SERMON CXVII.

SIXTH COMMANDMENT.-SUICIDE.

EXODUS XI. 13.-Thou shalt not kill.

THE next violation of this Command, which I shall have occasion to consider, is Suicide, or Self-Murder. In examining this subject I shall,

I. Consider the principal arguments, urged in Justification of Suicide: and,

II. Shall allege several Proofs of its Criminality.

Before I proceed to the consideration of the arguments, which have been supposed to justify Suicide, it will be necessary to observe, that there are two, totally distinct classes of mankind, by which this crime is committed: those who are labouring under the disease of melancholy, or that of derangement; and those, who act, in the same manner, in the full possession of their faculties. In the former of these classes the mental powers are so much disordered, as greatly to change, if not absolutely to annihilate, the criminality. The latter are guilty of this crime, in the same sense as of any other. To the former class, it is obvious, arguments on this or any other topic can be of no use; if addressed to them while under the influence of these infirmities. An habitual conviction of the turpitude of this crime, established in their minds, when possessed of their full strength and soundness, may, indeed, and not improbably, so far influence them, as to prevent this terrible catastrophe. In their diseased state, such of them, as have fallen under my observation, have been incapable of being controlled by the force of argument. The observations, which I shall make concerning this subject, will, therefore, be directed to those of the latter class: to men, who, in the full possession of their reason, from sudden passion, from disappointment in the pursuit of some darling object; such as Fame, Power, Wealth, or Pleasure; the loss of some important enjoyment; the sufferance of some severe disgrace; or the dread of some expected evil, put an end to their lives. These men, though acting thus irrationally under the pressure of violent feeling, may yet be reasoned with in their cooler moments. In these moments a conviction may, perhaps, be wrought, and principles established in their minds, which may control the distempered thoughts, and prevent the dangerous decisions, too naturally springing up in seasons of violent agitation.

VOL. III.

47

The general doctrine, insisted on by Mr. Hume, the only writer whom I shall attempt to answer, or whom I consider as having any claim to answer, on this subject, is, that man has a right to dispose of his own life. This he asserts in various forms of expression; all of them contributing to show, that he considered this right, as to be exercised according to the pleasure of the individual. Indeed, if such a right exists; the exercise of it cannot be limited in any other manner; unless the limitation be directly expressed by Him, who alone can give, or limit, the right. But no such limitation has been expressed by Him. In the Scriptures this is not even alluded to; and, whatever proof the Light of Nature may furnish, that God has given us this right, there cannot be a pretence, that it discovers to us any such limitation. The right itself, therefore, is to be exercised according to every man's judgment; or, what will in this case be exactly the same, according to every man's pleasure.

But where is the proof, that God has given this right to mankind? The arguments, which Mr. Hume adduces to this purpose, are chiefly the following.

1. That we were created for the end of effectuating our own enjoyment in the present life. "Men," he says, "are intrusted to their own judgment and discretion, and may employ every faculty, with which they are endowed, to provide for their ease, happiness, or preservation."

In a former discourse I have explained the end, for which man was made; and have, I trust, satisfactorily proved, that man was created to glorify his Maker by knowing, reverencing, loving, serving, and enjoying, him for ever. The accomplishment of this end in the Creation of Man I have, unless I have been deceived, shown to be in the highest degree honourable to God, and in the highest degree productive of happiness to man. That this end, whether the real end, for which man was created, or not, is incomparably nobler, better, and more worthy of God, than the end proposed by Mr. Hume, which is no other than the enjoyment of the pleasures of sense in this world, cannot be denied. No more can it be denied, that of the ends, which were capable of being answered by the creation of man, God selected that, which was noblest, best, and most worthy of His character; unless it be also denied, not only that He is Infinitely Wise and Good, but that He is Wise and Good at all. As, therefore, there are ends, for which man might be created, nobler, and better, than that alleged by Mr. Hume; as one, Infinitely nobler, and better, has been pointed out; it is certain, that that, proposed by him, is not the true end of the creation of man.

Besides; the enjoyment of this pleasure in the manner, exhibited by Mr. Hume himself, is inconsistent with the existence of virtue in man; and much more with the existence of perfect virtue. But to be virtuous is to render more honour to our Creator, to be

more conformed to His pleasure, and to enjoy more happiness, than is possible, if we are destitute of virtue. To be perfectly virtuous is to render the highest honour to our Creator; to be perfectly conformed to his pleasure; and to be perfectly happy. If, then, God regarded either Himself, or us; He did not propose, as the end of creating man, the enjoyment of the happiness, mentioned by Mr. Hume.

2. Mr. Hume alleges, as another argument for this right, the Insignificance of human life. "In the sight of God," he says, "every event is alike important: and the life of a man is of no greater importance to the Universe, than that of an oyster."

