is: nec quemquam moveat, quod unus a nobis editus liber est nec apocryphorum tertii et quarti libri somniis delectetur, quia et apud Hebraeos Esdrae Nehemiaeque sermones in unum volumen coarctantur, etc. Moreover, we find on examination, that three fourths of all the citations from the Fathers made by Pohlmann, refer to the one circumstance of the literary contest before Darius, and most of them to the striking expression which it contains respecting the power of the truth. This attractive story, taken in connection with a loose way of making quotations at this time, naturally became a kind of stock reference in the early church, and once started, readily passed from hand to hand with little or no thought of its origin. The most that can be said, therefore, is that the book was used with respect by a number of the Greek and Latin Fathers. But the probable reason why it was not accepted as canonical by the Tridentine Council in 1546, which elevated to this rank other works having apparently less claim, was, that in addition to the pronounced opposition of Jerome, it was not then known to exist in Greek. Luther, speaking of first and second Esdras says: "These books we would not translate, because they have nothing in them which you might not better find in Acsop." Oecolampadius and Calvin speak with more care, but refuse the book a place in the canon. The same is true of the English church from its earliest history, as is shown in its various translations of the Bible.2 The more recent criticism, as we have said, is characterized by a too extreme reaction in favor of the historical and critical worth of the book. Its value is chiefly lexical. The translation, which Trendelenburg compares for smoothness and elegance with that of Symmachus, can, no doubt, be made useful in the study of the remaining apocryphal books of the Old Testament as well as of the New Testament Greck. And there are, undoubtedly, a few instances where its aid may properly be invoked in the interpretation of those parts of the canonical books which it includes. 1 Praef. in libr. Esdr. Opp. T. ix. col. 1472 (ed. Migne). VI. Is it a Fragment ? - Opinions on the question whether the book in its present form is complete in itself will naturally be much modified by the view that is adopted respecting its aim. Those who hold that the compiler meant to arrange his material simply with reference to a history of the restoration of the temple, find the work, as it is, pretty nearly complete. But it undoubtedly breaks off in the midst of a sentence, and one cannot say with certainty whether the last part has been lost, or that the author failed to carry out his original design. At least, there would be nothing against the current opinion of the purpose of the author and it seems to be required by the abrupt conclusion - to suppose that Neh. viii. 13-18 originally formed a part of the work. The theory of Trendelenburg that the first part of the book is also wanting, which he bases on the fact that the history begins with the eighteenth instead of the first year of Josiah's reign, harmonizes with no tenable theory of its object. VII. Manuscripts and Versions.-The critical edition of the LXX undertaken in England by Holmes and completed by Parsons (Oxford, 1798-1827), in which the readings of twenty-four different MSS. of our book are given, still furnishes scholars with their principal resource for the criticism of its text. According to Fritzsche, these twenty-four MSS. may be divided with respect to worth into four classes, the best text being found in II. (Codex Vaticanus) 52 (Codex Liguriensis, Florentiae, sacculi fere x), and 55 (Codex Vaticanus, saeculi fere x). This text, however, is not free from mistakes of copyists in addition to arbitrary attempts at improvement. It is especially to be suspected, Fritzsche thinks, when agreeing with 19, (bibl. Chigianae Romac, saeculi x), and 108 (Vaticanus, n. 330, saeculi fere xiv). The latter MSS. represent in general the text of the Complutensian Polyglott (1514-1517). The remaining codices are (1) III. (Alexandrinus), XI. (Basiliano-Vaticanus, 2106, saeculi ix), 1 Libri Apocryphi Vet. Test., Praef. viii.-x. Cf. Tischendorf's Vetus Testament. Graece juxta LXX. interpretes. Lips. 1869. Prolegom. 58, 64, 119, 243, 245, 248, and the Aldine; (2) 44, 71, 74, 106, 107, 120, 121, 134, 236. These last two recensions, as they are named, present a text more or less emended the former with reference to Codex Alexandrinus — and, at the same time, do not always retain their distinctive features, being more or less influenced by each other. ARTICLE II. ARISTOTLE. BY D. MCGREGOR MEANS, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, BALTIMORE, MD. I. HIS THEOLOGY. Be "IT is natural that he who first discovers any art whatsoever, beyond the ordinary perceptions of the senses, is admired by men, not only because he has discovered something useful, but as wise and different from the rest of mankind."1 This remark of Aristotle's is peculiarly appropriate to himself. All men seem to be possessed with a desire to trace an art or an idea to its originator. Countless pages have been written to prove that this or that man first invented printing. Immense labor has been expended by the learned in their attempts to discover the discoverer of