necessarily, under him and below him, and, of course, cannot be Gods at all.-Next these three Beings, infinitely perfect, either have a superiority over each other, or are equal to each other. In the first case, none of them is God, since he has a supe rior; in the second, none is God indeed, because he has a rival, over whom he has no power. Finally, these three infinitely perfect beings either are distinguished from each other or not, by some absolute attribute or perfection. In the first case, none of them can be God, because destitute of that perfection by which he is distinguished from the others: in the second case, they cannot make but one and the same infinitely perfect being, for where there is no distinction whatever, there must needs be absolute identity.

But stop, says Mr. Sparks, "there would, indeed, be three Gods, but not one Supreme God."

Three Gods is a contradiction in the very terms; for the very reason that none would be supreme God, and, of course, not God at all. And, as three Gods involve contradiction, contradiction, of course, is involved in this other position, "that there may be three infinitely perfect beings."

Mr. Sparks, page 159, alleges several scripture texts to prove a truth, which the light of reason alone, teaches every man "coming into this world," viz. the Unity and Su premacy of God (words, by the by, which are not to be found in the scriptures.)

What christian ever denied this fundamental truth? By the texts so often quoted by our Unitarian friends, are indeed excluded from the Godhead, all created objects, all false divinities; but not those divine persons who are that one and only Lord and supreme God, whose unity and supremacy the scriptures proclaim.

Let us accompany Mr. J. S. whilst he is proceeding to fix the origin of the Trinity. "Few things in history, are better settled," says he, page 189," than the origin of the Trinity. The close analogy between this doctrine and the Philosophical speculations of Plato, leaves no room for mistake.” *

See the Appendix, where the paradox of the pretended origin of the Trinity, rom the Platonic philosophy, is fully exploded.

Continuation of the Review of Mr. Sparks's fifth letter.

"My next inquiry shall be, (so Mr. Sparks proceeds, v. letter, page 160,) whether Christ was this Supreme God." "To render it possible that a being, who was born, and who died, could be the eternal God, requires a weight of evidence, in comparison with which, the united testimony of every human being, since the world began, would be nothing, without a full, express, and positive revelation from God himself."

To renderit possible, that a being, who was born and who died, and who, at the same time, was nothing more than a mere man, could be the eternal God, would require more than all possible evidence, since such a thing is metaphysically impossible; but to render it possible, that a being that is a God-man, and that unites both divine and human nature in one and the same divine person, should be born and die as man; or, according to the human nature, and be the eternal God as God; or, according to his divine nature, requires no other evidence than that of a full, express, and positive relation from God himself, and that we have, as irresistibly appears from our accumulated evidences.

"Let us see, Mr. Sparks continues, if we can infer from his own language, that he was the Supreme God."

1. "To those who were disposed to kill him, for healing the sick man on the Sabbath day, he said "As the Father has life in himself, so has he given to the Son to have life in himself, and has given him authority to execute judgment, because he is the Son of man." John, v. 26, 27. Do you understand from this that the same being, who gave life and authority, was the being himself who received them? Were the giver and receiver the same?

My answer is short: they were the same as to nature, not the same with respect to persons, for the Father and the Son are two distinct persons. That this distinction is not gratuitous, the two following passages, were there no other authority besides, would sufficiently evince: "I and the Father are one." I and the Father-behold the distinction of per

sons, are one; behold the unity and identity of nature, of which only, as it appears from the context, this passage can be understood. "Go ye, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." In the name, in the singular number, not names, to signify the unity of power, authority, and substance, and "of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost," to mark the distinction of persons. Thus, the person, who gives life and authority, was not the same person who received them: the person who is the giver, is different from the person that is the receiver. The meaning of the first text, according to all the Fathers of the church, is this: "As the Father hath life in himself," without receiving it from another, since he does not proceed from another person, so he has given to the Son, "by communicating to him his whole divine nature through the eternal generation, to have life in himself." Now, to give, does not argue any superiority in the Father, any more than to receive, infers any inferiority in the Son: for it is as necessary and as perfect, for the Son to receive, as for the Father to give, since these internal divine operations necessarily flow from the essential exigency of the infinite perfection of the divine nature. The above argument, therefore, is a mere sophism.

