him; for we had never engaged to fupport him in an unjust rebellion against his lawful fovereign; and if by our means the Shah Zada had been eftablished upon the throne of his anceftors, the fame of the juftice of this nation would, at all the courts of the east, have accompanied that of our courage and military conduct. Even Mr. Holwell feems to have been for adopting this measure, or something like it, before he began his close correfpondence with Coffin Aly, after the death of Mhir Jaffeir's fon; and why it was not purfued, or at least attempted, after the accidental death of that prince I cannot divine.

Perhaps, our people in India, like our republican whigs here at home, might imagine, that it would derogate from their character, a true whigs, fhould they attempt to do any thing in favour of the true heir to the Mogul Crown; but the cenforious world will give a very different reafon: they will be apt to fay, the governors of our affairs in India did not attempt to do any thing in favour of the true heir to the Mogul crown; because he had no crores, * either in jewels or ready money, to give privately to any one. He had nothing but promifes to give, which perhaps he might not be able or willing to perform, after being feated upon the throne; and they could not involve the company in a war, for obliging him to perform any promife he had privately made to them. Whereas, Coffim Aly had probably, by cheating his fatherin-law, heaped up vaft fums in jewels and ready money, and confequently, befide making public promifes in favour of the company, could privately pay money in hand, to any perfon that would second his views against his unfortunate father in-law, and this the cenforious world will probably fay, was the cause of our people's joining with Coffim Aly not only against his father in-law, but also against the true heir to the throne of the Mogul empire; tho' I hope it will be made appear, that this

cenfure is entirely void of any foundation.

Now with regard to the zd revolution, or rather intended revolution; for to determine whether it fucceeds or no, we must wait for further accounts from Bengal. In order to ftate the reason for this intended revolution, or breach with our new friend Coffim Aly, I must give fome account of the nature of our trade formerly in the Mogul empire, which I cannot do better than from a pamphlet lately published, called Falts relating to governor Vanfittart's treaty of commerce, as follows;

"By the original phirmaund, fays' this author, or royal grant, in favour of the East India company, they have a right to trade in that country, free of duties; in all articles, and in every place; no diftinction is made as to the kinds of goods, or whether they are for exportation, or for inland commerce. The words of the grant are as extensive as can be expreffed by language, and contain no limitations. The fubfequent treaties with the nabobs, and funnods granted by them, are equally extensive ; and therefore, upon the footing of these grants and treaties, the company have hitherto had a right of carrying on every article of trade, both inland and foreign, free from duties.

It appears however, that the company. did not till fome years ago, carry on trade fo extenfively as their rights allowed them; in particular, they neglected feveral branches of the inland trade, and contented themfelves chiefly with those branches which confifted of exports and imports.

The principal articles of inland trade neglected by the company, were salt, tobacco, and beetle nut: no exception is made in the phirmaund in fubfequent treaties, as to any of these articles, no more than of opium or faltpetre; and therefore there could be no reason to doubt that the company, if they had inclined, might have carried on the trade in thefe articles, as freely as in any other.

Our

Our little acquaintance with the inland part of the country, and our having, till lately, no check upon the country government, was probably the cause that very little of this trade was carried on; and afterwards, when the practice of dealing in falt and tobacco commenced, the company's fervants who carried it on, did not fcruple to pay a fmall duty of 3 to 4 per cent on falt to the country government; and on the tobaccos imported to Dacca, from the country towards Rangamatty, Gualparah, &c. they paid, without objecting, after its arrival at Dacca, a duty of four annas per maund. This duty was inconfiftent with the phirmaund and treaties; but as the duty was fmall, and the trade but lately commenced, no objection was made.

This inland trade does not directly concern the company: it is carried on by the company's fervants. But the right of the company's fervants to carry on trade under their protection, is established upon very folid grounds. The al

lowance given by the company to their fervants abroad is so inconfiderable, that none but the meanest persons could be found to carry on their business, upon the footing of that allowance; the company therefore have always indulged their fervants with the privilege of carrying on trade for their own account, under the protection of the company, as far as was not inconfiftent with the intereft of the company itself. By this means, gentlemen of family and character have been induced to engage in the company's fervice. Of how great confequence this has been, both with refpect to the faithful management of the company's affairs, fituated at such a distance, and to their fuccefs in the late military tranfactions in those parts, muft be obvious to all men.

