was no notion of any such actions; no use of such combinations of ideas as were united, and, as it were, tied together, by those terms: and therefore in other countries there were no names for them.

7. And languages change.-Hence also we may see the reason why languages constantly change, take up new and lay by old terms. Because change of customs and opinions bringing with it new combinations of ideas which it is necessary frequently to think on and talk about, new names, to avoid long descriptions, are annexed to them, and so they become new species of complex modes. What a number of different ideas are by this means wrapped up in one short sound, and how much of our time and breath is thereby saved, any one will see who will but take the pains to enumerate all the ideas that either "reprieve" or "appeal" stand for; and instead of either of those names use a periphrasis to make any one understand their meaning.

8. Mixed modes, where they exist.—Though I shall have occasion to consider this more at large when I come to treat of words, and their use; yet I could not avoid to take thus much notice here of the names of mixed modes, which, being fleeting and transient combinations of simple ideas, which have but a short existence any where but in the minds of men, and there, too, have no longer any existence than whilst they are thought on, have not so much any where the appearance of a constant and lasting existence as in their names which are therefore, in these sort of ideas, very apt to be taken for the ideas themselves. For if we should inquire where the idea of a triumph or apotheosis exists, it is evident they could neither of them exist altogether any where in the things themselves, being actions that required time to their performance, and so could never all exist together; and as to the minds of men, where the ideas of these actions are supposed to be lodged, they have there, too, a very uncertain existence; and therefore we are apt to annex them to the names that excite them in us.

9. How we get the ideas of mixed modes.-There are therefore three ways whereby we get the complex ideas of mixed modes. (1.) By experience and observation of things themselves: thus by seeing two men wrestle or fence, we get the idea of wrestling or fencing. (2.) By invention, or voluntary putting together of several simple ideas in our own minds: so he that first invented printing, or etching, had an idea of it in his mind before it ever existed. (3.) Which is the most usual way, by explaining the names of actions we never saw, or notions we cannot see; and by enumerating and thereby, as it were, setting before our imaginations all those ideas which go to the making them up, and are the constituent parts of them. For, having by sensation and reflection stored our minds with simple ideas, and by use got the names that stand for them, we can by those names represent to another any complex idea we would have him conceive; so that it has in it no simple ideas but what he knows, and has with us the same name for. For all our complex ideas are ultimately resolvable into simple ideas, of which they are compounded, and originally made up, though perhaps their immediate ingredients, as I may so say, are

also complex ideas. Thus the mixed mode which the word "lie" stands for, is made of these simple ideas: (1.) Articulate sounds. (2.) Certain ideas in the mind of the speaker. (3.) Those words the signs of those ideas. (4.) Those signs put together by affirmation or negation, otherwise than the ideas they stand for are in the mind of the speaker. I think I need not go any farther in the analysis of that complex idea we call a "lie:" what I have said is enough to show that it is made up of simple ideas: and it could not be but an offensive tediousness to my reader, to trouble him with a more minute enumeration of every particular simple idea that goes to this complex one; which, from what has been said, he cannot but be able to make out to himself. The same may be done in all our complex ideas whatsoever; which, however compounded and decompounded, may at last be resolved into simple ideas, which are all the materials of knowledge or thought we have or can have. Nor shall we have reason to fear that the mind is hereby stinted to too scanty a number of ideas, if we consider what an inexhaustible stock of simple modes number and figure alone affords us. How far, then, mixed modes, which admit of the various combinations of different simple ideas and their infinite modes, are from being few and scanty, we may easily imagine. So that, before we have done, we shall see that nobody need be afraid he shall not have scope and compass enough for his thoughts to range in, though they be, as I pretend, confined only to simple ideas received from sensation or reflection, and their several combinations.

10. Motion, thinking, and power have been most modified.-It is worth our observing which of all our simple ideas have been most modified, and had most mixed modes made out of them, with names given to them; and those have been these three: thinking, and motion, (which are the two ideas which comprehend in them all action,) and power, from whence these actions are conceived to flow. These simple ideas, I say, of thinking, motion, and power, have been those which have been most modified, and out of whose modifications have been made most complex modes, with names to them. For, action being the great business of mankind, and the whole matter about which all laws are conversant, it is no wonder that the several modes of thinking and motion should be taken notice of, the ideas of them observed and laid up in the memory, and have names assigned to them; without which, laws could be but ill made, or vice and disorder repressed. Nor could any communication be well had amongst men without such complex ideas, with names to them: and therefore men have settled names and supposed settled ideas in their minds of modes of actions distinguished by their causes, means, objects, ends, instruments, time, place, and other circumstances, and also of their powers fitted for those actions; v. g. boldness is the power to speak or do what we intend before others, without fear or disorder; and the Greeks call the confidence of speaking by a peculiar name, agnoía. which power or ability in man of doing any thing, when it has been acquired by frequent doing the same thing, is that idea we name

"habit;" when it is forward and ready upon every occasion to break into action, we call it "disposition." Thus testiness is a disposition or aptness to be angry.

