vary, more or less, as those vibrations vary. In that expression, our Thoughts, he comprises all our Sensations, all our reflections and passions: yea, and all our Volitions, and consequently our Actions, which he supposes, unavoidably follow those vibrations. He premises," But you will say, this Scheme infers the universal necessity of human Actions: And frankly adds, "Certainly it does. I am sorry for it: But I cannot help it."

5. And this is the Scheme which is now adopted, by not a few of the most sensible men in our nation. One of these fairly confessing, that "He did not think himself a sinner," was asked, "Do you never feel any wrong Tempers? And do you never speak or act in such a manner as your own Reason condemns?" He candidly answered, "Indeed I do. I frequently feel tempers, and speak many words, and do many actions, which I do not approve of, But I cannot avoid it. They result, whether I will or not, from the vibrations of my Brain, together with the motion of my blood, and the flow of my animal Spirits. are not in my own power. I cannot help them. They are independent on my choice. And therefore I cannot apprehend myself to be a sinner on this account."

But these

6. Very lately another Gentleman in free conversation, was carrying this matter a little farther. Being asked, "Do you believe GOD is Almighty ?" He answered, “I do; or be could not have made the world." "Do you believe he is wise?" "I cannot tell. Much may be said on both sides." "Do you believe he is Good?" "No. I cannot believe it: I believe just the contrary. For all the evil in the world is owing to Him: I can ascribe it to no other cause. I cannot blame that cur for barking or biting: it is his nature: and he did not make himself. I feel wrong tempers in myself. But that is not my fault; for I cannot help it. It is my nature: And I could not prevent my having this nature, neither can I change it."

7. The Assembly of Divines, who met at Westminster in the last Century, express very nearly the same sentiment, though placed in a different light. They speak to this

effect: "Whatever happens in time, was unchangeably determined from all eternity. GOD ordained or ever the world was made, all the things that should come to pass therein. The greatest and the smallest events, were equally predetermined; in particular all the thoughts, all the words, all the actions of every child of man: All that every man' thinks, or speaks, or does, from his birth, till his Spirit returns to God that gave it." It follows, that no man can do either more or less good, or more or less evil than he does. None can think, speak, or act, any otherwise than he does, not in any the smallest circumstance. In all, he is bound by an invisible, but more than adamantine chain. No man can move his head or foot, open or shut his eyes, lift his hand, or stir a finger, any otherwise than as GOD determined he should, from all eternity.

8. That this chain is invisible, they allow :, Man himself perceives nothing of it. He suspects nothing less: He imagines himself to be free in all his Actions. He seems to move hither and thither, to go this way or that, to choose doing evil, or doing good, just at his own discretion. But all this is an entire mistake, it is no more than a pleasing dream. For all his ways are fixed, as the pillars of heaven; all-unalterably determined. So that notwithstanding these gay, flattering appearances,

"In spite of all the labour we create,

We only row; but we are steer'd by Fate!"

9. A late Writer, in his celebrated book upon Free-will, explains the matter thus. "The soul is now connected with a material vehicle, and placed in the material world. Various objects here continually strike upon one or other of the bodily organs. These communicate the impression to the Brain; consequent on which such and such sensations follow. These are the materials on which the Understanding works, in forming all its simple and complex ideas : according to which our judgments are formed. And according to our Judgments are our Passions; our Love and Hate, Joy and Sorrow, Desire and Fear, with their innumerable combinations. Now all these Passions together are the Will

*

variously modified. And all Actions flowing from the Will, are voluntary Actions. Consequently they are Good or Evil, which otherwise they could not be. And yet it is not in man to direct his own way, while he is in the body, and in the World."

10. The Author of an Essay on Liberty and Necessity,. published some years since at Edinburgh, speaks still more explicitly, and endeavours to trace the matter to the foundation." The impressions," says he, "which man receives in the Natural world, do not correspond to the truth of things. Thus the Qualities called Secondary, which we by natural instinct attribute to matter, belong not to Matter, nor exist without us: But all the Beauty of colours with which Heaven and Earth appear clothed, is a sort of romance or illusion. For in external objects there is really no other distinction, but that of the size and arrangement of their constituent parts, whereby the rays of light are variously reflected and refracted," p. 152, &c.