No. 2, page 161, after quoting several texts which have been already answered, Mr. Sparks goes on triumphantly, asking, "Here Christ explicitly declares, in several places, that he was sent by the Father. Would this language be intelligible, if Christ were God?”

Very intelligible, I reply, if Mr. Sparks were not to confound what is so clear in itself, if he were to observe that Christ, being a distinct person from the Father, may be said to be sent by the Father, although he be not less God than the Father; for mission, in the Godhead, or one person being sent by another, means nothing more than the same person proceeding from all eternity from another, and existing among creatures by some visible operations, such as the incarnation, the diffusion of the divine gifts in the descent of the Holy Ghost, &c. The Vol. II.No. X.

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Son, therefore, is sent by the Father, because he proceeds from the Father by his eternal generation, and begins to exist among men by the mysteries of his mortal life. If Mr. Sparks prefer to apply the above passage to Christ, as man, it is manifest, that, in that case, it will speak in favour of the christian doctrine. For assuredly, Christ as man, may be sent by the Father, without ceasing to be his natural Son.

"He came not to do his own will, but the will of the Father. In what terms can you more clearly define two distinct beings, than by attributing to them two wills?"

I answer, you can do it more clearly, "by attributing to them not only two wills," but, moreover, two distinct persons:" for beings, in a state of actual existence, are not multiplied by merely multiplying natures, but also by multiplying persons. As, therefore, there is but one and the same indivisible divine nature in the Father and in the Son, they are, indeed, twe distinct persons, but not distinct beings. And, after the same manner, as there is but one person in Christ, he cannot be but one being, although there be in him two natures, two wills, one divine, the other human. For as we have already so often remarked, to make two beings of Christ, would require not only two distinct natures, but also two distinct persons.

"When he says he came from God, does he mean that he came from himself?"

No: because, when he said, that he came from God, he meant to say, that he, as God the Son, the second person of the Trinity, came from God the Father, the first person, by his eternal generation; or, that as man, he received his mission from the Father. The other quibbles contained in page 161, have been already solved, and may be easily answered by every reader, by keeping in mind the observation, that, in most of the passages that are objected, in which Christ is speaking to, or of, his Father, he considers the Father and himself not so much as to the identity of their nature, as to the distinction of their persons.

No. 3, page 162, Mr. Sparks asserts that Christ uniformly ascribed all power, knowledge, goodness, and wisdom to the

Father, and repeatedly affirmed that he derived every thing from the Father."

So it is, indeed, whether the Lord Jesus Christ, be considered as God or as man, he derived every thing from the Father; first, as God, the second person of the Trinity, by his eternal generation, by which the whole divine nature, and, of course, all power and the other divine attributes, are communicated to him; and next, as man, he could possess nothing but what was derived from God.

"God is omnipotent, and needs no aid from any other being."

What conclusion does Mr. J. S. draw from this? That Christ as God, could not derive any aid from his Father? I grant it, but I defy him to prove that Christ, as God, ever received any aid from the Father. The texts adduced to prove that Christ needed the aid of the Father, prove no more, (as we have shown elsewhere,) when properly understood, than that Christ, as God, has derived his whole divine being from the Father by his eternal generation; and, as man, all he possessed as such,

Next, what is carefully to be remarked, Christ no where says, that he can do nothing without the aid of his Father; but, what is vastly different, and changes altogether the meaning, without his Father; for the first mode of expression implies manifestly inferiority and dependence on the part of the Son, whilst the second essentially imports an identity of nature, and consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, in consequence of which, it is metaphysically impossible for the Son to act of himself without the Father, on account of his possessing with the Father the same divine nature. The text, therefore, as rendered by Mr. J. S. and Unitarians at large, is adulterated, and distorted from its natural meaning.

The objection made against the omniscience of Jesus, by Mr. J. S. page 163, has already been solved in the preceding numberrs.

No. 5, same page, "At another time when one called him "Good Master;" he replied, "Why callest thou me good? There is none good, but one that is God." Math. xix. 17.