gunpowder. Fierce contests have raged over the question to whom the glory of applying steam as a motive power was due. tween the followers of Newton and those of Leibnitz a most envenomed controversy arose as to which was first in the application of fluxions. In more recent times we have seen the magnificent honors heaped upon Morse, because he first reduced electricity to the service of man. All early nations must have their eponymous heroes; when they cannot find them they invent them. The early writings of the Hebrews give us the names of the inventors of the arts; the modern Arabs even point out the tomb of the first of the human race. This desire may be explained in the words of Aristotle him1 Arist. Met., i. 1. extr. self, as a desire to know things in their causes; we do not feel that we thoroughly know a subject until we learn what others have known about it, and our satisfaction is never complete until we go back to the very earliest sources. Of course, we can never say that any man has not received the idea that has made him famous from some forerunner; yet, in the case of Aristotle, we may affirm with a tolerable degree of certainty, that to him belongs the glory of the first systematic treatment of the reasoning faculty. Before him all men had reasoned; some few had observed that they reasoned; he first clearly showed how they reasoned, and how all men must reason. The great principles that he was the first,1 so far as we know, to discern and clearly lay down, have been the guides of all following ages; the canons that he estab lished remained until within the present century, with little change, the rules to which all valid reasoning must conform. Isidore St. Hilaire has remarked: "It is the destiny and glory of the anatomist of Stagira, to have had before him simply precursors, and after him only disciples." In a similar way the great Cuvier has expressed the most unbounded admiration, not only of the genius but of the results achieved by Aristotle in his physical investigations. Although Lewes has severely criticized these unqualified laudations, he himself admits the wonderful results that Aristotle, in spite of the lack of suitable appliances, was able to obtain. We may, perhaps, no longer say that an acquaintance with his works on natural science is essential, or even desirable; but his metaphysics, ethics, and politics, his rhetoric and poetics are, 1 Maurice asserts that Zeno deserves the credit of being the inventor of Logic, but gives no satisfactory reasons. — Hist. Anc. Philos. in Encyc. Met., vi. 2 Lewes, Aristotle, xv. Lewes also quotes the opinions of Hamilton,-" His seal is upon all the sciences and his speculations have, mediately or immediately, determined those of all subsequent thinkers"; and Hegel: "He penetrated into the whole universe of things, and subjected its scattered wealth to intelligence; and to him the greater number of philosophical sciences owe their origin and distinction." St. George Mivart, in "Contemporary Evolution," remarks: "There is not and never was nor will be more than one philosophy which, properly understood, unites all speculative truth and eliminates all errcrs; the philosophy of the philosopher Aristotle." and will ever remain, among the great works of the human mind. Certainly the name of Aristotle is seldom mentioned without respect, but probably the number of persons in this country who have a familiar acquaintance with his writings is extremely small, while those who have any acquaintance at all, except at second hand, would, perhaps, not be very much more numerous. He is often referred to, but it is as a kind of mysterious deus ex machina— a name to conjure with, like that of Solomon to the Magicians of the East. It is eminently respectable to adorn a philosophical dissertation, or even a sermon, with a quotation from the Stagirite; but it may be doubted whether such quotations are always obtained from a perusal of his writings. There is, in The causes of this neglect are numerous. the first place, no very satisfactory English translation of most of his works; and the translations that are best are generally fatiguing from too great fidelity to the original. There is great need of an elegant paraphrase, such as Jowett has given of Plato, in order to clearly bring forth those merits that are hidden under an unattractive style. The lack of translations would not be so serious an obstacle, were it not for the failure of our system of education to give the ordinary college graduate such a knowledge of Greek as will enable him a year after leaving college to read even a simple author without painful labor. To the vast majority of what we call our "cultured" classes the Greek and Roman classics are closed books. The study of Latin is usually so conducted that most scholars relinquish it with no feeling except weariness or disgust; while the writers that are usually studied, as they were but imitators of the Greeks, with scarcely a trace of originality, prejudice the mind of the scholar against all classical literature. And as the language is studied practically for the sake of the grammar, the very name of Latin suggests thoughts of etymology and syntax rather than literary enjoyment. The study of Greek, following that of Latin, is approached with a mind prejudiced |