"In the Moral World, whatever is a cause, with regard to its proper effect, is an effect with regard to some prior cause, and so backward without end. Events therefore being a train of causes and effects, are necessary and fixed. Every one must be, and cannot be other ways than it is," p. 157, &c.

“And yet a feeling of an opposite kind is deeply rooted in our nature. Many things appear to us, as not predetermined by any invariable law. We naturally make a distinction, between things that must be, and things that may be, or may not.

"So with regard to the Actions of men. We see that connexion between an action and its motive to be so strong, that we reason with full confidence, concerning the future actions of others. But if Actions necessarily arise from their proper motives, then all human actions are necessary and fixed. Yet they do not appear so to us. Indeed before any particular action, we always judge, that the Action will be the necessary result of some motive. But

afterwards the feeling instantly varies. We accuse and condemn a man for doing what is wrong. We conceive, he had a power of acting otherwise, and the whole train of our feelings suppose him to have been entirely a free Agent."

"But what does this Liberty amount to? In all cases, our choice is determined by some motive. It must be determined by that motive, which appears the best upon the whole. But motives are not under our power or direction. When two motives offer, we have not the power of choosing as we please. We are necessarily determined."

"Man is passive in receiving impressions of things; according to which the Judgment is necessarily formed. This the Will necessarily obeys, and the outward action necessarily follows the Will.

"Hence it appears, that GOD decrees all future Events. He who gave such a nature to his creatures, and placed them in such circumstances, that a certain train of actions must necessarily follow: He who did so, and who must have foreseen the consequences, did certainly decree, That those events should fall out, and that men should act just as they do.

"The Deity is the First Cause of all things. He formed the plan on which all things were to be governed, and put it in execution by establishing both in the Natural and Moral World, certain Laws that are fixed and immutable. By virtue of these, all things proceed in a regular train of causes and effects, bringing about the events contained in the original plan, and admitting the possibility of no other. This Universe is a vast Machine winded up and set a-going. The several springs and wheels act unerringly upon one another. The hand advances and the clock strikes, précisely as the Artist has determined. In this plan, Man, a rational creature, was to fulfil certain ends. He was to appear as an Actor, and to act with consciousness and spontaneity. Consequently it was necessary he should have some Idea of Liberty, some feeling of things possible and contingent, things depending on himself, that he might be led to exercise that activity, for which he was designed. To have

seen himself a part of that great Machine, would have been altogether incongruous to the ends he was to fulfil. Had he seen that nothing was contingent, there would have been no room for forethought, nor for any sort of industry or care. Reason could not have been exercised in the way it is now; that is, man could not have been man. But now, the moment he comes into the world, he acts as a freeagent. And Contingency, though it has no real existence in things, is made to appear as really existing. Thus is our natural feeling directly opposite to truth and matter of fact: seeing it is certainly impossible, that any man should act any otherwise than he does."

See Necessity drawn at full length, and painted in the most lively colours!

II. 1. It is easy to observe, That every one of these Schemes implies the universal Necessity of human Actions. In this they all agree, that Man is not a free, but a necessary Agent, being absolutely determined in all his Actions, by a principle exterior to himself. But they do not agree, what that principle is. The most ancient of them, the Manichæan, maintained, that men are determined to evil, by the evil God, Arimanius: That Oromasdes, the Good GOD, would prevent, or remove that evil, but cannot: the power of the evil God being so great, that he is not able to control it.

2. The Stoics, on the other hand, did not impute the evil that is in the world to any intelligent principle, but either to the original stubbornness of matter, which even Divine Power was not capable of removing: To the concatenation of Causes and Effects, which no power whatever could alter: Or to unconquerable Fate, to which they supposed all the gods, the Supreme not excepted, to be subject.

3. The Author of two volumes entitled Man, rationally rejects all the preceding Schemes, while he deduces all human Actions from those Passions and Judgments, which, during the present union of the Soul and Body, necessarily result from such and such vibrations of the fibres of the Brain. Herein he indirectly ascribes the necessity of all