"We have bought," say the directors of the works, "two talents of lead for fastening the small figures of the frieze at Sostratus, of the burgh of Melitus, 10 drachmas." They also designate eleven or twelve pieces, name the artists which were charged with these, and indicate the price which was paid for them. These curious details deserve to be transcribed entire.

Phyromachus of Kephisia: The young man with a cuirass, 60 drachmas; Praxias of Melitus: ... and the person seen from behind who drives him back, 120 drachmas; Antiphanes of the Ceramicus: The chariot, the young man, and the two horses which are yoked to the chariot, 240 drachmas; Phyromachus of Kephisia: The man leading a horse, 60 drachmas; Myrmion of Agryle: The horse, the man who strikes him, and the column which he has added later, 120 drachmas; Soclus of Alope: The man holding the bridle, 60 drachmas; Phyromachus of Kephisia: The man standing near the altar, leaning on his staff, 60 drachmas; Iasos of Collytus: The woman before whom the young girl is kneeling, 80 drachmas."

Among the pieces preserved in the little Museum of the Acropolis are two mentioned in this inscription: the young girl kneeling, work of Iasos, and the three rearing horses abreast, which were yoked to a chariot.

The question whether these marbles were painted is discussed very fairly; and that they were painted is, to our mind, satisfactorily proved. First, there are traces of colors, such as blue and green, about the triglyphs of the Parthenon, and ornaments of the ceiling and friezes of the various temples. Secondly, the accounts containing the very sums paid to the painters have been found and deciphered; thus: scaffoldings for the painters of the interior ceiling; painters for having painted the cymatium on the interior architrave at the rate of five oboli a foot; gilders — for having gilded the conchs; to a painter who has painted the cymatium on the interior architrave at the rate of five oboli a foot, 113 feet; gold bought for the conchs, 166 leaves at 1 drachma the leaf, of Adonis, living in Melitus. These registers establish the decoration of the upper parts of the temple, but only of the upper parts.

Antiquity tells us that Phidias sculptured the great Chrysclephantine statue of Athena. But we are left to conjecture whether the colossal statues of the pediments, the reliefs of the metopes, and the exquisite bassreliefs of the frieze of the Parthenon are wrought by his hand, or designed by his genius. M. Beulé says: "I admit that, by the wish of Pericles, Phidias chose the men and distributed the works. But as it happens today in similar enterprises, each master, once called and his programme accepted, remains free and sovereign in his atelier surrounded by his pupils and workmen." Public opinion gives the name of Phidias more particularly to the frieze. His part in the vast work may have been the general design, the execution of some pieces for models, and a direct in

fluence on the studies of his pupils. His inspirations, his counsels, his surveillance conducted the execution and sustained in an unknown manner the pupils whom he initiated in his art.

The elaborate description which these volumes contain of the Parthenon suggests many hints with regard to the architecture of Christian churches. The very structure of this temple indicates introspection, thoughtfulness, calmness, and dignity of spirit. Men who go into such a house of worship do not go in for the sake of looking out of the windows. The whole plan of the Parthenon is seen at once, and makes a permanent impression on the mind. There are fifty elaborate church edifices which we have looked at a hundred times, long before and long since we examined the Parthenon, but we cannot, even now, form in our minds an exact picture of those churches. Some of them even now are entirely indistinct in our memories; but the size and form and proportions of the Parthenon are indelibly impressed on our mind. It is certainly a great perfection of architecture that such rare beauty is allied to such admirable simplicity.

The Parthenon has been the delight and wonder of all ages. The beauty of its remaining stately columns still pleases the eye of the traveller. The blocks of marble are so firmly united that they look like one shaft. The shattered fragments tell how they were once put together. Each block had a square hole in the centre, into which was fitted a piece of hard wood, of a somewhat cylindrical form. The wood in the lower block had a round hole. The wood in the upper stone was prolonged into a pivot corresponding to the hole in the lower drum. These two were then placed the one over the other. In order to make the adhesion perfect, the surface of each of these blocks was divided into The inner and outer were polished. The two others were hammered or slightly grooved, so that, in moving the top drum round upon the other like a mill-stone, all unevenness was ground into a powder, and every crevice was filled; not even the blade of a pen-knife can enter the joint. Many unfinished blocks lying on the ground have two ear-like projections on the rough stone for handles. After the operation of grinding is completed, these are taken off, and when the column is in place it is fluted.

zones.

