the sinner; which justice must inflict, before it can be properly satisfied: nor can it possibly admit of a surety here; because it can only punish him whom it first finds guilty; and not by reckoning him to be what he is not, according to human quibbles, but according to divine equity, which can only declare such guilty on whom the fault is found, and can only find the fault on such who have committed it." These expressions manifestly declare, (1) That Christ is a sinner, and committed the sin or fault for which he suffered, and that not by imputation and as the surety of his people, but really and literally. (2) That sin can be atoned for by the suffering of eternal death only. This and this only will properly satisfy justice.-(3) That therefore, as Christ is the propitiation for our sins, he is now, and will without end, be suffering eternal death.

But I need not trouble the reader with any further remarks on such wild and confused mysticism; such horrid doctrine.

III. Remarks on M. Petitpierre's "Thoughts on the Divine Goodness, relative to the government of moral agents, particularly displayed in future rewards and punishments."

This author is a Swiss, who was a clergyman in his own country; but falling into universalism, was censured and deposed. After this he went to London, where he published the book which is now the subject of remark. It first appeared in French, and was published in English in 1788.

If I mistake not, the fundamental principles of this book are these two,-That the sinner on the footing of strict justice, deserves no other punishment, than that which is necessary to lead him, to repentance and pre

pare him for happiness-That the happiness of every individual creature is necessary to the greatest happiness of the general system.

In page 38th, of the preceding work, a quotation or two was made to show, that the first of the two propositions now mentioned, is a principle of this author. To those quotations a great part of his book may be added to show the same; but I shall add the following sentences only. The Deity being infinitely just, will inflict on the wicked just and equitable punishments; punishments exactly proportioned both in degree and duration, to the nature and extent of their crimes."*. "The second rule which divine justice follows in the dispensation of punishment, is, to employ rigour only so much, and so long, as shall be necessary to the destruction of sin, and the conversion of the sinner.”†—“ The third rule of divine justice in the dispensations of sufferings, informs us, when the Supreme Being ceases punishment;" i. e. when the sinner repents." We have established a principle whence to form consistent ideas of the justice and severity of God, who punishes the wicked that he might bless them in turning them every one from their iniquities."§-Infinite justice adapts with the most perfect and minute detail, the respective suitableness of his dealing to our moral state, and consequently to our wants, throughout the whole of our existence."|| On these quotations it may be remarked,

1. That according to this plan, the most exact and rigorous justice, divine justice, infinite justice, admits that a sinner be made to suffer till he repents, and no further. Such a punishment as this, is "exactly proportioned both in degree and duration, to the nature and extent of

* Page 91. † Page 102. | Page 76.

‡ Page 110.

! Page 137.

the crimes" of the sinner. This then is the utmost which the divine law will admit: this is the true curse of the divine law; even that curse from which Christ hath redeemed us.

2. This punishment inflicted on any sinner, utterly precludes all pardon, forgiveness and mercy. How is he forgiven, who suffers to the utmost extent of justice? How is any sparing mercy exercised toward him, on whom the curse of the law is fully executed?—Yet M. Petitpierre constantly holds, that the salvation of sinners is effected in the way of mercy, pardon and forgiveness. Thus, speaking of the divine goodness, he says,* "Are men miserable? It is termed that infinite compassion he has for their wretchedness.-But when by a sincere repentance they turn from their iniquity, then it is his clemency, his pardon, his mercy, and his grace, that is extended to them."-"How striking, how awful, and at the same time how merciful, are the representations of future torments !"-" He will constantly pardon, and receive into favour the sincerely penitent, offender. Repentance appeases divine anger and disarms its justice, because it accomplishes the end infinite goodness has in view, even when arrayed in the awful majesty of avenging justice; which was severe, because the moral state of the sinner required such discipline; and which when that state is reversed by conversion-will have nothing to bestow suitable to it, but the delightful manifestations of mercy and forgiveness." It seems then, that not only is justice satisfied by the repentance of the sinner; but justice, even the awful majesty of avenging justice, will bestow mercy and forgiveness. But how forgiveness can be an act of justice, and especially an act of avenging justice, remains to be explained.

* Page 6. † Page 109.

3. The punishment now under consideration, is utterly inconsistent with redemption by Christ. How are they redeemed or delivered from the curse of the law, who in their own persons suffer that curse? And if Christ should deliver them from it, he would deprive them of an inestimable benefit.

4. If "infinite justice adapts with the most perfect and minute detail, the respective suitableness of his dealings to our moral state, and consequently to our wants, throughout the whole of our existence;" then what is goodness? and how is it distinguished from justice? What more kind and favourable than this, can goodness, the divine goodness, infinite and incomprehensible goodness, do for us? According to this definition of infinite justice, the institutions, promises and scheme of the gospel, nay the unspeakable gift of Christ himself, are mere communications of justice, and not of goodness and grace : and according to the same definition there never has been, and never can be, any benefit granted by the Deity to any of his creatures, which is any more than a fruit of mere justice, and which may be withholden consistently with justice': and all that God ever has done, and ever will or can do, for the happiness of his creatures, is barely sufficient to save his character from a well grounded charge of injustice.

But I mean not to dwell on this subject: I do but hint these particulars. It would be an infinite labour to point out the endless absurdities of this scheme of justice and punishment. I have considered the point more largely in chap. ii. to which I beg leave to refer the reader.

The other fundamental principle of this book is, That the happiness of every individual creature is necessary to the greatest happiness of the system. This idea is expressed in various passages, particularly in the following,"It is impossible the Divine Being should ever dis

pense any evil in this world, or in the world to come; which is not even to the individuals an actual exercise of perfect goodness.""*

And that this is necessarily implied in the scheme of this author, and of all others who argue universal salvation from the divine perfections, without respect to the atonement, must be manifest upon the slightest reflection. Goodness will always seek the greatest good or happiness of intelligent beings. And that the happiness of the system is a greater good than the happiness of any individual or individuals of that system, is a self-evident proposition. Therefore goodness will never seek the happiness of any individuals, so as to diminish the happiness of the system: for this would be not to seek the advancement of happiness on the whole, but the diminution of it. If therefore the divine goodness seeks the final happiness of every intelligent creature, it must be because the happiness of every creature promotes and is necessary to secure the greatest happiness of the system. If it be not necessary to the greatest happiness of the system, it is no object to goodness.

Concerning this principle the following strictures are suggested:

1. The truth of it is by no means evident.-Indeed M. Petitpierre supposes the absurdity of the contrary position to be exceedingly clear, and therefore indulges himself in the following ardent effusion: "Can we suppose that intelligent creatures capable by their nature of perfection and felicity, would be unable to attain to this glorious destination, unless at the same time a number of intelligent beings existed in eternal misery? Among creatures of the same nature, thence capable of the same happiness; must a part be made happy at the

* Page 220.