To conclude: let us examine any modes of action; v. g. consideration and assent, which are actions of the mind; running and speaking, which are actions of the body; revenge and murder, which are actions of both together; and we shall find them but so many collections of simple ideas, which together make up the complex ones signified by those names.

11. Several words seeming to signify action, signify but the effect. -Power being the source from whence all action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are, when they exert this power into act, are called "causes ;" and the substances which thereupon are produced, or the simple ideas which are introduced into any subject by the exerting of that power, are called "effects." The efficacy whereby the new substance or idea is produced, is called, in the subject exerting that power, "action;" but in the subject, wherein any simple idea is changed or produced, it is called "passion:" which efficacy however various, and the effects almost infinite, yet we can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual agents, to be nothing else but modes of thinking and willing; in corporeal agents, nothing else but modifications of motion. I say, I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but these two: for whatever sort of action besides these produces any effects, I confess myself to have no notion nor idea of; and so it is quite remote from my thoughts, apprehensions, and knowledge; and as much in the dark to me as five other senses, or as the ideas of colours to a blind man and therefore many words which seem to express some action, signify nothing of the action, or modus operandi, at all, but barely the effect, with some circumstances of the subject wrought on, or cause operating; v. g. creation, annihilation, contain in them no idea of the action or manner whereby they are produced, but barely of the cause, and the thing done. And when a countryman says the cold freezes water, though the word freezing" seems to import some action, yet truly it signifies nothing but the effect; viz. that water, that was before fluid, is become hard and consistent; without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done.

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12. Mixed modes made also of other ideas.-I think I shall not need to remark here, that though power and action make the greatest part of mixed modes, marked by names, and familiar in the minds and mouths of men, yet other simple ideas, and their several combinations, are not excluded; much less, I think, will it be necessary for me to enumerate all the mixed modes which have been settled, with names to them. That would be to make a dictionary of the greatest part of the words made use of in divinity, ethics, law, and politics, and several other sciences. All that is requisite to my present design is, to show what sort of ideas those are which I call "mixed modes;" how the mind comes by them; and that they are compositions made up of simple ideas got from sensation and reflection; which, I suppose, I have done.

CHAPTER XXIII.

OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.

1. Ideas of substances, how made.-The mind, being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple ideas conveyed in by the senses, as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice, also, that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple idea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas together: because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result; which therefore we call "substance."

"A

2. Our idea of substance in general. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called "accidents." If any one should be asked, "What is the subject wherein colour or weight inheres?" he would have nothing to say but, "The solid extended parts." And if he were demanded, "What is it that solidity and extension inhere in," he would not be in a much better case than the Indian before-mentioned, who, saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked, what the elephant rested on? to which his answer was, great tortoise:" but being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied, something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cases where we use words without having clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children; who being questioned what such a thing is which they know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, that it is something; which in truth signifies no more, when so used, either by children or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of, is what they have no distinct idea of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea, then, we have, to which we give the general name "substance," being nothing but the supposed, but unknown, support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist sine re substante, "without something to support them," we call that support substantia; which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, "standing under," or "upholding."†

3. Of the sorts of substances.-An obscure and relative idea of substance in general being thus made, we come to have the ideas of particular sorts of substances, by collecting such combinations of See Note A at the end of this chapter, p. 204.-EDIT. † See Note B at the end of this chapter, p. 205.-EDIT.

simple ideas as are by experience and observation of men's senses taken notice of to exist together, and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal constitution or unknown essence of that substance. Thus we come to have the ideas of a man, horse, gold, water, &c. of which substances, whether any one has any other clear idea, farther than of certain simple ideas co-existing together, I appeal to every one's own experience. It is the ordinary qualities observable in iron or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex idea of those substances, which a smith or a jeweller commonly knows better than a philosopher; who, whatever substantial forms he may talk of, has no other idea of those substances than what is framed by a collection of those simple ideas which are to be found in them. Only we must take notice, that our complex ideas of substances, besides all these simple ideas they are made up of, have always the confused idea of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist: and therefore, when we speak of any sort of substance, we say it is a thing having such or such qualities; as, body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of motion; spirit, a thing capable of thinking; and so hardness, friability, and power to draw iron, we say, are qualities to be found in a loadstone. These and the like fashions of speaking intimate that the substance is supposed always something besides the extension, figure, solidity, motion, thinking, or other observable ideas, though we know not what it is.

4. No clear idea of substance in general.-Hence, when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substances, as horse, stone, &c. though the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities which we use to find united in the thing called "horse" or stone;" yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by, some common subject; which support we denote by the name "substance," though it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support.

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5. As clear an idea of spirit as body.-The same happens concerning the operations of the mind; viz. thinking, reasoning, fearing, &c. which we concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the actions of some other substance, which we call "spirit;" whereby yet it is evident, that having no other idea or notion of matter, but something wherein those many sensible qualities which affect our senses do subsist; by supposing a substance wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power moving, &c. do subsist; we have as clear a notion of the substance of spirit as we have of body: the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the substratum to those simple ideas we have from without; and the other supposed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the substratum to those operations which we experiment in ourselves within. It is plain, then, that the idea of corporeal substance in matter is as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions as that of spiritual substance, or spirit; and