queft of. The Truth is, this ridiculous Chace after imaginary Pleasures cannot be fufficiently expofed, as it is the great Source of thofe Evils which generally undo a Nation. Let a Man's Eftate be what it will, he is a poor Man if he does not live within it, and naturally fets himself to Sale to any one that can give him his Price. When Pittacus, after the Death of his Brother, who had left him a good Eftate, was offered a great Sum of Money by the King of Lydia, he thanked him for his Kindness, but told him he had already more by half than he knew what to do with. In short, Content is equivalent to Wealth, and Luxury to Poverty; or, to give the Thought a more agreeable Turn, Content is natural Wealth, fays Socrates; to which I fhall add, Luxury is artificial Poverty. I fhall therefore recommend to the Confideration of those who are always aiming after fuperfluous and imaginary Enjoyments, and will not be at the Trouble of contracting their Defires, an excellent Saying of Bion the Philofopher; namely, That no Man has fo much Care, as he who endeavours after the most Happiness.

In the fecond Place, every one ought to reflect how much more unhappy he might be than he really is. The former Confideration took in all those who are fufficiently provided with the Means to make themfelves eafy; this regards fuch as actually lie under fome Preffure or Misfortune. These may receive great Alleviation from fuch a Comparison as the unhappy Perfon may make between himself and others, or between the Misfortune which he fuffers, and greater Misfortunes which might have befallen him.

I like the Story of the honeft Dutchman, who, upon breaking his Leg by a Fall from the Mainmaft, told the Standers by, It was a great Mercy that 'twas not his Neck. To which, fince I am got into Quotations, give me leave to add the Saying of an old Philofopher, who, after having invited fome of his Friends to dine with him, was ruffled by his Wife that came into the Room in a Paflion, and threw down the Table that ftood before them; Every one, fays he, bas his Calami

D 5

ty,

ty, and he is a happy Man that has no greater than this. We find an Inftance to the fame Purpose in the Life of Doctor Hammond, written by Bishop Fell. As this good Man was troubled with a Complication of Diftempers, when he had the Gout upon him, he used to thank God that it was not the Stone; and when he had the Stone, that he had not both these Diftempers on him at the fame time.

I cannot conclude this Effay without obferving that there was never any Syftem befides that of Chriftianity, which could effectually produce in the Mind of Man the Virtue I have been hitherto speaking of. In order to make us content with our prefent Condition, many of the ancient Philofophers tell us, that our Discontent only hurts our felves, without being able to make any Alteration in our Circumstances; others, that whatever Evil befals us is derived to us by a fatal Neceffity, to which the Gods themselves are fubject; whilft others very gravely tell the Man who is miserable, that it is neceffary he fhould be fo to keep up the Harmony of the Univerfe, and that the Scheme of Providence would be troubled and perverted were he otherwife. Thefe, and the like Confiderations, rather filence than fatisfy a Man. They may fhew him that his Difcontent is unreasonable, but are by no means fufficient to relieve it. They rather give Defpair than Confolation. In a Word, a Man might reply to one of these Comforters, as Auguftus did to his Friend, who advised him not to grieve for the Death of a Person whom he loved, because his Grief could not fetch him again: It is for that very Reason, faid the Emperor, that I grieve.

ON the contrary, Religion bears a more tender Regard to human Nature. It prefcribes to every miferable Man the Means of bettering his Condition; nay, it fhews him, that the bearing of his Afflictions as he ought to do will naturally end in the Removal of them : It makes him eafy here, because it can make him happy hereafter.

UPON the Whole, a contented Mind is the greatest Bleffing a Man can enjoy in this World; and if in the prefent Life his Happiness arises from the fubduing of

his

his Defires, it will arise in the next from the Gratification of them.

A

Monday, Auguft 2.

Nec morti effe locum.

Virg.

LEWD young Fellow feeing an aged Hermit go by him barefoot, Father, fays he, you are in a very miferable Condition if there is not another World. True Son, faid the Hermit; but what is thy Condition if there is? Man is a Creature defigned for two different States of Being, or rather, for two different Lives. His firft Life is fhort and tranfient; his fecond permanent and lafting. The Queftion we are all concerned in is this, In which of these two Lives it is our chief Intereft to make our felves happy? Or, in other Words, Whether we should endeavour to fecure to our felves the Pleasures and Gratifications of a Life which is uncertain and precarious, and at its utmost Length of a very inconfiderable Duration; or to fecure to cur felves the Pleasures of a Life which is fixed and fettled, and will never end? Every Man, upon the first hearing of this Queftion, knows very well which Side of it he ought to close with. But however right we are in Theory, it is plain that in Practice we adhere to the wrong Side of the Question. We make Provifions for this Life as tho' it were never to have an End, and for the other Life, as tho' it were never to have a Beginning.

