at laft acquiefce in the idea of an uncaufed intelligent cause of this univerfe, and of all the intermediate finite causes, be they ever fo many. What analogy is there in any of those wild fuppofitions to any thing that actually exifts?

On this fide there is only a difficulty of conceiving, but nothing contrary to our experience, and there is plainly no other choice left us. Our experience relates only to fuch things as are incapable of comprehending themselves, or finite, and therefore require a caufe. Confequently, though this experience furnishes a fufficient analogy for judging concerning all other things which have the fame property, it by no means furnifhes any ana logy by which to judge concerning what is totally different from any thing to which our experience extends; things not finite, but infinite, not deftitute of original felf.comprehenfion, but poffeffed of it. Here is fo great a difference, that as the one muft neceffarily be caufed, the other may be neceffarily uncaused.

• Though nothing can properly help our conception in a cafe fo much above the reach of our faculties, it may not be amiss to have recourse to any thing in the leaft degree fimilar, though equally incomprehenfible, as it may make it easier to us to acquiefce in our neceffary want of comprehenfion on the subject. Now, in fome refpects, the idea of fpace, though not intelligent, and therefore incapable of felf-comprehenfion, and no caufe of any thing, is fimilar to that of the intelligent caufe of all things, in that it is neceffarily infinite, and uncaufed. For the ideas of the creation, or of the annihilation of space, are equally inadmiffible. Though we may, in our imagination, exclude from exiftence every thing elfe, ftill the idea of space will remain. We cannot, even in idea, suppose it not to have been, not to be infinite, or not to be uncaufed. Now it may be, in fact, as impoffible that an intelligent infinite being should not exist, as that infinite space thould not exift, though we are necessarily incapable of perceiving that it must be fo.'

In a fubfequent letter he farther obferves, that our want of comprehenfion does not invalidate our conclufion in favour of an uncaused being,

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It is of no avail to fay, that we have no conception concerning the original exiftence of fuch a being, for having no idea at all of any thing implies no impoffibility, or contradiction whatever. This is mere ignorance, and an ignorance which, circumftanced as we are, we can never overcome; and the actual phenomena cannot be accounted for without the fuppofition of fuch a being. Incomprehenfible as it may be in ever fo many refpects, it is an hypothefis that is abfolutely neceffary to account for evident facts. We may, therefore, give what scope we will to our astonishment, and admiration, yet believe (if we be guided by a demonftrative evidence) we muft.'

Here we beg leave to observe, that the doctor's reasoning in this paffage coincides wirh our remark at the beginning of this article, relative to the ftupidity or the perverfeness of the unbeliever, and his groundless pretenfions to the title of philofopher.

Having by thefe, and other arguments, endeavoured to prove the existence of an original intelligent caufe of the univerfe, the author, in the next place, confiders his attributes. One of his arguments in favour of the general benevolence of the Deity is as follows:

To judge of the intention of the creator, we should not only confider the actual state of things, but take in as much as we can of the tendencies of things in future. Now, it requires but little judgment to fee that the world is in a ftate of melioration, in a variety of respects; and for the fame reafon, it will probably continue to improve, and perhaps without limits; so that our pofterity have a much better prospect before them than we have had.

A great proportion of the mifery of man is owing to ignorance, and it cannot be denied that the world grows wifer every day. Phyficians and furgeons know how much lefs men suffer now than they did in fimilar cafes formerly, owing to improvements in the science of medicine, and in furgical operations. To read the methods of the ancients with regard to the ftone in the bladder, is enough to fill one with horror. It was not till the time of Celfus that the practice of extracting the ftone was known; and till of late years in comparison, it was not expected that one in twenty of those who fubmitted to the operation would recover; whereas it is now a tolerably fafe operation; and befides, we are not without the hope of difcovering methods of diffolving the ftone, without pain, in the bladder. This is only one of many inftances of improvements that leffen the fufferings

of mankind. This fkill is indeed in a manner confined to Europeans, but thefe occupy a confiderable part of the globe, and the knowledge of Europeans will, no doubt, gradually extend over the whole world.

