by one of their laws, are barbarians. Impius hæc tam culta novalia miles habebit? Barbarus has segetes? I our brethren feel and resent the affront and injury now offered to this town; if they realize of how great importance it is to the liberties of all America that Boston should sustain this shock with dignity; if they recollect their own resolutions, to defend the public liberty at the expense of their fortunes and lives, they cannot fail to contribute their aid, by a temporary suspension of their trade.

I am your friend,

SAMUEL ADAMS.

James Warren, Esq.

LETTER FROM JOSEPH HAWLEY TO THOMAS

CUSHING.

THIS Letter is transcribed from Vol. 193, Massachusetts Archives, pp. 33-38. The following is the Resolve of Congress, to which the Letter alludes, which was passed October 8, 1774: "Resolved, That this Congress approve the opposition of the inhabitants of the Massachusetts Bay, to the execution of the late Acts of Parliament; and if the same shall be attempted to be carried into execution by force, in such case all America ought to support them in their opposition." R. F., JR.

DEAR SIR,

Northampton, Feb. 22, 1775.

Since I left Cambridge, I have had many thoughts on the state of this Province and continent; and suffer me to say, Sir, that the time is in fact arrived, when we are to drop all chimerical plans, and in our contemplations thoroughly to think down, and pervade every step that is proposed for practice; to judge of its practicability, and, as far as possible, to view all its consequences. With this conviction, I have been most seriously contemplating the commission and most important trust of our Committee of Safety, and especially that branch of it which relates to their mustering the minute men and others of the militia, when they shall judge that the late Acts of Parliament, viz. the regulation act and the murder act, are attempted to be carried into execution by force.

A most critical, most important, most arduous trust this. Here let me observe, that the soldiers, when thus mustered by the said Committee, who have this power devolved on them by the representative body of the Province, will suppose it is their duty to fight; they therefore will only deliberate how to fight to advantage. They will not consider the question, whether or not the time is, that

they ought to fight; they will suppose that the continent have devolved the resolution of that question upon this Province; and that this Province have devolved it on the Committee of Safety; and that the Committee, by calling them, have decided it. They will judge, that if they should decline fighting, when they are called for that intent, their honor and courage will be impeached. The soldier, therefore, will probably, at all events, fall on. Thus hostilities will be commenced, which we must suppose will, thenceforward continue, and be most vigorously pushed, until the fate of America be decided; hostilities, in which we must have a vigorous and persevering assistance of the other Colonies, or we must sink under them. Suffer me then to ask, whether it will not be the height of presumption to enter on such a scene with no other assurance or security of such effectual and continued aids as will be absolutely necessary, than what is contained in a resolution of about six lines, and they consisting of terms and expressions not the most definite, or of certain and precise meaning.

The words used in the resolution, to state the case wherein hostilities are to be commenced, are, in my opinion, by far too loose, to wit, "When the acts shall be attempted to be carried into execution by force;" as well as the words made use to secure the aid of the Colonies, to wit, "All America ought to support them in such opposition: not that they will actually support them, but a mere declaration that it would be reasonable and just that such support should be afforded. Is this a treaty offensive and defensive, of sufficient precision to make us secure of the effectual aid of the other Colonies in a war with Great Britain? Besides, by whom was this declaration or engagement, such as it is, made? Was it by Delegates specially authorized and instructed to make an engagement of this sort? Who knows whether the respective constituent bodies will avow this declaration? Moreover, it ought to be well considered, with regard to all the other Colonies, excepting Connecticut and Rhode Island, what situation they are in, to make an engagement of this sort, in case they were generally disposed to come into it. Don't we all say that this Province cannot levy, subsist and pay an

army sufficient to afford us any hope of present resistance, without a Legislature which the people will cheerfully submit to? Is not that precisely the case with all the other Colonies, the two abovementioned excepted? Have they not as much to do to assume a new government, every one of them, in order to levy, subsist and pay their respective quotas of an army, as we have? Nay, would not the success of an attempt of this sort be more precarious in every one of them than in this Province, as their people cannot be supposed so thoroughly to apprehend the necessity of it as ours may be supposed to do? Are they oppressed and affected by the new measures as we are? Will not their Governors obstruct, and labor to embarrass, every attempt of the kind as much as ours? Will they not have as many friends to government to assist them as there are here? Can it, therefore, be much short of madness and infatuation in us, to enter on a scene of this sort, in the present state of affairs? Nay, is it not obvious, therefore, that actual hostilities must be suspended, if possible, until the continent, by their representatives, shall, in the most explicit manner, in fact say, that the moment is actually arrived when the scene shall open?

No one, I presume, will say, that it will be found policy for us to enter on hostilities with only some prospect of such donations, from the other Colonies, to support the war, as have been made and are making, for the support of the poor of Boston. Does it not infinitely import us to admit these and many more considerations into our minds, before we enter upon lasting, most important hostilities? When once the blow is struck, it must be followed, and we must conquer, or all is lost forever. If we are not supported, perseveringly supported, by divers other Colonies, can we expect any thing else than in a short time to fall a prey to our enemies? May GOD make us consider it. Should large numbers of men come voluntarily into the province service, unless they should have been regularly raised, and proper provision made for their subsistence, and magazines of ammunition provided by the Colony, from whence they come, will they do any more than just look on us, turn about, and hasten home as fast as they came? In

order, therefore, for the necessary establishment of auxiliary troops, (as I said before,) must not the other Colonies assume new forms of government, as well as we? Is it to be supposed that all this can be done suddenly? We know, that according to their present respective constitutions, nothing of the sort above mentioned, to wit, the levying, subsisting, and paying of troops, can be done in a governmental way. When we shall have once made the hostile attack, we are, thenceforward, to look for nothing but fire and sword, until we have conquered or are ourselves vanquished. Therefore, if we, by order of our Committee of Safety, should begin the attack, and so bring on hostilities before the general and express consent of the Colonies that hostilities were altogether unavoidable, and that the time to commence them is absolutely arrived, and that we are actually ready, I conceive that there will be infinite hazard that the other governments will say, that we have unnecessarily and madly plunged into war, and therefore must get out of the scrape as we can; and we shall have no other aid from them, only from some warm people, who will resort to us in a fit of zeal, and soon return home again, as fast as they came, without affording us any real service, but will leave us in a worse state than we should have been if they had never come. I know your concern will be, that if we proceed in this deliberate way, the spirit of our people will evaporate and be lost. But let me assure you, that there is no danger of that. If I can make any judgment, all the danger is on the other hand; that our people will rashly and headily rush into hostilities before they can be upheld and supported; they will consequently fail of success; the tide will then turn; a very low ebb will succeed the high tide of flood; they will then give all up; and the good cause will be lost forever.

I beg of you, therefore, as you love your country, to use your utmost influence with our Committee of Safety, that our people be not mustered and that hostilities be not commenced, until we have the express categorical decision of the continent, that the time is absolutely come that hostilities ought to begin, and that they will support us in