that order before he had any acquaintance with them, or existence of himself; which is a question God puts to Job, to consider of (Job xxxviii. 4): 'Where wast thou when I laid the foundation of the earth? declare, if thou hast understanding.' All is ordered for man's use; the heavens answer to the earth, as a roof to a floor, both composing a delightful habitation for man; vapours ascend from the earth, and the heaven concocts them, and returns them back in welcome showers for the supplying of the earth. The light of the sun descends to beautify the earth, and employs its heat to midwife its fruits, and this for the good of the community, whereof man is the head; and though all creatures have distinct natures, and must act for particular ends, according to the law of their creation, yet there is a joint combination for the good of the whole, as the common end; just as all the rivers in the world, from what part soever they come, whether north or south, fall into the sea, for the supply of that mass of waters, which loudly proclaims some infinitely wise nature, who made those things in so exact an harmony. 'As in a clock, the hammer which strikes the bell leads us to the next wheel, that to another, the little wheel to a greater, whence it derives its motion, this at last to the spring, which acquaints us that there was some artist that framed them in this subordination to one another, for this orderly motion.'e

(4.) This order or subserviency is regular and uniform; every thing is determined to its peculiar nature. The sun and moon make day and night, months and years, determine the seasons, never are defective in coming back to their station and place; they wander not from their roads, shock not against one another, nor hinder one another in the functions assigned them. From a small grain or seed, a tree springs, with body, root, bark, leaves, fruit of the same shape, figure, smell, taste; that there should be as many parts in one, as in all of the same kind, and no more; and that in the womb of a sensitive creature, should be formed one of the same kind, with all the due members, and no more; and the creature that produceth it knows not how it is formed, or how it is perfected. If we say this is nature, this nature is an intelligent being; if not, how can it direct all causes to such uniform ends? if it be intelligent, this nature must be the same we call God, who ordered every herb to yield seed, and every fruit tree to yield fruit after its kind, and also every beast, and every creeping thing after its kind.' (Gen. i. 11, 12, 24.) And every thing is determined to its particular season; the sap riseth from the root at its appointed time, enlivening and clothing the branches with a new garment at such a time of the sun's returning, not wholly hindered by any accidental coldness of the weather, it being often colder at its return, than it was at the sun's departure. All things have their seasons of flourishing, budding, blossoming, bringing forth fruit; they ripen in their seasons, cast their leaves at the same time, throw off their old clothes, and in the spring appear with new garments, but still in the same fashion. The winds and the rain have their seasons, and seem to be administered by laws for the profit of man. No satisfactory cause of those things can be ascribed to the earth, the sea, to the air, or stars. 'Can any understand the spreading of his clouds, or the noise of his tabernacle?' (Job xxxviii. 29.) The natural reason of those things cannot be demonstrated, without recourse to an infinite and intelligent being; nothing can be rendered capable of the direction of those things but a God.

This regularity in plants and animals is in all nations. The heavens have the same motion in all parts of the world; all men have the same law of nature in their mind; all creatures are stamped with the same law of creation. In all parts the same creatures serve for the same use; and though there be different creatures in India and Europe, yet they have the same subordination, the same subserviency to one another, and ultimately to man; which shows that there is a Ged, and but one God, who tunes all those different strings to the same notes in all places. Is it nature merely conducts these natural causes in due measures to their proper effects, without interfering with one another? Can mere nature be the cause of those musical proportions of time? You may as well conceive a lute to sound its own strings without the hand of an artist; a city well governed without a governor; an army keep its stations without a general, as imagine so exact an order without an orderer. Would any man, when he hears a clock strike, by fit intervals, the hour of the day, imagine this regularity in it without the direction of one that had (d) Jer. x. 13. (e) Morn. de Verit. c. 1. p. 7. (ƒ) Amirant. (g) Coccei. sum. Theol. c. 8. § 77.

understanding to manage it? He would not only regard the motion of the clock, but commend the diligence of the clock-keeper.

