hotice by the affected fingularity of their conceits; to this they add ftrong declamation charged with invective, which, from the irritability of human nature, is well calculated to infure fuccefs. It is ufelefs to enquire if there be Atheifts in the world: that there are men who affect to believe there is no God is certain; that there are many who live as if they do not believe the existence of a God is equally certain: that there are men who, on pretended principles of demonftration, do not believe a God to exift, is uncertain. We know that of civilized Heathens none were fo impious as to deny the existence of fome powerful and immortal Being, which fuperintends this visible world either immediately or by fubordinate agents, if you except thofe fects, whofe abominable maxims were known to excite public indignation, who from the practice of fuch maxims had every thing to fear and nothing to hope. Though the Heathens, abforbed in fenfual pleasures, did not afcribe omnipotence, and all perfections, to the Deity, yet the idea of a God, howe ver disfigured, was not totally effaced from their minds Of apoftates from the Chriftian faith there may be fuch monsters God in punishment of their crimes may fo far extinguish the light of their understanding as to efface his own impreffion from their minds, An Atheist, can he be an honeft man? Yes, if he be not expofed to a delicate or dangerous temptation, with which he may by difhonefty comply, and escape public notice with honor and impunity: if he be honest in fuch a conjuncture he is a fool: why may not the acti ons of an Atheift from fome impulfe of nature be in confiftent with his principles at times, fince we see men who believe a God the avenger of crimes, act inconfiftently with this belief? The Atheift therefore may at times be honeft and upright through an impulfe of na ture, notwithstanding the perverfe tendency of his prin., ciples, tiples, as the Theilt may at times notwithstanding the purity of his principles be depraved through the corrup tion and instability of human nature. This primary agent, on which the vifible world de pends, is of neceffity felf-exiftent, eternal and independent these are perfections, which must be ascribed to a Being poffeffing all poffible perfection: for if you exclude any one of them, you annihilate the idea of a Being infinitely perfect: non-existence deftroys all forts of perfection; and a dependent or temporary existence argues abfolute imperfection, from which a Be ing infinitely perfect is free; our imagination cannot reach eternity, nor can our understanding form an adequate idea of infinite perfection. True, for this fimple reafon, thefe faculties in us are limited and cannot extend beyond their sphere; but our understanding eafily conceives that fome agent must be eternally exiftent, to give existence to the many Beings which now • exift that this agent must be omnipotent, as nothing lefs than omnipotence can give existence to a Being, which had none; that this agent must be omniscient, to determine the nature, the properties, the qualities, the place and pofition of fuch an immense variety of Beings forming one whole, in all its parts fo wonderfully diverfified by the useful and the ornamental; that this agent, infinite in power and wifdom, is infinite in all perfections, because infinity excludes all limitations, and the perfection of any Being is correfpondent to its nature, hence boundlefs perfection in any Being, limited in its nature, is impoffible, and any limitation of perfection in a Being infinite in its nature, is equally impoffible. These are simple truths within the sphere of human understanding. To pretend that we know nothing of a Being, because we cannot form an adequate idea of all its properties, or because our limited understanding cannot Cannot clearly and diftinctly conceive the nature and qualities of any Being, to fay that fuch a Being does not exist, is to contradict the fenfe of mankind: Thus for example though we do not know all the properties of a Dog, we know that a Dog is not a Horfe; and though we cannot form an idea of the nature, or physi cal conftitution of that animal, or determine the fprings which give it motion, we know that there are dogs, and many in the world, and that they are frequently in motion. On the fame principles, though we cannot conceive a distinct idea of the nature and perfections of a primary cause, yet as we fee a visible world, which is not felf-exiftent, which has not made itself, and as we fee the different parts, which compofe this world placed in a certain order, and preserving for ages their relative pofition, knowing that not one of these parts was capable of affuming or preferving its relative pofition, and in fine as we fee all the Heavenly Bodies, thefe vaft