SHOULD a Spirit of fuperior Rank, who is a Stranger to human Nature, accidentally alight upon the Earth, and take a Survey of its Inhabitants; what would his Notions of us be? Would not he think that we are a Species of Beings made for quite different Ends and Purposes than what we really are? Muft not he imagine that we were placed in this World to

get

get Riches and Honours? Would not he think that it was our Duty to toil after Wealth, and Station, and Title? Nay, would not he believe we were forbidden Poverty by Threats of eternal Punishment, and enjoyned to purfue our Pleasures under Pain of Damnation? He would certainly imagine that we were influenced by a Scheme of Duties quite oppofite to those which are indeed prescribed to us. And truly, according to fuch an Imagination, he muft conclude that we are a Species of the moft obedient Creatures in the Universe; that we are conftant to our Duty; and that we keep a fteddy Eye on the End for which we were sent hither.

BUT how great would be his Astonishment, when he learnt that we were Beings not defigned to exist in this World above Threefcore and Ten Years? and that the greatest Part of this bufy Species fall fhort even of that Age? How would he be loft in Horror and Admiration, when he fhould know that this Set of Creatures, who lay out all their Endeavours for this Life, which fcarce deferves the Name of Exiftence, when I fay, he fhould know that this Set of Creatures are to exift to all Eternity in another Life, for which they make no Preparations? Nothing can be a greater Difgrace to Reason, than that Men, who are perfwaded of thefe two different States of Being, fhould be perpetually employed in providing for a Life of Threefcore and Ten Years, and neglecting to make Provifion for that, which after many Myriads of Years will be ftill new, and fill beginning; efpecially when we confider that our Endeavours for making our felves great, or rich, or honourable, or whatever elfe we place our Happiness in, may after all prove unfuccefsful; whereas if we conftantly and fincerely endeavour to make our felves happy in the other Life, we are fure that our Endeavours will fucceed, and that we shall not be disappointed of our Hopes.

THE following Queftion is started by one of the Schoolmen. Suppofing the whole Body of the Earth were a great Ball or Mafs of the finest Sand, and that a fingle Grain or Particle of this Sand fhould be anni

hilated

hilated every thoufand Years. Suppofing then that you had it in your Choice to be happy all the while this prodigious Mafs of Sand was confuming by this flow Method till there was not a Grain of it left, on Condition you were to be miferable for ever after; or, fuppofing that you might be happy for ever after, on Condition you would be miferable till the whole Mafs of Sand were thus annihilated at the Rate of one Sand in a thoufand Years: Which of these two Cafes would you make your Choice?

'IT must be confeffed in this Cafe, fo many thoufands of Years are to the Imagination as a kind of Eternity, though in Reality they do not bear fo great a Proportion to that Duration which is to follow them, as an Unite does to the greatest Number which you can put together in Figures, or as one of thofe Sands to the fuppofed Heap. Reason therefore tells us, without any manner of Hefitation, which would be the better Part in this Choice. However, as I have before intimated, our Reafon might in fuch Cafe be fo overfet by the Imagination, as to difpofe fome Perfons to fink under the Confideration of the great Length of the first Part of this Duration, and of the great Distance of that fecond Duration which is to fucceed it. The Mind, I fay, might give it felf up to that Happiness which is at hand, confidering that it is fo very near, and that it would last fo very long. But when the Choice we actually have before us is this, Whether we will chufe to be happy for the Space of only Threescore and ten, nay perhaps of only Twenty or Ten Years, I might say of only a Day or an Hour, and miferable to all Eternity; or, on the contrary, miferable for this fhort Term of Years, and happy for a whole Eternity : What Words are fufficient to exprefs that Folly and want of Confideration which in fuch a Cafe makes a wrong Choice?

I here put the Cafe even at the worst, by fuppofing (what feldom happens) that a Courfe of Virtue makes us miferable in this Life: But if we fuppofe (as it generally happens) that Virtue would make us more happy even in this Life than a contrary Course of Vice; how can we fufficiently admire the Stupidity or Madness of

thofe