(5.) This order and subserviency is constant. Children change the customs and manners of their fathers; magistrates change the laws they have received from their ancestors, and enact new ones in their room: but in the world all things consist as they were created at the beginning; the law of nature in the creatures hath met with no change. Who can behold the sun rising in the morning, the moon shining in the night, increasing and decreasing in its due spaces, the stars in their regular motions night after night, for all ages, and yet deny a President over them? And this motion of the heavenly bodies, being contrary to the nature of other creatures, who move in order to rest, must be from some higher cause. But those, ever since the settling in their places, have been perpetually rounding the world, What nature, but one powerful and intelligent, could give that perpetual motion to the sun, which being bigger than the earth a hundred sixty-six times, runs many thousand miles with a mighty swiftness in the space of an hour, with an unwearied diligence performing its daily task, and, as a strong man, rejoicing to run its race, for above five thousand years together, without intermission, but in the time of Joshua? It is not nature's sun, but God's sun, which he makes to rise upon the just and unjust.' So a plant receives its nourishment from the earth, sends forth its juice to every branch, forms a bud which spreads it into a blossom and flower; the leaves of this drop off, and leave a fruit of the same colour and taste, every year, which, being ripened by the sun, leaves seeds behind it for the propagation of its like, which contains in the nature of it the same kind of buds, blossoms, fruit, which were before; and being nourished in the womb of the earth, and quickened by the power of the sun, discovers itself at length, in all the progresses and motions which its predecessor did. Thus in all ages, in all places, every year it performs the same task, spins out fruit of the same colour, taste, virtue, to refresh the several creatures for which they are provided. This settled state of things comes from that God who laid the foundations of the earth,' that it should not be removed' for ever; and set ordinances for them' to act by a stated law; " according to which they move as if they understood themselves to have made a covenant with their Creator.o

6

3. Add to this union of contrary qualities, and the subserviency of one thing to another, the admirable variety and diversity of things in the world. What variety of metals, living creatures, plants! what variety and distinction in the shape of their leaves, flowers, smell, resulting from them! Who can number up the several sorts of beasts on the earth, birds in the air, fish in the sea? How various are their motions! Some creep, some go, some fly, some swim; and in all this variety each creature hath organs or members, fitted for their peculiar motion. If you consider the multitude of stars, which shine like jewels in the heavens, their different magnitudes, or the variety of colours in the flowers and tapestry of the earth, you could no more conclude they made themselves, or were made by chance, than you can imagine a piece of arras, with a diversity of figures and colours, either wove itself, or were knit together by hazard.

How delicious is the sap of the vine, when turned into wine, above that of a crab! Both have the same womb of earth to conceive them, both agree in the nature of wood and twigs, as channels to convey it into fruit. What is that which makes the one so sweet, the other so sour, or makes that sweet which was a few weeks before unpleasantly sharp? Is it the earth? No: they both have the same soil; the branches may touch each other; the strings of their roots may, under ground, entwine about one another. Is it the sun? both have the same beams. Why is not the taste and colour of the one as gratifying as the other? Is it the root? the taste of that is far different from that of the fruit it bears. Why do they not, when they have the same soil, the same sun, and stand near one another, borrow something from one another's natures? No reason can be rendered, but that there is a God of infinite wisdom hath determined this variety, and bound up the nature of each creature within itself. Every thing follows the law of its creation; and it is worthy observation, that the Creator of them hath not given that

(4) Petav. ex Athanas. Theol. Dog. Tom. I. lib. i. c. 1. § 4. () Whether it be the sun or the earth that moves, it is all one. Whence have either of them this constant and uniform motion? Josh. x. 13. () Matt. v. 45. (m) Psalm civ. 5. (n) Job xxxviii. 33. (0) Jer. xxxiii. 20.

power to animals, which arise from different species, to propagate the like to themselves; as mules, that arise from different species. No reason can be rendered of this, but the fixed determination of the Creator, that those species which were created by him should not be lost in those mixtures which are contrary to the law of the creation.' This cannot possibly be ascribed to that which is commonly called nature, but unto the God of nature, who will not have his creatures exceed their bounds or come short of them.

Now since among those varieties there are some things better than other, yet all are good in their kind, and partake of goodness, there must be something better and more excellent than all those, from whom they derive that goodness, which inheres in their nature and is communicated by them to others: and this excellent Being must inherit, in an eminent way in his own nature, the goodness of all those varieties, since they made not themselves, but were made by another. All that goodness which is scattered in those varieties must be infinitely concentered in that nature, which distributed those various perfections to them (Ps. xciv. 9): 'He that planted the ear, shall not he hear; he that formed the eye, shall not he see; he that teacheth man knowledge, shall not he know? The Creator is greater than the creature, and whatsoever is in his effects, is but an impression of some excellency in himself; there is, therefore, some chief fountain of goodness whence all those various goodnesses in the world do flow.