If the company's fervants were not to be protected in these privileges of trade, the confequence would neceffarily be, that either thefe great affairs must be entrufted to the very dregs of mankind, who, at such a distance, would

be under no check, or the company muft give fuch high falaries and appointments to their fervants, as would be fufficient to engage gentlemen of character and ability to undertake the management of their affairs.

It appears therefore, that the trade allowed to the company's fervants is really an advantage to the company itfelf, and a very great faving to them; and on that account, the company have been almost equally attentive to protect this private trade of their fervants, as they have been to protect their own; and this private trade is univerfally known and understood as a matter with which the profperity of the company has an intimate connection.

Another reason occurs, why this private trade of the company's fervants is intitled to the utmost protection which the company can poffibly afford it, without hurting themselves; namely, that the company have obtained from the governmert a fort of monopoly of the trade to India. This is an infringement of the natural rights of the other fubjects of Great Britain, tho' confidered as a neceffary measure. It is therefore the duty of this company to stretch their monopoly no farther than their own intereft neceffarily requires, and to encourage and support the trade carried on by every British subject, so far as it does not interfere with the company. It is certain that the wealth acquired by individuals, as well as that which is acquired by the company, centers at lait in Great Britain: and thus the private trade of the company's fervants becomes an object in which the state itself is particularly interested.

After lord Clive had re-established the company's affairs in India, and had extended their influence beyond what had ever been known, the company's fervants began to engage more exten. fively in the inland trade."

[The Remainder in our next.]

From.

T

HE Author obferves, that in the first rude ages of Europe, when men fought only to possess and to fecure poffeffion, military prowess was the predominant fpirit of the world; that this fpirit formed the Roman empire, and afterwards divided the nations into the several governments that

were formed out of its ruins.

That afterwards, when leifure gave men time for speculation, and Religion was the only learning in the world, Religion naturally became the ruling fpirit in the policy of Europe; that this fpirit formed and gave away kingdoms; fet up and pulled down fovereigns: this

or

either allied the nations divided them, and formed the balance of power a-, mong them.

That fince the discovery of America, the establishment of a commercial intercourse with Afia, and the fettlement of Europeans on all fides of the Atlantic Ocean and in America, men have felt the power they derive from this new fource, and the spirit of commerce is now becoming the predominant principle that will form the general policy, and rule the powers of Europe.

He fuppofes, that the rife and establifhment of this commercial dominion conftitutes the prefent crisis.

This is the ground-work of his performance; of the fuperftructure, the reader will be able to form a general idea from what follows.

While each country fuppofes that its own government actuates and rules the trade of its respective subjects, there is a general intereft that is not concerned in, nor governed by the separate interefts of particular ftates; that flows in its own channel, and is held in motion by its own laws: this will become the bafis of a commercial dominion, and it is of the utmost importance to conVOL. III.

nect our operations as a nation with it, to as to partake of its influence, and build upon its power. It is not men that form great events, but the crisis of events, duly poffeffed and actuated, that forms great men.

We are not able to form this great commercial power, but we are able to take the lead of it, already formed, and rifing falt into dominion.

This lead, at the beginning of the war, feemed to vibrate between us and the French; it is now in our hands, and, if we keep it, whenever it becomes the foundation of dominion, that do'minion will be ours: our kingdom will be no more confidered as the mere kingdom of this ifland, with its appendages of provinces, colonies, and fettlements, but as a great marine dominion, confifting of our poffeffions in the Atlantic and in America, united into one intereft, of which Great Britain will be

the commercial center.

It is a general maxim, that the trade of colonies fhould be confined to the mother country; but a total infraction of this principle is at prefent abfolutely neceffary, not only to the trade of our colonies, but their existence.

They are not naturally nor artificially united with the interest, and submitted to the dominion of the mother-country; that they may be at war, when the mother-country might otherwife be at peace, the Spanifh war is a proof; that they may be in full poffeflion of the commerce of peace, when the mothercountries may be at war, every war is a proof: they now have an intereft, therefore, which requires a trade independent of the mother-country; and this independent intereft of the feveral colonies of different nations forms a general commercial intereft, diftinct from the intereft of the powers on which they depend: this intereft will natural-' ly lead, under the influence of that branch of bulinefs which predominates in the general intercourfe; and this lead will preclude the effect of all artificial connections which government would create, and form the natural conY

nections

'nections under which these interests actually exist.

