"Lest any

Mr. J. S. attempts to prove that they are. doubt should remain about the meaning of this word Person, it is immediately after added, that the second person is very God, and the third, very and eternal God. Here there is a being composed of three persons, one of whom is called the living and true God, the other very God, and the last, very and eternal God, and yet these three beings make but One God."

I deny, first, that there are three beings here, for the word being, as I just now observed, imports, in its direct and native meaning nature, and not person, except in an indirect and indeterminate manner. As, therefore, in God, or in the three divine persons, there is but one divine nature or Godhead, there can be but one divine being in them, and, of course. these three, not beings but persons, make but one God, because, they have but one divine nature. Each one of them is God, very God, &c. but, (mark it,) one and the same God with the others, on account of the unity of divine nature, common to all three.

The writer adds, "By the same course of reasoning, it may be made out, that a mile is a league, because a league consists of three miles; or, you might prove, with certain of the ancient Fathers, that three men are one man, having only a ' numerical difference,' and agreeing in "essential essence."

All this may be made out, to men who would be disposed, like the disciples of Pythagoras of old, to receive every paradox on Mr. Sparks's ipse dixit, but not to men who make use even of old logic. For that old kind of logic will point out to Mr. J. S. an immense disparity between the two cases. For a league, being a limited and circumscribed dimension, may be assuredly divided into three different equal parts, called miles, of which it is manifest that one is not the other, and, of course, a mile cannot be a league; as otherwise, one part of the whole, would be equal to the whole, which is a contradiction in the very terms.

On the contrary, the divine nature being infinitely perfect, may be communicated without being divided, to three dis

tinct persons, and, of course, it may be truly said, that these three persons are one, with regard to their nature. In the case of the league and mile, the whole, that is, the league, is divided into its parts: in the Deity, the divine nature is communicated without division, and is possessed whole and entire by each person.

Cudworth, in his Intellectual System, page 604, quoted in a note, and Mr. J. S. after his example and that of Professor Norton, will make the ancient Fathers speak downright nonsense, as well as the scriptures, in forcing upon their writings a meaning which they reprobated. I, therefore, roundly Jeny, that St. Gregory Nazianzen, Cyril, Maximus the Martyr, and others, ever advanced that three men are one man, having only a" numerical difference;" or, that they supposed that the three Persons of the Trinity have really no other, than a specific unity. Let the comparison employed by some Fathers, be taken in the proper point of view in which they adduced it, and their doctrine will be found perfectly concordant with the rest of the Christian world. The point of their comparison consists in this: that as three men are three persons, and have the same specific nature, so the three divine Persons have the same divine nature, not a different one, as the Arians would have it, nor only a specific one, as there is in three men, but the same numerical one. That this was the meaning of the Fathers, in using this comparison, is manifest, because they would never allow that it could be said, that there are three Gods, whereas, they granted that it may be truly said, that there are many men. this, that, if even it were proved that some one or other Father had used some less accurate comparison or simile to explain this mystery, this could not in any manner affect the common faith of the church, as delivered by the concurrent testimony of the other Fathers, or even of the same Fathers, in other places of their works, and of the symbols of the church, viz. that of the Apostles, that of Nice, that of Constantinople, finally that which bears the name of St. Athanasius. The very title of the Epistle of St. Gregory Nyssen, sufficiently shows,

Add to

that this Father's sentiments on the Trinity, were in perfect unison with the doctrine of the church, for it bears this inscription: "That there are not three Gods." This, however,' would evidently follow, if this Father meant to say, what' Messrs. Cudworth and Sparks wish to make him say. That St. Gregory Nyssen and St. Cyril perfectly agreed with the other Fathers, manifestly appears from the books which the former wrote on the Trinity, and those which the latter composed against Julian the Apostate.

If Dr. South actually preached what Mr. J. S. quotes of him in a note, page 156, I agree with him, that he spoke downright contradiction; because, although the three divine Persons be identified with the divine nature, still, as there exists a virtual distinction between the same divine nature and the three persons, the language of Dr. South is unquestionably "strange and unaccountable."

Page 157, Mr. J. S. writes thus: "There is also a very strange contradiction between the Apostles' Creed and the fifth article of the church. In the creed, it is said: the "Son was conceived of the Holy Ghost; " but, in the article, we are told, that the "Holy Ghost proceedeth from the Father and the Son." How these propositions are to be reconciled, may well occupy the attention of churchmen, or of any persons who believe them both to be true.”

