proposed," that it will ease the Crown of importunities," as I think it has no great weight in it, I am not concerned to urge anything in its defence against the Plebeian's answer to it.

30. We come now to the most considerable paragraph of the whole book, which I shall therefore transcribe at length. "But another consequence, of a much higher nature, attending the limitation of the number of Peers, is the danger there will be of changing the Constitution by this means into an aristocracy. And this may at any time in such case be effected by the confederacy of two or three great families, which would form such a body in the House of Lords, as the Crown would not be able to control. That this kind of government is one of the worst sorts of slavery, is too well known to be disputed. In a democracy, a great many different persons may come to have a share of power by several incidents, but in the other case it is birth only that entitles to superiority and the milk such nobles are nursed up with, is hatred and contempt for every human creature but those of their own imaginary dignity." The question to be stated here is, Whether the House of Lords under their present constitution is not as likely to run into an aristocracy, as it would be in case their number should be limited. It appears very plain to me, that a body of Peers perpetually increasing, and capable of additions, has in it a natural tendency to an aristocracy. Supposing that the House of Lords from sixty members is now swelled to two hundred: these, if increased by the same proportion, would in the same number of years amount to six hundred and sixty-six, to which we may presume there would be still the like proportionable additions. By this means they would in time receive such vast accessions of property, as might encourage them, not only to entertain so ambitious a design, but in a great measure to render it effectual: especially when any men could be admitted into their own order, with their great abilities in parliament, or their great influence among the people, who might be most capable of opposing their encroachments upon the Commons. I do allow that such additions would be prejudicial to the Crown; but this is no reason why they would not be made, as it has not prevented the additions that have been made in our own memory. For though the Crown in general would be a sufferer by this method; yet it would naturally have

recourse to it, as it has formerly, when it labours under any present exigency, that can only be removed by such an expedient. This danger of an aristocracy, every one must confess, would be very much abated, and, I think, utterly removed, by the limitation of the Lords to such a number as is now proposed. In such a case, their property would be so very inconsiderable, when compared with that of the Commons, (as I have before showed to a demonstration,) that it would render such a design in them the most chimerical, and the most impracticable. And since it is impossible that the whole body of Lords in their united strength could be able to establish themselves into an aristocracy, the author's imagination vanishes, that "this may at any time, in such a case, be effected by the confederacy of two or three great families, which would form such a body among the Lords as the Crown would not be able to control." If the author means in this place, by the Crown not being able to control the Lords, that it would be restrained from pouring in such a number as would always sway them to its inclinations, it is what ought to be wished for. If he means that this want of power in the Crown would enable them to erect an aristocracy, it is certainly a wrong consequence, because not only the Crown, but the people, would have a superior power in them to the body of nobles, and are equally concerned to preserve their stations in the government. The author after this brings an argument to prove, that an aristocracy is a bad form of government, and that a democracy is preferable to it, in which I entirely agree with him; but must add, that a mixt government, made out of aristocracy, democracy, and monarchy, is better than either of them. The author subjoins, that "the milk which nobles are nursed up with is hatred and contempt of every human creature, but those of their own imaginary dignity.' If so, the fewer of them the better. What Commoner would not desire to put a stop to the increase of them ?

31. The next objection I meet with is from the great privileges the Lords are already possessed of, with relation to actions de Scandalis Magnatum, &c., which is likewise a very good reason why we should hinder the increase of persons invested with these privileges; and as for the judicial power, with that of imprisoning, they are such as subsist in their body as it is now constituted, and therefore cannot be ob

jected to the proposed alteration, which would only leave them as they are.

66

"Because

32. "The increasing the number of Peers," says the author, "is always to be wished for by the Commons." We have seen sufficient reasons why it should not. the greater their number, the less considerable they become;" the contrary of which has been evidently proved; "and the less within the influence of court favours." "What! when by this very power of increasing them at will, it can secure any point among them that it pleases? By which means alone ministers are kept in awe, and remain in a situation of being called to account for their actions. Were it otherwise, they would be out of the reach of any accusation. They would know exactly by whom they were to be tried, and their judges might be their accomplices. And should this once come to be the case, what might they not attempt with impunity ?" Is this inconvenience better prevented in a House of Peers on the bottom it now stands? Can any one who has been a good minister be secure, if the Crown should add a sufficient number of his enemies to those who sit in judgment upon him? Or is a bad minister in any danger, when he may be sheltered by the addition of a sufficient number of his friends?

