SER M. Voured to give fome faint hints and reIX. prefentations, fome little inadequate Idea, wherein the peculiar Perfection of this divine Power confifts, and in what inftances it has principally difplayed itself; I proceed

in the

IIId place, To confider what particulars are not included in the true Notion of Omnipotence itself. And

ift, 'Tis evident Infinite Power must be understood to reach to all poffible things, but cannot be faid to extend to the working any thing which implies a Contradiction: As, that a Thing fhould be and not be at the fame time; that the fame thing fhould be made, and not be made; or have been, and not have been: That the fame Body should be in two places at once, or not be in the place where it is: That things fhould be equal and not equal at the fame time; or the fame thing greater or lefs, than itself. These and the like, are, in the Nature of Things, abfolutely impoffible; and to afcribe to God a Power of doing what can't be done, is not magnifying, but mocking his Power. And the Reafon is plain: Because a Power of caufing a thing to be, at the fame

time that it is not, is only a Power of SER M.
doing that which is Nothing, that is, no
Power at all.

2dly, THE Infinite Power of God, can-
not be faid to extend to fuch things as
are naturally evil abfolutely with refpect
to himself; that is to fay, which imply
natural imperfection in the Being itself, to
whom fuch Power is afcribed. Such
would be, a Power of deftroying his own
Being, weakning or diminishing his own
Power, or limiting it any otherwise than
by the free determinations of Wisdom and
Goodness. For, any capacity, or poffibility
of being diminished, even though by the un-
limited Power itself working upon itself,
would be Imperfection or Weakness, and

not Power.

3dly, INFINITE Power, cannot be understood to include a poffibility of doing fuch things as are morally evil, with regard to Others. Such are whatever things are unjust, unrighteous, cruel, contrary to Promife, and the like. A poffibility of doing any of which things, is (as

as before) a Mark, not of Power, but of Impotency or Weakness. Hence the Scripture frequently ufes fuch expreffions as

thefe ;

IX.

SER M.thefe; God, which cannot lye, Tit. i. z; IX. he cannot deny himself, 2 Tim. ii. 13. And Heb. vi. 13, 18. Becaufe God could fwear by no greater, he fware by himself, -confirming the immutability of his counfel by an Oath; that by two immutable things, in which it was impoffible for God to lye, we might have a strong confolation. The Ground indeed or Reafon of the impoffibility of God's doing any of these things, is not the fame as the impoffibility of working contradictions. For contradictions are impoffible abfolutely, in the nature of the things themselves; but doing evil is impoffible relatively only, with refpect to the Nature of a perfectly good Being. But though the ground or reafon of the impoffibility is different, yet the impoffibility itself is in Event the fame. For God can no more act in contradiction to the moral perfections of his own Nature, than he can act in contradiction to the abfolute Nature of Things: Nor is it any more poffible, that a Being of infinite Juice, Goodness, and Truth, fhould do any thing unjufly, unrighteoufly, or falfely than that a Thing should be and not be at the fame time. The

;

Rectitude

Rectitude of his Will, is as unalterable, SERM.

as the Neceffity of his Nature: and 'tis as truly a contradiction, that the Will of an infinitely Good Being, should chufe to do any thing contrary to Right; as that the Power of an infinitely powerful Being, fhould be able to do any thing inconfiftent with Power. For in like manner, as 'tis for this Reafon manifeft, that infinite Power cannot extend to natural contradictions, because they imply a destruction of that very Power, by which they must be fuppofed to be worked; fo 'tis alfo for the like reafon evident, that the fame infinite Power cannot extend to moral contradictions, because Thefe imply a deftruction of fome other Attributes, as neceffarily belonging to the divine Nature as

Power.

IV. THUS have I endeavoured briefly, ift, to prove, that God must of neceffity be all-powerful; 2dly, to give fome general and inadequate idea, wherein the Perfection of this Power confifts; and 3dly, to show what particulars are not included in the true Notion even of Om

nipotence itself. What remains, is, to draw fome useful Inferences from the fe

IX.

m

SER M.veral parts of the foregoing Discourse. IX. And thefe inferences will be of two forts;

1st, such as may affift us to make a right judgment of the Truth or Falsehood of feveral Doctrines which have been taught in Divinity; And 2dly, fuch as may tend more immediately to direct and influence our Practice. But the confideration of These, must be referred to a following opportunity.

SERMON