untary exertion, is such an agency as hath moral desert in it." This definition, if correct, would render every beast of the field, every bird of the air, every fish of the sea, and each and every insect and creeping thing, a moral agent deserving of reward or punishment; for every one of them performs "spontaneous, voluntary exertions." The qualifications constituting moral agency are not vague or indeterminate, although they differ in different subjects. God is a moral agent. Adam, in innocency, was a moral agent. He was one after his transgression. His posterity are moral agents, though impressed with marked variety of character. Moral agency in Deity, is always, like himG self, immutable. In mankind, like themselves, tinged with variety of shades; and yet, in some respects, bears striking resemblance to that of God himself.

Edward remarks on some dissimilarities and on some resemblances.

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DISSIMILARITIES.

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"Here it may be noted that there is a circumstan"tial difference between the moral agency of a ruler "and a subject. I call it circumstantial, because it P "lies only in the difference of moral inducements "they are capable of being influenced by, arising from "the difference of circumstances. A ruler, acting in "that capacity only, is not capable of being influenced

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by the sanctions of a moral law, as the subject is. "And therefore the moral agency of the Supreme Be'ing, who acts only in the capacity of a ruler towards "his creatures, and never as a subject, differs in that

respect from the moral agency of created intelligent "beings;" because, "by reason of his being supreme

over all, it is not possible HE should be under the "influence of law or command, promises or threaten"ings, rewards or punishments, counsels or warn'ings."* And besides this circumstantial difference, of being exalted above the inducements resulting from law; there is also a marked real one in this, that moral agency in God is underived; and is "the "source of all ability of moral agency to man.”

RESEMBLANCES.

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"The essential qualities of a moral agent are in "God, in the greatest possible perfection; such as understanding, to perceive the difference of moral good and evil, a capacity of discerning of that moral "worthiness and demerit, by which some things are praise-worthy, others deserving of blame and "ishment; and also a capacity of choice, and choice guided by understanding, and a power of acting according to his choice or pleasure, and being capable "of doing those things which are in the highest sense "praise-worthy. And herein does very much consist "that image of God, wherein he made man (which

we read of Genesis 1, 26, 27, and 1x, 6) by which "God distinguished man from the beasts, viz. in "those faculties and principles of nature, whereby he "is capable of moral agency. Herein very much

*Inquiry, pages 39, 40, Albany edition,

"consists the natural image of God; as his spiritual "and moral image, wherein man was made at first, "consisted in that moral excellency, that he was en"dowed with."* Truly deserving of the strictest attention, is this definition of moral agency. It is indeed verbose, vague and tautological; but all these were necessary to the thing designed. It is explicit and obscure, deep, wary, artful, a very master piece, strikingly characteristick of the genius of its subtile author. In order duly to comprehend it, it is expedient to note and bear in remembrance, that the above definition of moral agency lays claim to its containing within itself, through the medium of the divine character, "the essential qualities of a moral agent in the greatest possible perfection." That it recognises and enumerates distinctly, several of those qualities essential to a moral agent. That one of the qualities deemed most essential to moral agency, is expressed in the obscure terms, of God's "being capable of doing those things, which are in the highest sense praise. worthy;" for neither these things themselves, nor yet, wherein consists the capacity of performing them, is in this definition expressed or intimated.

And lastly, that the foregoing Edwardean definition of moral agency, ascribes to man at his creation, a participation in the character of divine moral agency, whereby God distinguished him from the beasts; but this ascription of moral endowment and resemblance

*Inquiry, page 40, 41.

in Adam to his Creator, is declared in such ambiguous terms, that it is difficult to comprehend what portion of moral faculties, whether the whole, a part, or what part of them, were in the confering of the divine image, impressed upon man. And by a sudden transition from the ideas of moral agency, to the idea of a "natural image of God," as distinct from the divine moral image, the reader becomes bewildered, and at a loss to comprehend what portion of moral faculties were lost at the fall, and whether mankind are now distinguishable from the beasts: For the above mentioned sudden transition, seems to have been made only for the purpose of wresting all claim to moral ability from the non-elest, leaving them, however, invested with such respective portions of natural ability, as should saddle moral condemnation on the shoulders of these wretched elves.

But in order to scrutinize more narrowly this mysterious wheel of the complex engine, we should, laying aside all metaphor, trace with circumspection the essential qualities of moral agency, as distinctly enumerated by Edwards himself, and which deducting tautology and verbosity, consists, first, "in a capacity so to understand between moral good and evil, as to be able to discern betwixt that moral worthiness and demerit, by which some things are praise-worthy, and others deserving of blame and punishment:" Secondly, "in a capacity of choice guided by understanding." And thirdly, "In a power of acting according to choice." These three particulars, according to the above definition, contain the sum total of qualifications

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essential to human moral agency.

And to render them the more important and acceptable, they are declared to exist also in the Deity.And to add yet more to their weight, no other essential qualification of moral agency is explicitly ascribed to God himself. A circumstantial difference of agency betwixt ruler and subject is indeed expressly noted, and the difference betwixt self existent and an imparted power of agency were remarked, and something else was hinted at of Deity "doing those things which in the highest sense are praise-worthy." And with these exceptions, all the other qualifications were, he admits, confered on man. But for what, is all this studied precaution, this circumlocution, this veil of mystery? If to prevent mistake and errour, it is deserving of high praise: but if to entrap, if to deceive his readers by withholding from their inquiring minds, the knowledge and belief of some one quality essential in the very highest degree to moral agency, it must cause regret, that talents so rare and exquisite were thus unhappily enlisted on the side of errour. But of this no doubt can remain; for on the list of qualities essential to moral agency, no mention whatsoever is made of the moral agent being endued with such a capacity as invests him "power over his own will." Had this quality of self government in volitions, or in exertions of the will been omitted in this definition, it would have mutilated the character of divine moral agency; and had it been plainly expressed, it might have frustrated his deep design; he therefore was induced to exhibit it under the disguise of the mysterious expressions,