cy is as much concerned in their bad, as in their " good actions."*

This master-piece of ingenuity and effrontery, requires a close and particular examination. I begin with the insidious inference, "Since the scripture ascribes all the actions of men to God, as well as to themselves, &c." But from whence is this inference derived? Is it immediately from plain and positive assertions of scripture? or is it through an obscure, perplexed and impotent medium? or yet, is it from texts of doubtful signification, seemingly on his side, forcibly yoked up with other texts, which openly and unequivocally disclaim all connexion with his cause, his argument, and his inference? His medium and his ground of inference shall each speak for themselves.

His medium. "Here is no difficulty, if we only "allow that there is a propriety sometimes in ascribing "the actions of men wholly to themselves, and some"times in ascribing their actions wholly to God. It "is proper sometimes to ascribe men's good actions

wholly to themselves; and sometimes equally proper "to ascribe their bad actions wholly to themselves. "While on the other hand, it is sometimes proper to "ascribe men's good actions wholly to God; and "sometimes equally proper to ascribe their bad actions "wholly to him." Here we are fatigued with a jabbering of sometimes and sometimes and sometimes, &c. &c. And what is it all for? but, if possible, to manufacture one all times, out of just half a dozen

*Sermon on Genesis, 45, 5. Pages 38, 39,

sometimeses. But as sometimes and sometimes, an hundred times repeated, will not make one all times, it therefore cannot be admitted, that the "Idea" of "the scriptures, ascribing all the actions of men to God," is either a true or a scriptural idea.

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From this despicable medium of inference, we now will resort to the ground from whence derived. And here conforming to the scripture rule of the first being last, and the last becoming first, we shall begin with the apostle James, who, through violence is impressed into this service, and who here, instead of mearly cringing to Hopkinsian authority, boldly enters his protest against it. "Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: For God cannot be tempted "of evil, neither tempteth he any man; but every "man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own "lust, and enticed, &c." (1: 13, 14.) Temptation, in the sense as here used by the apostle, does not so much mean external solicitation to sin, as that internal seduction thereto, whereby the external allurement becomes unhappily effectual. Temptation, externally may be from satan, from wicked men, and from various surrounding enticing objects: but internal effectual seduction, is here taught to be only from the man himself who sins. And it is here as clearly taught, that as God cannot himself be the subject of temptation, so as to be accessible to its defilement; so, that for the very same reasons also, he cannot seduce any of his creatures into that pollution and guilt, which are so perfectly opposite to the immutable holiness of his own nature. And whilst the apostle thus vindicates

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the divine character against all suspicion, so he also most expressly, and in the most peremptory manner, forbids every man from imputing his subjection to sin, to the agency of his creator. But Hopkinsianism long habituated to ascribing the causation of sin to God, and regardless of apostolic reproof, subverts the apostles own doctrine, which denies the sinful actions of men to be the actions of God; by positively asserting it to affirm, what it as positively denies.

That God should so far be concerned in the good actions of pious men, as to command, approve, reward, and occasionally to promote them by a positive exci ting influence, is in no degree incompatible with the divine honour and character. And as such, was taught by this apostle, "do not err my beloved brethren.

Every good gift, and every perfect gift, is from "above, and cometh down from the Father of lights." (James 1, 16, 17.) And from whom also cometh, "the wisdom that is pure, peaceable, gentle, easy to "be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, and "without partiality, and without hypocrisy." (111, 17.)

Such, and such only, are the doctrines taught by this apostle concerning human and divine agency. But the attempt to compel him to teach otherwise, redounds neither to the honour of Hopkinsianism, nor yet to the credit of its most able advocate.

Although these passages thus from James, and the others from Psalms, &c. to be yet considered; were adduced by the doctor, as proofs of all human actions, being God's actions; still they were so adduced, not as principals, but only as auxiliaries; the chief de

pendence being placed in supposed proofs, from the = circumstance of Joseph's brethren selling him into Egypt; from the case likewise, of Pharaoh's refusal to permit the Israelites departure out of Egypt; and also, from the nature of the conduct of Christ's enemies in his sufferings and crucifixion. And this in no small degree accounts for the doctor's great embarrassment, which constrained him to shuffle over and over his sometimes and sometimes, &c. as before noticed. Because his object was to endeavour to prove, what his means of proof could not possibly enable him to effect. For his attempt was to establish a universal proposition by infering it from particular premises. For if he could even have proved, that God irresistibly caused Joseph's brethren to sell him; that he in like manner caused Pharaoh's refusal, and also in like manner caused Christ's enemies to betray and crucify him: Still no universal inference could herefrom regularly have been deduced; because, although, "particular propositions are contained in universals, and may be infered from them; yet universals are not contained, in particulars, nor can be inferred from them." (Watts' Logick.) But it is the doctor's infelicity, that even these particular propositions cannot be so proved, as to constitute even the limited human actions to which they relate, the actions of God. But for proof of this, I must refer you to a future letter on predestination and divine decrees, where this subject will be more largely discussed. And therefore, I shall now proceed to consider the remaining auxiliary texts.

The first of these is Psalm crx, 36, "Incline my heart unto thy testimonies, and not to covetousness." The second being also like this, the words of David, and being nearly similar in signification, I therefore shall consider both under one head. Psalm CXLI, 4, "Incline not my heart to any evil thing, to practise wicked works, with men that work iniquity."

The heart which offered up both of these prayers, was previously inclined to God and to his testimonies : And whilst it was perfectly consistent, that God should in answer to the fervent prayers of such a person, work in him still further to will and do of his good pleasure; so it was no less consistent, that such person distrusting himself, when exposed to seduction from a variety of temptations, should seek assistance from God to enable him to resist the evil. And thus it was, that David prayed, in the former text, for aid against seduction, from objects alluring to covetousness; and in the latter text, for assistance against temptation from vicious example. And with this exposition of these texts, Christ's words in Matthew VI, 13, most exactly agree. "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil." "This might be "translated, and lead us not into temptation, but so as "to deliver us from the evil, either by removing the "temptation itself, when it proves too hard for us, or

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et

by mitigating its force, or by increasing our strength

to resist it, as God shall see most for his glory." (Macknight.) This subject admits of further illustration from Genesis XXII, 4, and from the annexed commentary. "It came to pass that God did tempt