33. I must not pass over another remarkable paragraph of the author upon the same argument for increasing the Lords at pleasure. "The great advantage," says he, "that the number of their body cannot be increased, is at present the most valuable privilege of the House of Commons, and the only thing that makes them considerable." This is indeed a very poor advantage, to found upon it the grandeur of the House of Commons. Is not the power of giving money and raising taxes confined to that body, and which can never fail to give them the greatest weight in the legislature? Will not this be always the most valuable privilege of the Commons ? and what other privilege can make them more considerable? He goes on, "The Lords are possessed of many great privileges that they will not permit the Commons to share with them; and therefore the Commons would be highly wanting to themselves, if they should add this advantage likewise to the Lords, which is the only one that they can enjoy distinct from them." Our author, as it may turn to his account, sometimes considers

the Lords in their personal privileges as they are individuals, and sometimes as they are a body of men in the legislature. If he here means their privileges in the former view, I do allow they are very great ones, and therefore certainly every Commoner cannot desire an increase of such individuals. But if he here means their privileges as a legislative body, it is certain that all their privileges together are not equal to that one of commanding the purse of the community. So that it is wonderful how he could advance, that the number of the House of Commons, not being subject to an increase, "is the only advantage that they enjoy distinct from the House of Lords."

34. Our author next proceeds to speak of the proportion of property between the two Houses of Lords and Commons, which is a point already so fully discussed, that I shall not trouble the reader with any repetitions; but cannot omit what the author asserts as an indisputable point, and which in itself is the greatest paradox. I ever heard advanced. His words are, 66 Indeed, if a restraining bill should pass, I do not doubt but it would be soon followed with a bill to prevent Lords from alienating their estates, for which many plausible reasons are to be produced; and then, without all dispute, the balance of property will be soon turned on the side of their Lordships." Which is as much as to say, in plain English, that the Lords will have as much wealth amongst them as the whole body of the British Commons, or that one million will be a balance against a hundred millions. Indeed the House of Lords in their present constitution may be always approaching to a balance in property with the Commons, from whence they are continually receiving into their body such large supplies; but if their number be once limited, you cut off their recruits, and lay them under an impossibility of ever rivaling the other branch of the legislature in this particular.

35. Our author's argument, that a new power would arise to the House of Lords from the alteration so much talked of, is founded upon a fact which every one denies at first sight. His words are these: "For as to what is commonly said, that the Lords would get nothing, no new power would be added to them by this means; I beg leave to state this matter in a proper light. Suppose the balance to be now even betwixt the Lords and the Crown, as it certainly is, or

else the Constitution would not subsist in quiet; is it not plain to the most common capacity, that when two scales are upon an equal poise, if you take any weight out of one of them, you give the advantage to the other without putting anything into it?" The author here supposes that the balance between the two parts of the legislature should be even; and so far I concur with him, that being the chief end which this alteration has in view. But I can by no means suppose with him that they are even, because it is contrary to matter of fact. For we plainly see that the Sovereign has it always in his power to make what division of party or opinion he pleases prevail in that House. As for the reason of their present supposed equality," that otherwise they could not subsist in quiet," it has no force in it, because we see very ill-constituted governments will subsist in quiet for many ages, not that they are preserved by a rightly tempered Constitution, which would give them the greatest strength, but by other accidental causes. The ill consequences of such an inequality may be frequently felt and complained of, though they may not shake the tranquillity of the public.

36. I have now gone through everything that carries the face of an argument for the constitution of the House of Lords, as it now stands, or of an objection against the alteration proposed to be made; having only avoided saying anything in this case as it affects the Scottish nobility, because I have here considered it only as an English Commoner, and because I have thoughts of prosecuting the subject, as it relates to Scotland, in another pamphlet, being unwilling to swell this to a greater bulk.

37. Since the writing of the foregoing discourse, I have perused a pamphlet, intituled, "The Thoughts of a Member of the Lower House," &c.,' in which the author first approves our Constitution as divided into its three branches, and through the whole course of his book contends in effect that it should consist of no more than two; for he supposes the * House of Lords instituted only as guardians and ornaments to the throne, and to be augmented by the Crown in such a proportion, as may strengthen it in opposition to the House of Commons. The reader may see his scheme in the following words: "There is not," says this writer, a more certain By Mr. Asgill.