would happen in his own creation. Mr. Bryant treats this notion as an abfurd and impious fuppofition.

Dr. Priestley having confidered the propriety of rewards and panishments, and the foundation of praife and blame, on the fcheme of ncceffity, his antagonist endeavours to prove, that where a man is not his own mafter, he is not refponsible for his actions; and where he is not accountable for his actions, he cannot juftly be the object either of reward or punishment. How, fays he, is praife confiftent with neceffity? and how can any prefent view of things at all affect the will, which is antecedently determined? If the mind has a propenfity to any virtuous action, it was unavoidably impreffed upon it, according to your principles. Whence then the claim to merit and to praife?"

Dr. Prieftley fpends fome pages in fhewing the moral influence of the doctrine of neceffity, and the happy confequences which refult from it. Mr. Bryant inquires, what these happy confequences may poffibly be: but he does not find that his opponent has advanced any thing fatisfactory on this head; and indeed it is molt probable that thefe pretended advantages are only imaginary.

Dr. Prieflley having made it a queftion, in what sense God may be confidered as the author of fin, his opponent thus expoftulates with him on the tendency of his hypothefis :

There is only an alternative, that God either is, or is not, the author of fin and however you may foften things at fetting out, you at last determine, that he is fo in every fenfe," by making him the proper caufe of all evil," p. 125. In this place you go fo far as to fay, that as all evils are fubfervient to greater good, "every thing, without diftinction, may be fafely afcribed to God," p. 115. Surely, Sir, this is as rafh, as it is shocking. How can a perfon of the leaft reverence towards his Creator fuppofe, that the God of all goodness and justice, as well as of all purity and holiness, should have decreed theft, murder, parricide, and every fpecies of cruelty? That he fhould have ordained and appointed pollution, filth, inceft, and every unnatural defire, directed every evil affection of the mind, and, with a high hand, carried every crime into execution? Do not, Sir, think it any want of fortitude in me, if I tremble at the bare recital for it is past expreffion fhocking to conceive the horrid confequences, which neceffarily follow from your principles.'

Dr. Priestley maintains, that the fcriptures are favourable to the doctrine of neceflity. His adverfary, on the contrary, infifts, that the fcriptures teach us a very different leffon.

In the laft fection the author endeavours to fhew, that the boafted doctrine of philofophical neceffity, however it may be foftened and qualified, is no other than the unavoidable predeftination of the Calvinists, and the fate of the Stoics; and confequently that it is by no means new, but has been long fince canvaffed and confuted.

A Letter to Jacob Bryant, Efq. in Defence of Pbilofophical Necef fity. By Jofeph Priestley, LL. D. F. R. S. 8vo. 15. Johnfon.. The author of the Addrefs having affumed what Dr. Priestley is pleased to call a high tone of authority,' and used some se

vere and acrimonious expreffions; having, at the fame time, as he afferts, mistaken or mifreprefented his meaning, the latter introduces his Defence with the following polemical compliments.

"I cannot do lefs than take fome public notice of an Address to me from a perfon fo diftinguifhed in the republic of letters as Mr. Bryant; and had your letter been uniformly respectful, I should have thought my felf honoured by it, though you had differed from me ever fo much in opinion, and had even expreffed ever fo much abhorrence of the doctrine I have maintained. But when you com. pliment me in fome places, and load me with abufe in others, taxing me with felf-fufficiency, arrogance, infincerity, impiety, and infidelity, and treat me with ridicule and farcafm throughout, I think that, on the balance, but little remains due to you on that fcore; though, perhaps, any kind of notice from Mr. Bryant must be fome honour.

It is, however, I affure you, Sir, your name only, together with the folicitation of fome friends, that induces me to take any notice of your Address; and had not a letter to me from yourself accompanied the pamphlet, which is anonymous, I really believe I hould not even have read more than a page or two in the whole work,

So grofs, Sir, and fo uniform has been your misconception of the whole fubject, in all its parts, and fo ftrange has been your mifapprehenfion of my meaning throughout, that I think myself justified in saying, that I have not found one pertinent obfervation in the whole piece. Your ftyle is also affectedly rhetorical, and on that account exceedingly improper for controverfy.

Had there not been an air of ferioufnefs in fome parts of your work (though rhetorical declamation is not the natural expreffion of seriousness) and had you not begun with affuring me, that the doctrine of neceffity was "a fubject you had much considered, and that you had even long ago, for your private fatisfaction, written down your thoughts upon it," and also said, "when you took my treatife in hand, you formed a refolution not to be too hafty in your conclufions, but to read it over with that attention and care which every thing deferves that proceeds from a perfon fo juftly celebrated (you are pleased to fay) as Dr. Priestley ;" I fhould have been apt to imagine, that the pamphlet had been a mere jeu d'efprit, written by way of an experiment, to try how much abfurdity might be passed upon the public under the fanction of fuch a name as yours.

