not clogged with any terms or conditions whatsoever, they must certainly, in a popular manner of speaking, choose the former. But truly and properly there would be no choice at all, as that implies any thing of difficulty or trial, or moral merit in choosing the good part. This, therefore, in the very nature and reason of things, cannot be the case in a state of probation; in which God tries or proves his creatures, that he may know (that is, that it may be known, that it may plainly appear) what is in their hearts, and how they will act. And if this cannot be the case, what constitution of things would you expect, or require, to answer this purpose, but such an one as we actually find in fact? In which, things are so contrived, good and evil, natural and moral, are so mixed and adjusted, that men are by no means necessitated to choose either the one or the other; but are left to such a free exercise of their liberty, in the determination of their elections, as renders them strictly of moral consideration. A state of happiness or misery, immutable and final, is fairly proposed to them; that is, they really have their choice of them; not immediately and absolutely, without any conditions, but as depending on the choice how they will lead their lives. It is too little to say, that in forming this most important election they are entirely free; they are, moreover, excited to form it right, by all the motives and arguments which can influence the hearts of reasonable creatures. No expedient, one may say, has been left unattempted, but all engines have been set to work, to induce them to choose that good part, which shall not be taken away from them 8. It is on this footing that

8 Luke x. 42.

the scriptures always represent men's destruction, as proceeding from themselves: they sow to themselves in wickedness, and they reap the fruit of their own elections. How can this be prevented? They must not be deprived of this elective power, and rendered incapable of either virtue or vice. And the nature of things cannot be so destroyed or confounded, as to hinder the consequences from taking place, or to make them reap what they did not sow. I add further, that

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The misery which they thus bring upon themselves, so far from supposing God to delight in cruelty and barbarity, ("the most savage cruelty and barbarity possible h,") is inflicted by him, or rather is executed in the natural consequences of things, without any emotions of anger, rage, or fury; but as the effect of justice, and wisdom, and goodness itself; and therefore fixes no imputation of cruelty, injustice, or tyranny upon God. The punishments are in no sense or degree the effects of malice, revenge, or a tyrannical humour, or of any passions whatsoever; (none of which are in God;) so that there is no reason to suspect that they will be excessive or unjust, or beyond what reason and truth require. The Letter Writer, whom I mentioned before, insists upon this principle, and thinks it of advantage to his cause. "If divine justice,” he says ',

h Mr. Whiston, p. 137.

i Letter I. What he here says about "millions of creatures" is agreeable to his constant manner of representing the case. The miserable are always with him "myriads," and the like; in comparison of whom the blessed in heaven are but a "6 'handful of "men," a "small number of the elect:" in which representation there is no sense.

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"is not really attended, either with hatred, fury, or revenge, but is inseparable from infinite goodness; "can we conceive it will condemn millions of crea

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tures, formed after God's image, to dreadful and never-ending misery; and even doom them to the "hatred of God, to rage, to despair, and blasphemy "for all eternity?" This writer should have considered, that "divine justice," which "is inseparable "from infinite goodness," and which he compares to "a perfectly equal balance, which inclines to one "side only by the force of the weight put into one "scale," being, on the "supposition," entirely free from all passion, could condemn them, at first, to nothing but what was just and right: and as there was nothing done in the first allotment of their state but what was just and right, justice can see no reason to alter it, any more than the balance can alter its determination while the weight continues as it did before. If their punishment was the result of passion, it might alter; for what is more changeable than passion? But when it proceeds from immutable principles, the infinite perfections of God, and the eternal reasons of things, it will be as im

The Judge of the world will say to the wicked at the last day, Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, &c. And they shall go away into everlasting punishment. We agree that neither this sentence, nor the execution of it, is the effect of passion. Can this be of any advantage to his cause? Can there be any reason to reverse a sentence, pronounced so righteously? Or to put a stop to the execution of what is awarded by pure justice and truth itself, without the mixture of any passion, or wrong bias, whatsoever? The only way, by which any release or relief can come, must be by their amendment; which I have said something to already, and must consider more minutely in the next chapter, when I come to examine this author's system of the restoration.

mutable as they are; unless the reason of the case (the weight in the scale) should be altered, by a change of the moral character of the creatures concerned; which we have no reason to expect. But this author, by an odd confusion of ideas, at the same time that he is supposing no passions in God, seems to represent him as if he acted passionately, and "doomed" his creatures to a more "dreadful" state of misery than they deserved, or than divine justice, which is inseparable from infinite goodness, will permit. Upon this supposition it is reasonable to presume, that when his passion abated, or his revenge was gratified, he would contrive some method to relieve them; but this is by no means the case. Nor is the author consistent with himself, when he represents "divine justice" as "dooming them to the ha"tred of God," &c. For in the paragraph immediately before, he goes so far as to say, "The torments "it seems to inflict upon sinners do not proceed "from justice, but from themselves, who lay up "treasures of wrath, Rom. ii. They alone feed the "worm that must gnaw them, and pile up com"bustible materials for the fire that must burn "them." It is certain that it was not God, but themselves, who were the cause of their "hatred of "God:" and if this which was their crime, continues to be their punishment, it is no more than what is agreeable to the constitution of things, and the appointment of Providence, which makes sin the punishment of itself.

When these considerations are laid together, and are allowed their due weight, without prejudice or passion; nothing more, I conceive, will be needful to defend our doctrine, or make it appear consistent

with reason for that, it is to be remembered, is the point in view; not to prove it from reason, but to reconcile it with it, and with our natural notions of God's perfections. The proper proof arises from the scriptures; to them we appealed, and by them we must be determined; provided only that the case be not, in the very nature of it, incapable of proof, by being plainly absurd, or contradictory to some clear principle of reason. This, I think, is not the case of the doctrine of the eternity of future punishment. It appears to be consistent at least with reason; and if reason does not gainsay or contradict it, and scripture asserts and teaches it, we can reasonably ask no more1. The latter of these points is considered in the two former chapters, and the first in the present. If the principles laid down be true, I think they are sufficient to justify the conduct of Providence on this head. And our adversaries themselves, one or other of them, bear testimony to the truth of all, or most of them; as might be proved, if that was necessary, from their own plain concessions. Even the first, which is as it were the pillar and ground of all, is allowed by Mr. Whiston; and must, in consistency with themselves, by all who are in the hypothesis of annihilation: because it cannot be conceived that God would annihilate any intelligent beings, if they were good for any thing, or capable of being made better.

This makes it very different from the case of transubstantiation, with which our adversaries affect to compare it. See Burnet, p. 302. Whiston, p. 2. Transubstantiation is plainly contrary to sense and reason, and is built upon one figurative expression of scripture the doctrine here asserted is not contrary to sense or reason, is taught in variety of plain expressions, and countenanced by the whole tenor of scripture.