From all this it follows, if there be an order, and harmony, there must be an Orderer; one that 'made the earth by his power, established the world by his wisdom, and stretched out the heavens by his discretion' (Jer. x. 12). Order being the effect, cannot be the cause of itself: order is the disposition of things to an end, and is not intelligent, but implies an intelligent Orderer; and, therefore, it is as certain that there is a God, as it is certain there is order in the world. Order is an effect of reason and counsel; this reason and counsel must have its residence in some being before this order was fixed: the things ordered are always distinct from that reason and counsel whereby they are ordered, and also after it, as the effect is after the cause. No man begins a piece of work but he hath the model of it in his own mind: no man builds a house, or makes a watch, but he hath the idea or copy of it in his own head. This beautiful world bespeaks an idea of it, or a model: since there is such a magnificent wisdom in the make of each creature, and the proportion of one creature to another, this model must be before the world, as the pattern is always before the thing that is wrought by it. This, therefore, must be in some intelligent and wise agent, and this is God. Since the reason of those things exceed the reason and all the art of man, who can ascribe them to any inferior cause? Chance it could not be; the motions of chance are not constant, and at set seasons, as the motions of creatures are. That which is by chance is contingent, this is necessary; uniformity can never be the birth of chance. Who can imagine that all the parts of a watch can meet together and put themselves in order and motion by chance? 'Nor can it be nature only, which indeed is a disposition of second causes. If nature hath not an understanding, it cannot work such effects. If nature therefore uses counsel to begin a thing, reason to dispose it, art to effect it, virtue to complete it, and power to govern it, why should it be called nature rather than God?' 'Nothing so sure as that which hath an end to which it tends, hath a cause by which it is ordered to that end. Since therefore all things are ordered in subserviency to the good of man, they are so ordered by Him that made both man and them; and man must acknowledge the wisdom and goodness of his Creator, and act in subserviency to his glory, as other creatures act in subserviency to his good. Sensible objects were not made only to gratify the sense of man, but to hand something to his mind as he is a rational creature; to discover God to him as an object of love and desire to be enjoyed. If this be not the effect of it, the order of the creature, as to such an one, is in vain, and falls short of its true end.s

To conclude this: As when a man comes into a palace, built according to the exactest rule of art, and with an unexceptionable conveniency for the inhabitants, he would acknowledge both the being and skill of the builder; so whosoever shall observe the disposition of all the parts of the world, their connexion, comeliness, the variety of seasons, the swarms of different creatures, and the mutual offices they render to one another, cannot conclude less, than that it was contrived by an (p) Amirald. de Trinitate, p. 21. (7) Gen, i. 31. (r) Lactant. (8) Coccei. sum. Theol. c. 8. § 63, 64.

infinite skill, effected by infinite power, and governed by infinite wisdom. None can imagine a ship to be orderly conducted without a pilot; nor the parts of the world to perform their several functions without a wise guide; considering the members of the body cannot perform theirs, without the active presence of the soul. The atheist, then, is a fool to deny that which every creature in his constitution asserts, and thereby renders himself unable to give a satisfactory account of that constant uniformity in the motions of the creatures.

Thirdly, As the production and harmony, so particular creatures, pursuing and attaining their ends, manifest that there is a God. All particular creatures have natural instincts, which move them for some end. The intending of an end is a property of a rational creature; since the lower creatures cannot challenge that title, they must act by the understanding and direction of another; and since man cannot challenge the honour of inspiring the creatures with such instincts, it must be ascribed to some nature infinitely above any creature in understanding. No creature doth determine itself. Why do the fruits and grain of the earth nourish us, when the earth which instrumentally gives them that fitness, cannot nourish us, but because their several ends are determined by one higher than the world?

1. Several creatures have several natures. How soon will all creatures, as soon as they see the light, move to that whereby they must live, and make use of the natural arms God hath given their kind, for their defence, before they are grown to any maturity to afford them that defence! The Scripture makes the appetite of infants to their milk a foundation of the divine glory, (Ps. viii. 3), Out of the mouths of babes and sucklings hast thou ordained strength;' that is, matter of praise and acknowledgment of God, in the natural appetite they have to their milk and their relish of it. All creatures have a natural affection to their young ones; all young ones by a natural instinct, move to, and receive the nourishment that is proper for them; some are their own physicians, as well as their own caterers, and naturally discern what preserves them in life, and what restores them when sick. The swallow flies to its celandine, and the toad hastens to its plantain. Can we behold the spider's nets, or silkworm's web, the bee's closets, or the ant's granaries, without acknowledging a higher being than a creature who hath planted that genius in them? The consideration of the nature of several creatures God commended to Job, (chap. xxxix., where he discourseth to Job of the natural instincts of the goat, the ostrich, horse, and eagle, &c.) to persuade him to the acknowledgment and admiration of God, and humiliation of himself. The spider, as if it understood the art of weaving, fits its web both for its own habitation, and a net to catch its prey. The bee builds a cell which serves for chambers to reside in, and a repository for its provision. Birds are observed to build their nests with a clammy matter without, for the firmer duration of it, and with a soft moss and down within, for the conveniency and warmth of their young. The stork knows his appointed time' (Jer. viii. 7), and the swallows observe the time of their coming; they go and return according to the seasons of the year; this they gain not by consideration, it descends to them with their nature; they neither gain nor increase it by rational deductions. It is not in vain to speak of these. How little do we improve by meditation those objects which daily offer themselves to our view, full of instructions for us! And our Saviour sends his disciples to spell God in the lilies.t It is observed also, that the creatures offensive to man go single; if they went by troops, they would bring destruction upon man and beast; this is the nature of them, for the preservation of others.