Finding the work to be really your own, that hypothefis must be fet afide; and I am obliged to have recourfe to fome other. But the fact is fo extremely ftrange, that I do not know whether any thing that has occurred to me will throw any light upon it. Two of my conjectures are all that I fhall mention. The first is, that though you fay you formed a resolution not to be too hafty in your conclufions, you did not really execute it. The other is, that you

have been fo bewildered in this bufinefs, that you have neither been able to preserve your temper, nor retain the perfect use of your faculties. For you fay, p. 13, "Your arguments confound, rather than convince; fo that believe me, good Sir, I scarcely know where I am, or upon what ground I ftand."

Upon the whole, this folution, fuggefted by yourself, appears the most probable. Indeed, Sir, in this region of metaphyfics, you have quite loft yourfelf. You do not know where you are, or on what ground you ftand; as I have little doubt of fully fatisfying all competent judges of the fubject, and perhaps even yourself; though, conúdering your age, and your long study of this fubject, I cannc

promife

promife myself much fuccefs, in my attempts to difentangle and new" arrange your ideas.

As to myself, I may, to be sure, be mistaken, but I think that, with respect to this fubject, and your addrefs to me relating to it, I do know perfectly well where I am, and on what ground I ftand. My only difficulty is how to place in the cleareft light a va riety of fallacies and mistakes, that are fufficiently manifeft in every light. It is this choice that breeds all my care. This, Sir, though you may think it faid lightly, I should not advance at random. My letter to you, as well as yours to me, will be open to the public; and my reputation (which I must suppose to be as great as you reprefent it) is at stake.'

The first fection is employed in fettling fome few points, refpecting the candour of the two controverfialists. The fecond is a ftate of the argument, which, Dr. Priestley affirms, his adverfary appears never to have rightly apprehended.

It is not, he fays, that a man has no will at all, or that he can not do whatever he wills or pleafes; but that his volitions are definite in definite circumftances. Therefore, though a man exerts a real and proper volition, it is so circumscribed by the circumftances or motives under which it is made, that it cannot be otherwife than it is.'

He goes on:

"Who, you fay, p. 39, ever afferted that the mind was never under any influence, and that the will was not determined by inotives." What could any neceffarian fay more to his own purpose ? For my own part, I cannot exprefs my own principles in more proper, or more decifive language.

But you add, "the great question is, whether these motives are coercive, whether their influence be irresistible; fo that the mind has no power of election, and cannot by any means reject. You will tell me this is owing to a stronger motive, which overcomes the weaker. This I fhall not controvert." Then, let me tell you, Sir, there is nothing in the whole business that you can controvert, that will be to any purpose.

But I must take in what you fubjoin. "All I now fay is, whatever influence there may be, we are bleffed with reafon, to confider and judge, and have a power to reject or to chufe." But, Sir, does any neceffarian deny that man is endued with reafon? So far is he from denying that confideration and judgment precede volition, and direct it, that this is the very circumftance that his fcheme requires, in order to exclude felf-determination, which it effectually does. Indeed, Sir, here you are got upon clear neceffarian ground, though, being unfortunately bewildered, as you truly fay of yourself, you know not where you are.'

In treating of the chain of causes, Dr. Prieftley fays:

"You, indeed, tell me, Sir, p. 25, that every thought is predetermined, and in every act of volition I am forcibly impelled, fo that I could not, in any instance, have made my election otherwise than I have done. Every movement of the mind, you fay, arifes from a preffing uneafinefs.' By the way this is not what I fay, but what Mr. Locke fays." This theory may appear fpecious, but it feems to run counter to all experiences; and the contrary, if I miftake not, is felf-evident. I fit at this inftant at my eafe, in a calm and difpaffionate state of mind, as you are pleased, Sir, to recom

mend.