Mr. J. S. imagines difficulties, where there are none.Churchmen may get rid of the troublesome task, by referring Mr. J. S. to any christian tolerably instructed in his religion. Let him ask, how he understands the said article of the Apostles' Creed, and he will unhesitatingly reply, "that the Son, 'as man, or according to his human nature, was conceived of the Holy Ghost." Let him next ask, how the said article of the church, is to be understood, and he will answer, with equal readiness, that "The Holy Ghost proceedeth from the Father and the Son "--from the Son, not as man, but as God. Now, there is no shadow of contradiction between the Son, as man, being conceived of the Holy Ghost, and the same Holy Ghost proceeding from the Father and the Son, as God. For, since

the Son is considered as man, in the first proposition, and as God, in the second, it is manifest, that there can be no kind of contradiction; and the Greeks are much to be censured, if they, intimidated by this pitiful sophism, as Mr. J. S. would fain make us believe, altered their creed.

Mr. J. S. proceeds, in the 158th page, to discuss the mystery of the Trinity, from the very nature of the Godhead. "The moment you conceive God to be divided into parts, you destroy his character as God."

Perfectly correct! But who is there, so stupid, as to conceive God divided into parts? The christian? But this calumny has already been exploded, above..

"But," continues Mr. J. S. "unless God be supposed to be separated into parts, how can he be said to exist in three persons ?"

He can be said to exist in three persons; because, one and the same divine being, or nature, is communicated, without any division or separation whatever, by the Father to the Son, and by the Father and the Son, as one common principle, to the Holy Ghost; and thus, the divine nature indivisibly and inseparably exists in each of the three divine persons. From this, it follows, that he is one as to nature, and three as to persons. His unity, therefore, is not destroyed. There is no christian that does not solemnly profess, with Tertullian, whom Mr. J. S. quotes in a note, that there is, and that there cannot be, but one "Summum Magnum," one only Supreme Being; as there is none that does not firmly believe, that there is but one divine, indivisible nature in God; and that, of course, were you even to suppose what is impossible, more than three persons, still there would be but one Supreme Being; for beings, philosophically speaking, are only multiplied by multiplying natures and persons, and not by multiplying persons only. For suppose, through another impossibility, that one and the same numerical human nature, were to exist in ten different persons, there would be, in this case, but one being, one nature existing in ten distinct modes of existence. "Again, the attributes of the Deity are infinite.-God could

not be the only omniscient being, if any other knew as much as he."

Quite right, if any other were a different being from the omniscient Being; which is not the case in the Trinity. For, if each person be true God, it is not a different God from the other persons, but one and the same God with them, on account of the identity of nature common to the three persons; and, for which reason, they constitute but one “Summum Magnum,”-one Supreme and Omniscient Being.

"If the Son and Holy Spirit, be each 'very God,' they must have the perfect attributes of God.”

ones.

No doubt, they must; but, (N. B.) each of the persons must have the very same attributes of God, not different For attributes appertain directly to nature, and not to persons but indirectly, in as far as nature cannot actually exist but united to some person. As, therefore, each person in God, has one and the same indivisible nature, each one, too, has the same infinite attributes, which are nothing else but divine nature itself, and, of course, they make but one and the same divine Being.

"This is not impossible," says Mr. Sparks, "there may be three infinitely perfect beings, but in such cases-there would be three Gods, but not one Supreme God."

Here is as great a paradox, methinks, as ever was advanced, and a flat contradiction to the first notions, all men naturally have of the Deity. "There may be three infinitely perfect Beings." If so, then there may be three "Summa Magna," three Supreme Beings, three real and true Gods; for a being infinitely perfect, possesses all possible perfection, and that in an infinite degree; it is, therefore, essentially above all, and can have no equal, since to have an equal is an imperfection, which is repugnant to the very idea of God, whom all mankind have ever conceived, with Tertullian, as being essentially above all, as having none above, and all below himself. But it is absurd to maintain that three such beings are possible; for, it is clearer than noon-day, that, if the very essence of the first being requires that he should be above all, and have all other things below himself, the two other beings must be,