceffity of a number of articles which are to be obtained from the West-Indies, and no other county. In either of thefe cafes, what muft become of our manufactures? We know that we receive from these islands certain commodities abfolutely necessary to carry them on to any advantage and extent, and which we can procure from no other country. We must take the remains from Fiance or America, after they have supplied themselves, and fulfilled their contracts with their allies, at their own prices, and loaded with the expence of foreign transportation, if we are permitted to trade for them at all.

Will not Great-Britain lofe much of her independence, in the prefent ftare of Europe, while the is obliged to other countries for her naval flores? It is not long fince fe was obliged to the northern countries for thofe very fupplies, upon which her fafety depended. She had them not within her own dominions, but received them from others at their own prices. We may recolle&, that, in the time of Queen Anne, we paid, at Stockholm, 3. per barrei for pitch and tar, to the extortionate Swede; and that fuch was the fmall demand of thofe countries for the manufactures of this, that the balance of trade was greatly in their favour. The gold and filver, and the wealth of this nation, which we obtained in our other commerce, was continually pouring into their laps. But of late we have greatly reduced that balance, by our impor ration of large quantities of thofe supplies from America.

It has hitherto happened, that, fince we have found it neceflary to increase our naval force to its prefent extent, we have not heen at war with the northern Powers; but how long this may be the cafe, the wifeft man among us cannot foretell. The po F 2

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licy and councils of nations are changed and reverfed by fo great a variety of circumfances, that reafon forbids a reliance on them. A wife State fhould guard against all accidents. We have feen Spain intimately united with Britain, and receiving her independence from our arms, but we now fee her combined with our inveterate enemy, and actually in war against us. The Houfe of Autiria was lately reicued from ruin by the friendship and valeur of Britain; and yet, loft to all fenfe of gratitude, we foon after faw her united against us, with that very enemy from whofe power fhe had been faved. Should a war take place between us and the northern Powers, where are we to procure our naval ftores ? America produces all of them, and can yield more than fufficient for the British navy, and all the British trade. Timber of every kind, iron, faltpetre, tar, pitch, turpentine, and hemp, are raised and manufactured in that country. Fields of 100,000 acres of hemp are to be feen fpontaneoully growing between the Ohio and the Mifffippi, and of a quality little inferior to the European. Naval flores have been already imported, at a price much lower than that of the fame articles from the northern countries. Surely a wife people will readily per ceive the good policy of keeping in their own bands, and at their own command, con med ties which are so immediately ne, ceffary to their fatety.

Should America be independent, and the Weft-1: dies be conquered by France, or annexed to America, all their produce, fecuted to this country by the laws of trade, we moft receive at the bands of France or Amerc, at their own prices, and fubject to the xpence of foreign transportation, or it may be florped at their pleasure; the neceffary consequence of which must be, that the trade of Great Britain will depend on the pleasure of our enemies.

America independent! the Weft-Indies conquered by France, or annexed to America! our fisheries on the banks of Newfoundland, and the American coafts, with all the trade of the West Indies and America, cut off from the British commerce! Where are our nu feries of feamen? Will the coaft trade, and our trade in the Baltic and Mediterranean, with the fmall intercourfe which we have in our own bottoms with other nations, furnish feamen fufficient for a navy neceflary for the protection of Great Britain and its trade? Will the numbers of our mariners, bred and maintained in thefe nurferies, continue as they are at prefent, when our manufacturers are 3

labouring under the difadvantage of receiveing their materials at higher and exorbitant prices, and felling at foreign markets at a certain lofs? Will these nurieries of feamen, I ask, thus weakened, fupply the lafs of 80 000, fuftained by the Independence of America and the conquest of the Weft-Indies? We wanted teamen laft war, although affifted by America and the Welt-Indies; we want them row, to fit out a fleet equal in force to that of our combined enemies. What then must be the fate of our naval force, when fo great a proportion of our leamen are cut off, and thrown into the fcale of our enemies, and when the nurferies which raised them are loft for ever? The answer to this question is as evident as diftreffing. Our navy, the great bulwark of our fately, will be funk into contempt, and the British flag will be no more refpected in the British feas, than the lug-fail of an oyfier-boat.

The forlorn and wretched fate of Britain, before the relied on maritime force for her protection, is to be seen in her hiftory. Continually plundered and ravaged, he was reduced, by foreign invaders, to the laft extremity; and although her Princes foon after found that her fafety depended on that force, and exerted themselves to increase it by every means in their power, yet in the reign of Queen Elizabeth it did not exceed thirty three veffels of war, of an inferior fize; a force by no means equal, in number of mariners and guns, to that of the privateers fitted out in the last war by America alone. By what means has the ftrength of our navy, from that day to this, been increafing to its pretent amazing force Can it be justly imputed to any other than the fettlement of the Colonies, the variety and extent of our foreign commercè in confequence of it, the additional nurseries of feamen, and the great amount of wealth which has been poured into Great Britain by the immediate and circuitous trade of America and the Well-Indies? And when thefe caufes fhall ceafe, will not their ef-, fects ceafe with them? The British navy fhall rapidly fink into decay, while the fleets of her enemies are continually growing up to greater power!

The fatal effects of the frange pofition I am endeavouring to refute do not stop here. The British navy thus weakened, and the fleets of our enemies thus ftrengthened, the latter will ride triumphant in the mouths of our ports and harbours. In time of war our commerce mult ceafe, or be quickly destroyed, and our manufactu rers must farve. The ifles in the British

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