Our Saviour informs us, on the contrary, that men are of more value in the sight of God than many sparrows. Common sense irresistibly subscribes to the truth of this declaration. It is impossible to believe the contrary declaration. God unquestionably sees things as they are. But, as unquestionably, a mind, possessed of the powers of thought, volition, and motivity; a mind, capable of knowing, and in many instances actually knowing, loving, serving, and glorifying, its Creator; a mind, which can originate, and diffuse, important good to its fellow-creatures; a mind, formed for Immortal being, and destined to an endless improvement in knowledge, virtue, and enjoyment; is certainly of more value than many oysters. All this, however, depends on the life of man. The life of man, therefore, is of more value than that of an oyster. Were it not; parents, so far as the light of nature teaches us, might, in agreement with the doctrine of Diogenes, and other Cynics, lawfully roast, and eat, their children; as lawfully, as they may now roast, and eat, oysters. A man of common sense would hardly be persuaded, that Moses, Paul, Louis the Good, the two Gustavuses, Alfred the Great, and Washington, were of no more importance to the Universe, than oysters. With a view, probably, to strengthen this allegation, Mr. Hume asks, "Where is the crime of turning a few ounces of blood out of their channel?" By this question he undoubtedly intends, that his readers shall suppose Suicide to be nothing more, than merely diverting the course of a few ounces of blood. If Mr. Hume believed this; he deserved very little of that reputation, which he has acquired for understanding. If he did not believe it; the question does very little honour to his candour, or sincerity. It is no crime to turn a few ounces of blood out of the channel. Often it is a duty; because it is the means of preserving, or restoring, health. Many ounces of blood may be thus diverted from their course; and life be not only continued, but invigorated, and prolonged. In this case, the sphere of man's usefulness, and duty, and comfort, may in this world be enlarged; and his happiness in the world to come secured, and increased. But the destruction of human life, by whatever means it is accomplished, terminates usefulness, duty, and comfort, in the present world; and, if voluntarily accomplished,

The

prevents the existence of happiness in the world to come. difference between these things, as intended by Mr. Hume, is of course infinite. The phraseology, which appropriately expresses the one, cannot, therefore, be employed, consistently with propriety, nor with even vulgar honesty, to denote the other.

3. The same writer argues this right from the Smallness of the Objects, and Accidents, by which the life of man is frequently destroyed without his concurrence. "A hair," he says, "a fly, an insect, is able to destroy this mighty being, whose life is of such importance. Is it an absurdity then," he asks, "to suppose, that human prudence may lawfully dispose of what depends on such insignificant causes ?"

To this question the reply is easy, and complete.

The destruction of human life by a fly, an insect, or a hair, is accomplished, as every man perfectly well knows, and as every man habitually says, by the immediate Providence of God. In the case of Suicide, it is destroyed by the will of man himself. God, who gave life, has an unquestionable right to take it away. It is yet to be proved, that man, who has only received it from God, has a right to destroy it without the known permission of its Author.

4. This assertion is, however, denied by Mr. Hume; and he directly declares, that Suicide is as absolutely the work of God, as any of those events, specified under the preceding head. "When I fall upon my own sword;" he says, "I receive my death equally from the hands of the Deity, as if it had proceeded from a lion, a precipice, or a fever."

Mr. Hume does not, in this Essay, any where, in form, discuss the question, Whether man is a moral agent, in such a sense, as to be accountable for his actions, and to be deserving of praise or blame, punishment or reward. But it is evident, that he all along proceeds upon the supposition, that man is not such an agent. Of this he has given very numerous, and very plain, indications. A very clear and decisive one is found in the declaration, which I am now considering. If man is not such an agent; all the observations in this Essay might have been spared. For, plainly, no action of man could, in this case, be of a criminal, because, it could not be of a moral, nature. In this case, it would be equally just to censure a post, or a wall, for falling upon a man, and killing him, as to censure an assassin, for producing the same catastrophe by an act of murder. If a man be not such an agent; all inquiries concerning the moral nature of his actions are nugatory; because they are unmeaning. Mr. Hume, particularly, ought never to have written the numerous things, which he has so strenuously urged concerning right and wrong, in the different parts of his Works. Neither rectitude, nor its opposite, are predicable of brutes. Why? Because they are not moral agents. If men are not moral agents; neither would these attributes be any more pre

dicable of them. But if men are moral agents; then those, which are called human actions, are not in any such sense the acts of God, as to prevent men from being accountable for them, or to prevent them from being truly commendable, and rewardable, for one class of such actions, and blameworthy, and punishable, for the opposite. All nations, in all ages, have accordingly censured, and punished, such as were guilty of one class of these actions, and praised, and rewarded, such as performed the other. On this foundation rests all human intercourse, and all human discipline. The child is punished at home, and at school; because he is considered as having done that which is wrong; and rewarded in both, because he is considered as having done that which is right. On the same grounds men are disesteemed, hated, censured, and punished even with death; or approved, loved, applauded, and have their merit acknowledged by the most ample reward. As this has been the universal conduct of men from the beginning; it is a clear and full testimony of the views, entertained by the human mind concerning this subject. It is further to be observed, that men cannot act in any other manner. The admission of the doctrine, that mankind are not such agents, would ruin the world. Nor ought it to be forgotten, that, although many persons have thought proper to assert this doctrine, not an individual among them has ever been found, who acted in conformity to it: not one, who did not as bitterly complain of what he called wrongs, or vindicate as strenuously what he called his rights, as his fellow-men. But, should we admit this argument, it will prove more, than either we, or even Mr. Hume, may be aware of; at least, more than he intended. If men are not moral agents; if their voluntary actions are merely the acts of God; then it will follow, that equally with Suicide, their frauds, lies, oppressions, and murders, are acts of God. Should a swindler cheat Mr. Hume out of his estate; or an assassin plunge a poniard into his bosom; it would, I think, be a very odd, a very unsatisfactory, consolation to him, to be told by the villain, that he ought to be perfectly contented with the villainy, since it was only an act of his Creator.

5. Another argument, alleged by Mr. Hume for the right in question, is, that Suicide does not disturb the Order of the Universe. "There is no being," he says, "which by ever so irregular an action can encroach upon the plan of the Creator's Providence, or disorder the Universe."

If Mr. Hume intended by this declaration, that God rules all things with such an universal and absolute dominion, as that none can stay His Hand, nor any being lawfully say unto Him, What doest Thou? as that he will bring "good out of the evil, and order out of the confusion," occasioned by sin; he has undoubtedly declared, here, a truth of high importance. Unfortunately for him, however, this truth will contribute nothing to the support of