2. They know not their end. They have a law in their natures, but have no rational understanding, either of the end to which they are appointed, or the means fit to attain it; they naturally do what they do, and move by no counsel of their own, but by a law impressed by some higher hand upon their natures. What plant knows why it strikes its root into the earth? doth it understand what storms it is to contest with? Or why it shoots up its branches towards heaven? doth it know it needs the droppings of the clouds to preserve itself, and make it fruitful? These are acts of understanding; the root is downward to preserve its own standing, the branches upward to preserve other creatures; this understanding is not in the creature itself, but originally in another. Thunders and tempests know not why they are sent; yet by the direction of a mighty hand, they are instruments of

(1) Matt. vi. 28.

justice upon a wicked world. Rational creatures that act for some end, and know
the end they aim at, yet know not the manner of the natural motion of the
members to it. When we intend to look upon a thing, we take no counsel about
the natural motion of our eyes, we know not all the principles of their operations,
or how that dull matter whereof our bodies are composed, is subject to the order
of our minds. We are not of counsel with our stomachs about the concoction of
our meat, or the distribution of the nourishing juice to the several parts of the
body. Neither the mother nor the foetus sit in council how the formation
should be made in the womb. We know no more than a plant knows what
stature it is of, and what medicinal virtue its fruit hath for the good of man; yet
all those natural operations are perfectly directed to their proper end, by an higher
wisdom than any human understanding is able to conceive, since they exceed the
ability of an inanimate or fleshly nature, yea, and the wisdom of a man.
Do we
not often see reasonable creatures acting for one end, and perfecting a higher than
what they aimed at or could suspect? When Joseph's brethren sold him for a
slave, their end was to be rid of an informer; but the action issued in preparing
him to be the preserver of them and their families. Cyrus's end was to be a
conqueror, but the action ended in being the Jews' deliverer (Prov. xvi. 9). 'A
man's heart deviseth his way, but the Lord directs his steps.'

3. Therefore there is some superior understanding and nature which so acts
them. That which acts for an end unknown to itself, depends upon some over-
ruling wisdom that knows that end. Who should direct them in all those ends,
but He that bestowed a being upon them for those ends; who knows what is
convenient for their life, security and propagation of their natures? An exact
knowledge is necessary both of what is agreeable to them, and the means whereby
they must attain it, which, since it is not inherent in them, is in that wise God,
who puts those instincts into them, and governs them in the exercise of them to
such ends. Any man that sees a dart flung, knows it cannot hit the mark
without the skill and strength of an archer; or he that sees the hand of a dial
pointing to the hours successively, knows that the dial is ignorant of its own end,
and is disposed and directed in that motion by another. All creatures ignorant of
their own natures, could not universally in the whole kind, and in every climate
and country, without any difference in the whole world, tend to a certain end, if
some over-ruling wisdom did not preside over the world and guide them and if
the creatures have a Conductor, they have a Creator; all things are 'turned round
about by his counsel, that they may do whatsoever he commands them, upon the
face of the world in the earth.'a So that in this respect the folly of atheism
appears. Without the owning a God, no account can be given of those actions of
creatures, that are an imitation of reason. To say the bees, &c. are rational, is to
equal them to man: nay, make them his superiors, since they do more by nature
than the wisest man can do by art: it is their own counsel whereby they act, or
another's; if it be their own, they are reasonable creatures; if by another's, it is
not mere nature that is necessary; then other creatures would not be without the
same skill, there would be no difference among them. If nature be restrained by
another, it hath a superior; if not, it is a free agent; it is an understanding Being
that directs them; and then it is something superior to all creatures in the world;
and by this, therefore, we may ascend to the acknowledgment of the necessity of a God.
Fourthly. Add to the production and order of the world and the creatures acting
for their end, the preservation of them. Nothing can depend upon itself in its
preservation, no more than it could in its being. If the order of the world was
not fixed by itself, the preservation of that order cannot be continued by itself.
Though the matter of the world after creation cannot return to that nothing
whence it was fetched, without the power of God that made it, (because the same
power is as requisite to reduce a thing to nothing as to raise a thing from nothing,)
yet without the actual exerting of a power that made the creatures, they would fall
into confusion. Those contesting qualities which are in every part of it, could not
have preserved, but would have consumed, and extinguished one another, and
reduced the world to that confused chaos, wherein it was before the Spirit move
upon the waters: as contrary parts could not have met together in one form, unles
(x) Peirson on the Creed, p. 35. (y) Gen. xxxvii.
(a) Job xxxvii. 12.

(u) Coccei. sum. Theolog. c. 8. § 67, &c. (z) Lessius de Providen. lib, i. p. 652.