ently be reserved for the present section, being neceffary for explaining the fubjects to which they relate; the final caufe for instance of erecting a standard of morals upon the common fenfe of mankind. I proceed now to what have not been mentioned, or but slightly mentioned.

The final cause that presents itself first to view, refpects man confidered as an accountable being. The sense of being accountable, is one of our most vigilant guards against the filent attacks of vice. When a temptation moves me, it immediately occurs, What will the world fay? I imagine my friends expoftulating, my enemies reviling-it would be in vain to diffemble-my fpirits fink-the temptation vanifhes. 2dly, Praife and blame, efpecially from those we regard, are strong incentives to virtue: but if we were not accountable for our conduct, praise and blame would feldom be well directed; for how fhall a man's intentions be known, without calling him to account? And praise or blame, frequently ill-directed, would lose their influence. branch of our nature, is the corner-ftone

3dly, This

of

of the criminal law. Did not a man think himself accountable to all the world, and to his judge in a peculiar manner, it would be natural for him to think, that the juftest sentence pronounced against him, is oppreffion, not justice. 4thly, It promotes fociety. If we were not accountable beings, thofe connected by blood, or by country, would be no lefs fhy and referved, than if they were utter ftrangers to each other.

it

The final caufe that next occurs, being

fimple and obvious, is mentioned only that may not feem to have been overlooked. All right actions are agreeable, all wrong actions, difagreeable. This is a wife appointment of Providence. We meet with fo many temptations against duty, that it is not always easy to persevere in the right path: would we perfevere, were duty difagreeable? And were acts of pure benevolence difagreeable, they would be rare, however worthy of praise.

Another final caufe refpects duty, in contradiftinction to pure benevolence. All the moral laws are founded on intuitive perception; and are fo fimple and plain, as to be perfectly apprehended by the most ignorant.

ignorant. Were they in any degree complex or obfcure, they would be perverted by selfishness and prejudice. No conviction inferior to what is afforded by intuitive perception, could produce in mankind a common fenfe in moral duties. Reafon would afford no general conviction; because that faculty is distributed in portions fo unequal, as to bar all hopes from it of uniformity either in practice or in opinion. We are taught befide by woful experience, that reafon even the most convincing, has no commanding influence over the greater part of men. Reason, it is true, aided by experience, fupports morality; by convincing us, that we cannot be happy if we abandon duty for any other interest. But conviction feldom weighs much against imperious paflion; to control which the vigorous and commanding principle of duty is requifite, directed by the fhining light of intuition.

A propofition laid down above, appears a fort of mystery in the moral fyftem, That tho' evidently all moral duties are contrived for promoting the general good,

that a choice is not permitted among yet different goods, or between good and ill;

but

but that we are strictly tied down to perform or forbear certain particular acts, without regard to confequences; or, in other words, that we must not do wrong, whatever good it may produce. The final cause I am about to unfold, will clear this mystery, and fet the beauty of the moral fyftem in a confpicuous light. I begin with obferving, that as the general good of mankind, or even of the fociety we live in, refults from many and various circumftances intricately combined; it is far above the capacity of man, to judge in every instance what particular action will tend the moft to that end. The authorifing therefore a man to trace out his duty by weighing endless circumftances good and ill, would open a wide door to partiality and paffion, and often lead him unwittingly to prefer the preponderating ill, under a falfe appearance of being the greater good. At that rate, the opinions of men about right and wrong, would be as various as their faces; which, as obferved above, would totally unhinge fociety. It is better ordered by Providence even for the general good, that, avoiding complex and obfcure objects, we are di

rected by the moral fenfe to perform certain plain and fimple acts, which admit no ambiguity.

In the next place, To permit ill in order to produce greater good, may fuit a being of univerfal benevolence; but is repugnant to the nature of man, compofed of selfish and benevolent principles. We have seen above, that the true moral balance depends on a fubordination of selflove to duty, and of difcretionary benevolence to felf-love; and accordingly every man is fenfible of injuftice when he is hurt in order to benefit another. Were it a rule in fociety, That a greater good to any other would make it an act of justice to deprive me of my life, of my reputation, or of my property, I fhould renounce the fociety of men, and affociate with more harmless animals.

Thirdly, The true moral fyftem, that which is difplay'd above, is not only better fuited to the nature of man and to his limited capacity, but contributes more to the general good, which I now proceed to demonftrate. It would be lofing time to prove, that one entirely felfifh is ill fitted VOL. IV.

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