Hickok (Laurens P., D.D., LL.D.). The Logic of Reason, Universal and Eternal. pp. 192. Boston: Lee and Shepard. 1875. Hill (Thomas, D.D., LL.D.). A Statement of the Natural Sources of Theology; with a Discussion of their Validity and of Modern Sceptical Objections; to which is added an Article on the First Chapter of Genesis. Reprinted from the Bibliotheca Sacra. pp. 139.

W. F. Draper. 1877.

Andover:

Huxley (Thomas H., F.R.S., F.L.S.). Lectures on the Theory of Evolution, delivered in New York. Published in Tribune Extra. No. 36, also, with the author's revision, in the Popular Science Monthly for Nov. and Dec. 1876, Jan. 1877.

2. Article on Biology in the ninth edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica. Jackson (Rev. William, M.A., F.S.A.). The Philosophy of Natural Theology. An Essay in Confutation of the Scepticism of the Present Day, which obtained a prize at Oxford, Nov. 26, 1872. pp. xviii, and 398. New York: A. D. F. Randolph and Co. 1875.

LeConte (Dr. John L.) Address before the American Association for the Advancement of Science at Detroit, Michigan, August, 1875. pp. 18. Salem. 1875.

Martineau (James, D.D., LL.D.). Modern Materialism in its Relations to Theology and Religion. With an Introduction by Henry W. Bellows, D.D. 18mo. pp. 211. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1877.

Maxwell (Prof. Clerk). In Article on " Atoms" in the ninth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. He argues the absurdity of "pangenesis," from mathematical calculations regarding the size of atoms. Morse (Professor Edward S.). Paper read before the American Association for the advancement of Science at Buffalo, N. Y. Aug. 1876. Published in Popular Science Review for Nov. and Dec. 1876. pp. 1-16,

181-198.

McCosh (James, D.D., LL.D., President of Princeton College). The Development Hypothesis: Is it Sufficient? 12mo. pp. 104. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers.

1876.

The earlier works of the same author should by no means be neglected. The more important are:

The Method of the Divine Government, Physical and Moral. pp. 547. Especially Book II. pp. 75-257. Edinburgh. 1855.

Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation. pp. 556. Edinburgh.

1857.

The Intuitions of the Mind Inductively Investigated. Revised edition. pp. 448. London. 1865.

Porter (President Noah, D.D., of Yale College). The Human Intellect, etc. pp. 693. Especially Chapter v. of the Fourth Part, on "Design, or Final Cause." New York. 1869.

Smith (Prof. Goldwin). "The Ascent of Man."

Article in Macmillan's

Magazine for Jan. 1877. pp. 10. Republished in Eclectic Magazine for March. Socrates. Reported in Xenophon's Memorabilia. Book I. chap. 4 and Book IV. chap. 3. This author is not very recent, neither are the Bridgewater Treatises, to which the reader should be referred, fully up to date, but there is as much meaning in them now as ever, and, as modern science is trying to show, a little more.

Wallace (Alfred Russell). The Geographical Distribution of Animals, with a Study of the Relations of Living and Extinct Forms as Elucidating the Past Changes of the Earth's Surface. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 503, 607. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1876.

Address at the Glasgow Meeting of the British Association. Published in the American Journal of Science and Arts for Nov. 1876. pp. 354-85.

Weismann (Prof. August). Studien zur Descendenz-Theorie. II. Uber die letzten Ursachen der Transmutationen, Mit fünf Farbendrucktafeln. 8vo. pp. 336. Leipzig. 1876.

Wilder (Rev. M. A.) Natural Law and Spiritual Agency. Article in New Englander, Vol. xxxiii. (Oct. 1874). pp. 674-702. This is a very satisfactory vindication of the general doctrine of Mind in Nature.

I. Is there Design in Nature?

IF on shaking a quantity of type in a basket it should appear that some of the pieces stuck together, when they fell, in such order as to compose the story of Moses in the bulrushes, could we resist the conclusion that these particular types were loaded with the design of composing that story, on condition that they were well shaken? Indeed, should we not see more design in type thus endowed than in ordinary "pie," from which an intelligible sentence can be formed only by the direct efforts of a highly skilled workman?

We read the design in the complicated and intelligible adaptation of the final result. It is no prejudice to our conclusion to show that the forces producing this delicate adaptation have passed through a variety of transformations, and that their origin is out of sight. Whatever that might prove, it would in no manner disprove origination in an intelligent designer. The atmosphere of modern speculation is not inimical to the Paleyan argument when properly understood, but is rather a positive supporter of it.

We hear much about the conservation of force. Energy may be cast down from one seat and another, but it cannot be destroyed. It is protean in its forms. There is a principle of continuity in nature. Lines of force which we see in operation in present phenomena may be traced backward into more indefinite, because less known, forms; but they cannot be run so far back as to project behind adequate causation. It is precisely so with the evidence of design in complicated adaptations of nature. Chance produces nothing definite and orderly. Nature "conserves" design as much as it does. force, and in much the same manner.