It is scarcely forty years since the curvatures of the stylobate, architrave, etc., have been discovered. It is for want of these same curves that the Madeleine Church in Paris looks flat and sunken on the roof and elsewhere.

[The preceding is one of a Series of Articles on Art to be continued in future Numbers of the Bibliotheca Sacra].

ARTICLE XII.

GERMAN NOTICES OF MR. ROWLAND G. HAZARD'S VOLUME ON CAUSATION AND FREEDOM IN WILLING.1

THIS volume of a well-known manufacturer in Rhode Island has been translated into the German language. It has been briefly, but favorably reviewed in the Literarisches Centralblatt for June 24, 1876; also in the Illustrirte Deutsche Monatshefte for January 1877, and in other German periodicals. The following notice is from the Theolog. Jahresbericht, Vol. x. No. 12. We cannot but regard it as an honor to our country that the speculations of what we call a "business-man" and "a man of affairs" should attract so much attention among European scholars. He is studied by theological students as if he were a professed theologian, and by philosophical inquirers as if his life had been consumed in the schools.

The author is highly esteemed in North America as a writer upon metaphysics. The present work, translated into German, shows that this esteem is well deserved. For many years I have not seen any philosophical investigations more sterling and more profound than these. And the results, in several of the most important questions of human knowledge and human life, at which the author arrives, seem to me to deserve in the highest degree the attention of all thinking minds. His problem is the great question of freedom in willing, in its relation to the general laws of the universe. It is notorious that our philosophers, and still more the naturalists of our time, are most of them about to decide this question in a way most unfavorable, if not destructive, to freedom. The answer is either pantheistic, - i.e. "determinative," and sacrifices human freedom to unknown fate; or it is atheistic, — i.e. "naturalistic,”—and sacrifices it to the Moloch of matter. Hazard shows that this method does not, and cannot, solve the mysteries of life, that it creates unending difficulties, and that it is as little honorable to the culture of our age, in other respects so great, as it would be to abandon the system of Copernicus, and to return to that of Ptolemy or Tycho Brahe. For to suppose, as many do in our time, that human actions are not a product of man's intelligence and will, but only of the space and time in which man finds himself; to suppose that all the facts and phenomena of the world do not depend

1 Two Letters on Causation and Freedom in Willing, addressed to John Stuart Mill; with an Appendix on the Existence of Matter, and our notions of Infinite Space. By Rowland G. Hazard. English edition, Boston: Lee and Shepard. 1869. German edition, New York: B. Westerman, and Co. 1875.

upon an intelligent, self-knowing, and free-acting God, but on a multiplicity of unconscious and un-free agencies in matter - this fact" shows a retrograde movement in ideas, carrying us farther back than the mythology of the Greeks, or the rude notions of our Indian tribes, and landing us substantially in fetichism. Though the time is past in which mere power was deemed the proper object of worship, still, if we believed that all the beneficent and aesthetic conditions of existence were caused by material phenomena and events, we could hardly fail, as rational and emotional beings, to adore them" (Eng. ed. pp. 61, 62; Germ. ed. p. 65).

