the sensational happiness he derived from his monotonous existence. The light so well adapted to his marvellous eyes, the agreeable temperature of the waters, the slimy food on which he lived, all this, and more, brought him some degree of pleasure; and that is to be considered a part of the final cause of his existence. But a far higher purpose is served in the adaptation of his complicated organism, and the position of his tomb in a sedimentary deposit, to arrest the attention and direct the reasoning of a scientific observer. The pleasure of one lofty thought is worth more, and so more fitted to be with the Creator an object of design, than a whole herd of sensational pleasures. A page of Darwin has, to a single reader, more "value in use" than all the elements had, to the whole race of the trilobites in Silurian seas. Yet the latter, with their marks in the rocks,-what are present as well as what are absent, when correlated with general laws of production and preservation, may have been necessary before ever the thought which illuminates the page of the naturalist could have been engendered. This leads us to the real question of the doctrine of final causes, a question that also lies at the foundation of the authority of conscience. And here the modern bent of the scientific mind allies itself with Theism as opposed to Deism, and with the intuitional theory of morals as opposed to the utilitarian.

VII. The Revelation of God is the Highest End of Nature.

With those modern men of science who give attention to the philosophy which really underlies their processes of thought, the combination of marks in the organic world pointing to the affinity of all species with each other, is held to be of the very highest value as God's hand-writing. The men of science would live "not by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God." The temporal uses to which the various incidents of the development were put, are of infinitely less account than the purpose they serve in revealing the eternal glory of the Creator.

The very doctrine of final causes which leads us, as theolo

gians, to look for occasional miracles in the administration of God's moral system, would, perhaps, persuade us not to look for them previous to the establishment of that system. In the true doctrine of final causes the wants of rational creatures must be supposed to be the principal object kept in view by the Creator. "How much better is a man than a sheep"? "Are ye not of more worth than many sparrows"? And of the wants of such beings the most imperious is that of a means of communication with each other and with the Creator. Thus the persistent adherence of the Creator to a definite plan of operations, and the trustworthiness of the marks revealing the style of his workmanship and handwriting, become essential elements in the well-being of a progressive and immortal race. It is confidence in this uniformity of manifestation as involving the veracity of supreme goodness, that renders it possible to have communion and fellowship either with our fellow creatures or with our Creator. It is this intuition of the value to us of uniformity in the ordinary operation of divine power, which makes a miracle miraculous, and therefore an instructive attestation; i.e. which makes a break in the appareut uniformity for moral ends conceivable and cognizable.

The theistic hypothesis which acknowledges the need of the revelation of the Bible has this special merit, that it brings into prominence the inscrutability of the ways of God. A prominent assumption at the bottom of the reasoning of theists regarding the revelation given in the Bible, is that we have less power to interpret, in the narrow sense, the final causes of existing things, than we have to discern the marks of God's veracity in revealing a law of conduct for us. Indeed, this revelation of a law of duty to us, is a large part of the final cause of all things. Our faith in Scripture rests on the intuition that, with the conscious limitations of power and experience belonging to human reason, it is easier for us to recognize the authenticity of the hand-writing of God, than it is to interpret the ultimate end which a particular part of the creation is designed to serve. The veracity of God in his dealings with

us flows more directly from his goodness than any other of his moral qualities. Confidence in the marks of his veracity as guides of our conduct is what constitutes faith. In these marks of God's veracity in revealing himself to us, we have a provisional guide in practical morality. The instincts of our nature have thus a certain amount of authority from God. And with reference to the Bible, though its revelations are beyond the reach of reason, and are many of them profoundly mysterious, yet the veracity of God is so bound up in the evidence of its genuineness, and of its authority on moral subjects, that we accept it as a rule of action, with all there is in it to stagger the reason.

It is upon the same department of our reasoning powers that the present scientific habit of thought makes its demands. It denies our power exhaustively to interpret the final cause of the narrow fields of nature which we explore. It says, the true spirit of theism, the full meaning of this is above our sight, and we do not attempt to comprehend it. We will acknowledge to the fullest extent the uses to which all these contrivances are and may be put. But we still hold that there are irrefragable evidences that these uses are but incidental in working out a master scheme, whose law of development we dimly discern. We transfer you from the narrow and delusive study of the final cause of the things as isolated and in themselves, to contemplate the final cause of the whole scheme of nature. In that infinite scheme, so the thoughtful man of science must say we believe that the good which may come from being able to discover the truth in the works of God and to enlarge our conceptions of his plans, may be far greater than that possible to arise in connection with the transient sensational uses which a contrivance is allowed to serve. That is, God has taken more pains to reveal to us his methods and laws, than to reveal his particular ends. It is the supremest mark of design that the method of God should be so admirably correlated to the capacity of our understanding. The revelation of God himsclf is the larger part of the final cause of creation.

It is in place to remark here that a question altogether similar to the foregoing has to be considered when we seek for the ground of the authority of conscience. Is conscience guided by a direct perception of the utility of its commands, or by an indirect belief that certain impulses and intuitions are infallible guides to utility? The latter is most certainly the case. Man cannot refrain from acting till he has demonstrated the utility of his choice. He obeys certain impulses, and intuitions, and tendencies of mind, as being the voice of God. Within certain limits he does not discern the utility of purity or honesty, but accepts obedience to the voice of God as infallibly leading to the highest utility. General principles have more weight in sanctioning moral action than a narrow circle of visible results. There is the same distinction as this between the prevailing scientific interpretation of final causes and the ordinary method.

To prevent misapprehension it may be well, in conclusion, to state more explicitly our position. The universe is made. for happiness of one sort or another. There is no happiness in the universe, not even that of the smallest insect, but such as was designed by the Creator. The system, however, was chosen as a whole. The prospective pleasure of the worm had some power as an element determining to the creation. as it is, it was a part of that sufficient reason which moved the divine being to creative activity in the modes which we witness. But there are grades of happiness, and hierarchies of being. The same impulse of the designing mind which leads to a provision for the sensational happiness of the oyster, leads also to the subordination of the oyster to the higher orders of being. The welfare of oysters, of birds, and of men, were elements in the final cause which led to the creation as it is. But for the sake of the oysters, God would have made the world somewhat different from what it is. But for the sake of the birds, he would have made it still more different. Had it not been that man was to be incorporated in the scheme, the plan would have been very different indeed. It is important, for both men of science and

theologians to occupy that median position, where the truth lies; on the one hand avoiding the presumption which aspires by searching to "find out" God, and on the other hand, shunning that false humility which disowns our divine birthright of reason, a birthright which enables us to penetrate to some extent into the realm of both final and secondary causes, and to partially answer the two inseparable questions, how does God work? and what does he work for?

It may have been observed that the order announced for the treatment of the subjects in this series of papers has been departed from in the present discussion. What was announced as the fifth, is given as the fourth of the series. This was partly due to the desire to present first, the subjects which were least theological; though to some, this paper may seem theological enough. What follows, however, in succeeding Articles must be still more deeply tinctured with theology. But we beg our scientific readers, if we have any, to be patient with us, as we have been with them. Theology, even more than science, suffers from fragmentary treatment. If the men of science object to the petty criticisms, and narrow judgments, of those who have only a superficial acquaintance with the problems presented in nature; so may students. of theology complain, if the system of thought to which the great body of Christendom has given its assent is set aside without being adequately understood. "We be brethren," all of us, gathering pebbles along the shore of the same illimitable ocean.