maffes of inert matter, placed at fuch an amazing distance one from the other, yet mutually connected and dependent in their motions, we must be ignorant indeed, if we do not know that there exifts a primary cause eternal, independent, omnipotent and omniscient, which gave this vifible world existence, which formed its different parts, placed them in their respective pofitions, established these laws of motion by which the fymmetry and harmony of the whole is preferved. To have rècourfe to an infinite fucceffion of caufes and effects without a primary caufe, ftrongly marks the ignorance of the Atheistical writer. For if it be impoffible for an effect to exift without a cause, it will be at leaft equally impoffible for many effects to exift without a caufe, and the height of abfurdity to pretend, that an infinite number of effects could exift without a cause; which must be the cafe in the fuppofition of an infinite fucceffion, as all the caufes in that fucceffion must have been effects of preceding causes. Hence the Atheist under pretence of removing a difficulty encreases it, or rather makes it infinitely great. To fay nothing of the abfurdity of an infinite fucceffion continually in creafing, as if infinity were capable of any increase. The immutability of this primary caufe is an imme diate and neceffary confequence of the abfolute neceffity of its exiftence for as this caufe is effentially felf-exist. ent, it cannot poffibly cease to exift, no more than a cir cle can cease to be round; and as no being either crea ted or increated is in exiftence without properties correspondent to its nature, hence it follows that the prc. perties or perfections of an increated and eternal Being are increated and eternal, the perfections of a Being ef fentially exiftent, are effentially exiftent, cannot of course cease to exist, cân neither increase nor diminish, this primary cause therefore cannot ceafe to be, nor are its perfections fubject to the fhadow of mutation. Juftice, wisdom, goodnefs, &c. in created Spirits are accidental qualities, because their fpirits are in their nature contingent, and from a ftaté of non-existence, have been by the almighty power of à primary cause brought into exiftence; their qualities are correfpon dent to their nature, they may exift, or ceafe to exist, and confequently increafe or diminish; but in God this primary caufe there are no accidental qualities: They are incompatible with the divine nature. God is not faid to be good and just as if goodness and justice were qualities inherent in him; but because that he is in himself the fource of all goodness, and the fountain of all juftice. He is equally immutable in his decrees: for as he cannot increase in knowledge, he can have no motive to change, and to change without a motive is an argument of levity inconfiftent with his nature. ( This primary caufe is infinite in its nature and in all its perfections limitation argues a dependence on fome other caufe or receptacle, which in a primary cause is repugnant, and fince the primary cause has not given, nog could not give itself existence, nor properties corre fpondent to its exiftence, it can give them no limitation. The infinitude therefore of its nature and perfections is manifeft. Some perfections, fuch as juftice and mercy infinite, nay feem inconfiftent. To obviate this difficulty, which may embarrass the uninformed mind, it must be confidered that justice is not faid to be infinite because it never remits any part of the penalty, it would confound juftice with cruelty, and totally exclude clemency. In the cafe of vindictive juftice, the only fpecies of justice which can at all be thought inconfiftent with mercy, the punishment of the criminal is intended to fecure tranquility, to fatisfy the injured, and prevent future aggreffion; if these objects be attained without inflicting the whole of the punishment, is not clemency confiftent with juftice? God is faid to be infinitely juft, not because he never forgives, nor remits any part of the punishment due, but becaufe he never remits without fome cause known to his wisdom, which is his rule of action; in like manner he is faid to be infinitely merciful, not because he never punishes; but because there is no crime fo great, which he may not pardon, when he is to forgive, or when he is to punish his infinite wisdom and fovereign will determines. A temporal Prince either through ignorance, or inattention (the refpect due to God's reprefentative, does not permit the writer to make use of a more harfh term) frequent ly pardons regardless of juftice; and as frequently punishes in prejudice of clemency, forgetting that he is bimself fubject to the natural law, and accountable to God, if not to his fubjects, for the use or abufe of the power |