• Civilization and good government have made great advances in Europe, and by means of this men live in a state of much greater fecurity and happiness; and even the intercourfe between diftant places, and diftant countries, is both fafe and pleasurable; whereas in former times, this intercourfe was hardly practicable. Let any perfon read the ftate of Italy, and that of the continent of Europe in general, in the times of Petrarch, and he will be fatisfied that the prefent ftate of things is a paradife in comparison with it.

• War is unspeakably lefs dreadful than formerly, though it is a great evil ftill; and as true political knowledge advances, and the advantages of commerce, which fuppofes a peaceable intercourfe, are more experienced, it is fairly to be prefumed, that

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wars will not fail to be lefs frequent, as well as lefs fanguinary fo that focieties of men, as well as families and individuals, will find it to be their common intereft to be good neighbours, and national jealoufy will give place to national generofity.

The progrefs of knowledge, and other caufes, have greatly improved the fpirit of the various religions that have prevailed in the world. Thofe peculiarly horrid modes of religion which enjoined human facrifices, as well as many abominable practices, have been long extinct; and perfecution to death for conscience fake, by which the world suffered so much under the pagan Roman emperors, and even the philofophical and mild Marcus Aurelius, as well as in the days of papal tyranny, and under other ecclefiaftical hierarchies, we have reafon to think, will hardly ever be revived; the folly as well as the cruelty of these practices is fo generally acknowledged. In confequence of this greater liberty of fpeculating upon all fubjects, truth has a much fairer chance of prevailing in the world; and the knowledge and general fpread of truth cannot fail to be attended with a great variety of advantages, favourable to the virtue and happiness of mankind.

• We have no occafion to confider by what particular means thefe advantages have accrued to mankind: for whatever the secondary caufes may have been, they could not have operated without the kind provifion of the first and proper cause of all; and therefore, they are to be confidered as arguments of his benevolence, or of the preference that he gives to happiness before mifery.'

The author proceeds to fhew, that, notwithstanding fome feemingly contrary appearances, this benevolence may, in a fufficiently proper fenfe, be confidered as infinite. He then ftates the arguments in favour of God's moral government, and the future existence of man.

In the ninth and tenth letters, he examines the doctrines advanced by Mr. Hume in his Dialogues on Natural Religion, and in his Effay on a particular Providence and a Future State. -In this examination he expreffes the moft contemptuous opinion of Mr. Hume, and feems to think that he could not have maintained fo many abfurdities, if he had given himself the trouble to read Dr. Hartley's Obfervations on Man.

The doctrine of affociation of ideas (he fays) as explained and extended by Dr. Hartley, fupplies materials for the most fatisfactory folution of almoft all the difficulties he has started; fo that to a perfon acquainted with this theory of the human mind, Mr. Hume's Effays appear the mereft trifling. Compared with Dr. Hartley, I confider Mr. Hume as not even a child.'

Letter XI. contains fome animadverfions on the Systeme de la Nature, a performance which is confidered by many perfons as a kind of bible of atheism.

In demonftrating the being and attributes of God, the friends of religion have purfued different courfes. Drs. Reid, Beattie, and Ofwald, have maintained, that the belief of a God is an inftin&tive principle. Defcartes thought, that the very idea of a God was a fufficient proof of his existence. And the celebrated Dr. Clarke attempted to prove his being by arguments à priori. Our author confiders all thefe as fallacious methods of reasoning, and concludes his animadverfions on the arguments à priori with thefe general obfervations:

If the whole of what Dr. Clarke has advanced, on the proof of the being of a God be attentively confidered, it will not be very easy to fay what his idea of God, as proved a priori, is. It is that of a being felf-existent, eternal, and co-extended with infinite space, but not fpace. It is the caufe of all things, but without power, intelligence, or moral attributes; for these he makes to depend upon the perceived relation of things. Confequently, they pre-fuppofe intelligence, which he acknowledges cannot be proved a priori.