mend. I perceive myself at full liberty, and know not of any ex ternal impulfe to determine me either in my thoughts or actions, I purpose to move, but antecedently examine whether I am under any bias or neceflity, or directed by any foreign power. I find none. In the vast series of caufes, fo often mentioned, I do not perceive one that will have any fhare in the effect which I am about to produce. The whole originates in myself, whether I move my body, or my arm, or am content with extending a finger. The like appears in respect to my thoughts. I am here equally free, and among the various objects which are ready at my call, I arbitrarily chufe thofe to which my fancy leads me. You tell me every thought is an effect, and that it is connected with a prior idea, by which it was produced. I cannot fee any fuch uniform affinity or correfpondence, and to give a proof of my liberty and independence, I will for once expatiate freely, and produce a feries of unconnected ideas from my own imagination. I accordingly, without any preffing uneafinefs, think of a tree, of time, of the ocean, of darkness, of a cone, of truth, of a tower, of probability, of Therfites, of love, of Epidaurus, of Socrates, of a mole, of cafuiftry, of the Iliad, of Otaheite, of Tenterden fteeple, of a mole, of a moufe-trap. In doing this I did not find that I was reftrained by any law of nature, or impelled by any foreign power. Nor can I at last perceive that thefe defultory thoughts have the leaft connection with one another, much lefs with any prior ideas. You affure me that they muft unavoidably have a reference, and that they are dependent upon others which have preceded. In fhort, according to your principles, they arofe fo neceffarily in my mind, that four days hence, or five years hence, in the fame circumftances, and with the fame difpofition, I fhould infallibly make the very fame choice. But this feems contrary to experience for though I am as precifely in the fame circumftances as we can fuppofe any man to be, and likewife in the fame difpofition of mind; yet after an interval of a very few minutes, I am not able to go over a fourth part of this feries. And, however cogent the neceffity may be, I can recollect very little more than the mole, and the moufe-trap.'

You think, Sir, that the curious affortment of ideas you have prefented us with had no connection, mediate, you must mean, or immediate. But odd as you, who appear to know fo little of the human mind, may think it, I have no doubt but they really had. Are you sure that you have omitted no other ideas, that might connect thole that you have produced? Or, which you may better recollect, did you at first set them down exactly in the order in which they now ftand? Were not the words love and a tower a little nearer together, and did not the ftory of Hero and Leander occur to you; and are you quite fure that nothing fqueezed in between the mole and the mouse-trap?

• You fay you have placed yourself as precifely in the fame circumftances as we can fuppofe any man to be, and likewife in the fame difpofition of mind. But, Sir, what you may fuppofe to be the fame, may not be precifely fo; and a very flight alteration in the difpofition of your mind, perhaps the pofition of your body, may put the mole in the place of the moufe-trap, or, vice verfa.'

In fpeaking of the divine prefcience, Dr. Priestley fays:

Nothing can be feen to be what it is not, because it would then be what it is not.-If this be juft, it must be true, and no presumption to affert, that the Deity himself cannot fee that to be certain, which is in itself contingent, or that to be contingent, which is abfolutely certain."

He

He adds:

• Mr. Hobbes's argument is a very plain one. Yet it might, perhaps, have been better expreffed as follows: "Whatever God purpofes to accomplish by means of men, they, if they be poffeffed of a felf-determining power, may fruftrate. In which cafe God muft either never foretel any thing, or declare that a thing fhall come to pafs, which, for any thing that he can tell, may never come to pafs

at all."

Here we beg leave to observe, that if the Deity fees into all futurity (and who can prefcribe any limits to infinite wisdom ?) as we fee what is immediately prefent, Hobbes's argument is of no weight, and only founded on our ignorance of the divine foreknowlege.

In the next fection the author defends himself against the charge of infidelity, and concludes in this manner:

The very poor figure you have made in this business (fo little judgment accompanying a boundless imagination) makes me fufpect more than I ever did before, that there may be fomething amifs with your fyftem of mythology. The building you have reared has a fair front, the decorations are fine, and many of the rooms, I doubt not, are well proportioned; but I fufpect the foundation; and it is very poffible that, in fome of my rambles, which are pretty various and excurfive, I may take a walk that way, in order to take a nearer view of it.'

If this menace fhould be put in execution, it may afford fome amufement to the cool by-ftander.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Memoirs of the Rev. Ifaac Watts, D. D. By Thomas Gibbons, D.D. 8vo. 6s. Buckland.

In our review of two volumes, lately published *, intitled, • The Pofthumous Works of the late learned and reverend Ifaac Watts, D. D.' we laid before our readers a fhort account of this eminent writer, extracted from that publication; we fhall therefore pass over thefe Memoirs, without giving ourselves the trouble of epitomizing their contents.

The lives of many learned men, exclufive of their literary productions, may be comprifed in a few pages. The life of Dr. Watts is of this nature: he paffed his time in a peaceful retirement, in a faithful difcharge of his private duties, and his paftoral office, and in the publication of many valuable writings, in various departments of literature †.

The author of thefe Memoirs, having given us an account of the life and character of Dr. Watts, endeavours to fhew the excellence of his compofitions, both in profe and verse, by producing feveral paffages from his works.

To thefe Memoirs he has fubjoined a confiderable number of felect Letters, written to Dr. Watts by perfons of eminence at that time: as, the late archbishop Secker, with whom he appears to have been acquainted in 1711; Dr. Hort, archbishop of Tuam; Dr. Gibfon, bishop of London; Frances, countefs of

Crit. Rev. Nov. 1779 † His works make fix vols. in quarto.

Hert