"One day at Naples," says a French writer, "a certain person in our presence put six dice into a dice-box, and offered a wager that he would throw sixes with the whole set. I said that the chance was possible. He threw the dice in this way twice in succession; and I still observed, that possibly he had succeeded by chance. He put back the dice into the box for the third, fourth, and fifth time, and invariably threw sixes with the whole set. By the blood of Bacchus,' I exclaimed, 'the dice are loaded'; and so they were.

Philosophers, when I look at the order of nature that is constantly reproduced, its fixed laws, its successive changes, invariably producing the same effect, when I consider that there is but one chance which can preserve the universe in the state in which we now see it, and that this always happens, in spite of a hundred millions of other possible chances of perturbation and destruction,-I cry out, 'Surely, Nature's dice are also loaded."

The adaptations which we behold in such profusion in nature, may each of them, with respect both to their secon dary causes and their final causes, be compared to a river like the Mississippi, flowing past our doors. We shall not be able to dispense with the idea of design in the location of the river by showing that the channel was not dug by the

How little sense there is in attributing orderly manifestations to chance, especially such adaptations as those by which we live and move and have our being, we have shown in previous Articles. See Bib. Sac., Vol. xxxii. pp. 544-547; also Vol. xxxiii. pp. 669, 674, 676, and 687; see also, Hill's Natural Sources of Theology, p. 77 f.; J. S. Mill's Inductive Logic, Book iii., chapters 17 and 18; Bowen, on Metaphysical and Ethical Science, pp. 165-171; Jevons's Principles of Science, Vol. i. p. 225 ff.

2 The Abbé Galiani in discussion with Diderot, translated and quoted by Bowen from Dugald Stewart's notes.

use of spades, and the material removed on wheelbarrows; for that is only one way, and is not God's way, of forming a canal. The nature of the instrument used in accomplishing an object has nothing whatever to do with the fact of a design. We may, if we please, trace the Mississippi back through all its numerous tributaries to the raindrops and the skies, but we are still in a charmed and closed circle of " principles of order," combining for definite results. We never in our investigations get within sight of chaos. What is science but a study of orderly operations? Where order seems to cease, the scientific investigator pauses in bewilderment. "Principles of order" compass his "path and his lying down," they beset him "behind and before." If he "ascend up into heaven they are there; if he take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall they lead him."

In any case of secondary causation we do not care, so far as the argument for the existence of an intelligent designer is concerned, at how many, or at what points, the various elements of design entered. The inference of design in nature is drawn from complexity and niceness of adaptation. This inference need not be affected by any new view of the mode of origination, and cannot be rebutted, except by assigning a sufficient physical cause, irrespective of intelligence. If any one asserts that these adaptations arise from necessity, he is bound to show by what necessity. Until that is shown, the inference of an intelligent cause is as good as it ever was, however much our conception of nature's intricate machinery may be enlarged. Man is himself a designer. The hypothesis that the adaptations of nature had their origin in design is, to say the least, more intelligible than that which ascribes them to necessity. Certainly it devolves upon those who deny or refuse to recognize design in organic complexity, to do more than push back one step, or one hundred steps, the point at which the designing impulse may have been given. They must draw lines of circumvallation around the whole field, and cut off every avenue of approach, or the argument

for design will enter with all its force in spite of them. Sober-minded naturalists do not undertake this task. We do not envy the success of those philososphers who have undertaken it. For, it is as hard to banish the idea of final cause as of efficient causation, and for precisely the same reason.

In the case referred to, of type arranging itself to compose the story of Moses, there is an accumulation of particular designs. In type set up by a printer, a very large part of the particular design enters through his work. But he did not design the type, nor did the type-founder design the story. In this case the skill of the type-setter is called into requisition because the type-maker had not the power or the inclination to go farther in his design than to get the material in readiness for the more specific designs of the printer. But if this type, when shaken sufficiently by horse power in the cellar, would in a square box become 'Milton's "Sonnet on his Blindness," in a round one the "Lord's Prayer," in a tin pan the "Sayings of Poor Richard," and in a rush basket the story of Moses, we have not lost the design because an animal furnished the power which did the shaking. We grant that the animal did not of his own will add anything to the evidence of the design,perhaps he was only trying to get at an ear of corn on a stick before him. But design entered in adjusting the forces to make the mill go. We grant, also, that a person of less skill than a printer could set the mill in operation. But so far as the argument for design is concerned, you have, in bringing forward these considerations, only transferred more of the designing activity to this extraordinary typefounder. The evidence of design is not obscured.

II. Paley did not Reason in a Circle.

Paley, in the second chapter of his Natural Theology, considers the case of one watch being produced from another in a regular series; and shows that such a discovery would only increase our "admiration of the contrivance," and our "conviction of the consummate skill of the contriver."