In fact, therefore, he proved nothing a priori but mere being, without any proper powers whatever. But the terms, being, or fubftance, give no ideas at all, when divefted of powers or properties. So that, in reality, notwithstanding his affertion of the contrary, it is nothing but empty space that he is capable of proving a priori. And, with refpect to this, I perfectly agree with him; because, do what we will, we cannot fo much as fuppofe infinite and eternal space not to have exifted.

Far, however, am I from faying that a deity, an efficient deity, with all his attributes, is not, properly fpeaking, neceffarily exiftent; or that his existence is not, in reality, as neceffary as that of space itself. But then we come to the knowledge of this neceffity, with refpect to him, in a different manner. It is by beginning a posteriori, finding that, in confequence of the actual exiftence of beings that must have had a caufe, there muft have been fome being that could not have had a caufe, though we are altogether at a lofs to conceive, a priori, how, or why, he fhould exift without a caufe, and can in idea eafily imagine him not to have existed, which is not the cafe with respect to space. Then, the neceffary existence of a fupreme caufe once fuppofed, there are various attributes, as thofe of eternity, immenfity, and unity, that may either with certainty, or with the greatest probability, be deduced from the confideration of neceffary exiftence.

But though to us, and our conceptions, there be this difference between the idea of the existence of space, and of that of the deity, there may not be any in reality. Indeed the deity could not have been neceffarily exiftent, if there had not been, in the nature of things, if we may ufe the phrafe (which, however, can only be improperly applied in this cafe) as much reafon for his exiflence, as for that of fpace. But neither the term reason,

nor

nor any thing equivalent to it, ought, in ftrictness, to be used in this cafe, left it should imply, contrary to the fuppofition, that there is fome proper caufe of the divine existence; whereas he cannot have had any caufe.

On this account, I dislike the phraseology of Dr. Clark, when he fometimes fpeaks of neceffity being the cause of the divine exiftence. Indeed the whole of our language is fo appropriated to finite and caused beings, that it is hardly poffible to use any part of it in fpeaking with ftrict propriety of a being infinite and uncaufed. We should, therefore, forgive one another any overfights of this nature that we inadvertently fall into.'

The laft letter is a critical review of Mr. Hume's Philofophical Effays. In the courfe of this examination, the author gives his reasons for the general cenfure which he has passed upon him in a former letter; and, before he takes his leave, brings him down from that eminence to which, in his opinion, he has been undefervedly raised; strips him of his laurels, lays him proftrate at his feet, and thus, like fome of the heroes of antiquity, triumphs over his fallen adverfary.

I have given you my reafons, as briefly as I well could, for placing Mr. Hume fo low as I do in the clafs of metaphyfical writers, or moral philofophers. As to natural philofophy, or mathematics, I never heard that he had any pretenfions to merit; and of that which conftitutes an hiftorian, you will not, I imagine, think that much remains to him, befides that of a pleafing compiler, after reading Dr. Towers's judicious Remarks on his Hiftory of England*. His Mifcellaneous and Political Effays always pleafed me, but they by no means intitle him to the first rank among writers of either clafs. As to his ftyle, notwithftanding its excellence in fome refpects, I have fhewn in my English grammar (and, as I have been informed, to Mr. Hume's own fatisfaction) that he has departed farther from the true idiom of the English language, than perhaps any other writer of note in the present age.'

This publication is only a part of the author's defign. If it fhould be favourably received, he intends to go on, and confider the fpeculative difficulties which attend the doctrines of revelation.

The Art of War; a Poem, in fix Books; tranflated from the French of the King of Pruffia: With a Critique on the Poem, by the Comie Algarotti, tranflated from the Italian. 4to. 2s. 6d. Riley.

WHAT great men are Reviewers, to give laws to majefty, and fit in judgment upon kings! upon an arbitrary monarch too, whofe fingle nod, if we were in his dominions,

See Crit. Rev. vol. xlv. p. 289.
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