'The author shows it to be very difficult to pronounce more than bare suppositions on the originating cause of all things, or on the origin of the world. But one thing is certain: "All theories of causation, when traced to their foundation, must bring us to something which is already active, or that has in itself the ability to become so" (Eng. ed. p. 71; Germ. ed. p. 76). Can this be matter? Never! To understand its motion and action it would still be necessary to assume another force operating upon and preceding matter. Or might we believe that matter and mind have been co-existent from eternity? Once more, never! "We can only judge as to what was by what has since been. From secondary causes (or uniform modes of God's action now observable) the geologist seeks to trace the history of the formation of the rocks of our globe, through the mutations of a time which it overtasks the imagination to compass; as the astronomer, with a mightier stretch of thought, reconstructs the universe, and unfolds the mysteries of creation in its various stages of development. And if for all this we rely upon mere observation for our facts, and trust that the forces which we now detect in such minute proportions in the laboratory were then magnificently active in the great laboratory of nature, that the principles which now apply to the formation of a soap-bubble then applied to the formation of suns and satellites, may we not have as rational and as philosophic faith that the only power which we now know that can begin change, and modify and direct the material forces in our own little sphere, was then also active throughout the realms of space that intelligence, so limited in us, in a mightier form sought, designed, and executed the symmetrical arrangement which so harmonizes with our own sentiment of beauty and love of order, with our aspirations for the sublimely vast and our admiration of the minutely perfect" (Eng. ed. pp. 72, 73; Germ. ed. pp. 77, 78).

'It is not matter; mind is the primary, the first cause in the system of the universe. And it is the power of mind, and by no means that of matter or physical substance, on which the individual facts and phenomena in the progress of the world depend. "That by observation we have found that certain events uniformly succeed certain other events is, then, a fact of great practical importance, enabling us to predict or conjecture, with more or less of certainty, the future course of events by which we are

liable to be affected. But it is thus important only for the reason that we have power in ourselves to act upon the future, and make it different from what, without our efforts, this uniformity in the flow of events indicates that it would be. If we had no such causal power, then this knowledge of the uniformity of the succession of certain consequents to certain antecedents would be of no practical importance, and inductive science would rank among those which merely furnish a play-ground for the intellect, or gratify an idle curiosity. It may be said that we only add our efforts to the other antecedents; but if we really do this, and thus change the subsequent events, or the order of them, we act as cause, modifying the effects of all causes extrinsic to us, though the relation of consequents to the antecedents, which embrace these efforts, is not less uniform than in other cases. Except in regard to instinctive actions, it is because of the uniformity in the effects of effort that we can know how to influence the future. This uniformity may arise from an occult connection, making it a necessity; but this does not affect the question of our freedom in making the effort" (Eng. ed. pp. 74, 75; Germ. ed. pp. 79, 80).

'The above quotation gives the principal contents of the first letter (Eng. ed. pp. 3-80; Germ. ed. pp. 1-84). The second and larger letter (Eng. ed. pp. 81-254; Germ. ed. pp. 89-274) mainly treats the question advanced by Hartmann's latest philosophy - how to consider the action of the active subject, since it is influenced by such untold numbers of outward relations and events of all kinds. Can we, in the face of these latter, really speak of freedom in human willing and human action? Or is all that man speaks, thinks, and does perhaps only a necessary result of the space and time in which he finds himself? Is the world in general and particular ruled by something conscious or unconscious? (To use an illustration of my own, must the political eminence which the new German empire possesses since the year 1870 over other powers be considered a mere result of the position of certain political constellations that unconsciously favorably arranged themselves? Or must we regard it as the consciously intended fruit of its own knowing and willing, of its progress towards power and liberty?) As might be expected after the first letter, the author takes a firm stand on the ideal side, on the side of consciousness and freedom of mind as against matter. He does not over-rate the truth of such expressions as "motion and action of matter." But if what happens must needs be the result of effort in some potent agent, he says, and surely with justice: "We never think or speak of the effort of matter. All effort is of the mind, which has no other mode of exerting its power" (Eng. ed. p. 120; Germ. ed. p. 129). "An unconscious effort is in thought as absurd as an unfelt feeling" (Eng. ed. p. 129; Germ. ed. p. 139). Of unintelligent matter it must be said that it "must be moved by something not itself, and then cannot stop its motion or change its direction, but for these also requires to be acted