The great queftion will be, what ftate will poffefs fuch branch of business, and, in confequence of that, take the lead under this commercial dominion, and unite its government with it.

To enable Great Britain to do this, it is neceffary that the administration at home fhould form fuch an establishment for the direction of fuch interefts and powers, as may lead them in their natural channel, under due connections with the government.

This establishment must be fovereign and fupreme, as to every thing properly in its own department; it must be a fecretary of state's office in itfelf. It fhould have cognizance and direction of the general trade of the kingdom, as far as government can interfere; it fhould be the depofitory and reporter of the ftate and condition of it; of every thing that can advance or obstruct it; and of the state of manufactories, of the fisheries, of the employment of the poor. It should derive every poffible advantage from every event that arifes in commercial politics: apply every poffible remedy to every evil; prepare proper laws for the confideration of parliament; take cognizance and direction of the plantations with respect to government, in every matter judicial or commercial; direct the fettlement of colonies; report to the king in council on all these points, and its official fiat or negative fhould be his majesty's information in council. As to the legiflature of the colonies, it fhould hear and determine all matters of complaint, and of mal-administration of the crownofficers and others in the plantations, and examine witneffes on path. It should correfpond with all 'the fervants of the crown on these points, and iffue the king's orders and inftructions to his fervants.

The executive officer of this department may be either the fecretary of state, or the first lord and other commiffioners of trade, or a minister may be created with all neceffary powers for e department in particular.

The profperity of a trading nation, as well as of a trading fhop-keeper, depends upon having a great number of good customers. The customers we gain under a foreign trade, we are liable to lofe; those whom we can, as it were, create under our own influence, we cannot lose; and fuch are the customers procured by the colonies.

It is the duty and intereft, therefore, of the mother-country to cultivate, protect, and govern its colonies with refpect particularly to two effential points: Firft, That all the profits of their produce and manufactures center in the mother-country. 2dly, That they continue the fole cuftomers of the mothercountry. Care should also be taken to keep them unconnected and independent of each other; because, by a union, they might poffibly shake off their de pendance upon the mother-country, and fet up for themselves. It happens fortunately for us, that they are settled in different manners, live under different modes of government, tho' effentially the fame; and are actuated by different principles, both with refpect to religion and policy. We have therefore little to do but to fecure them in the free and full poffeffion of their rights and privileges, in order to preferve the difunion which thefe differences produce.

Under the guidance therefore of these principles, that the final external profits of the labour and produce of the colonies fhould center in the mothercountry; that the colonists should be the appropriated customers of the mother-country; that the colonies, in their government and trade, should be united in communion with and fubordination to the government of the mother-country, but always unconnected with and independent on each other; and with a fpirit and temper fuitable to the remembrance that their inhabitants are our own people, our brethren, faithful, good, and beneficial fubjects, and either free born Englishmen, or, by adoption, poffeffing all the rights of freedom: let a revifion be made of the general and feveral governments of the

colonies;

zolonies; of their laws and courts of justice; of their trade, and the general British laws of trade, in the several relations in which they ftand to the mother-country, foreign countries and each other.

Upon fuch a review, it will appear, that the two great points which the colonists have in view, are, the estab lishment of their rights and privileges as Englishmen, and the keeping in their own hands the revenue, and the pay of the officers of government, as a fecurity for their conduct.

Under the first of these come all the difputes about the king's inftructions and the governor's power, the fettling and determining which, is of the moft effential import to the liberties of the colonists on one hand, and to their fubordination to the mother-country on the other.

In the examination of this point, it will come under confideration, first, Whether the whole legislature can, in any cafe, be fufpended; and, zdly, whether by the crown alone, or in conjunction with the parliament.

It will also come under examination, whether the votes or orders of the legislatures of the colonies, not reduced to an act, fhall have their effect without being sent home for confirmation, as their acts are by their constitution obliged to be. If it should appear that any of the colonies, by this device, carry the power of their legislature into execution, independent of the crown, even to the fufpending establishments for pay, and precluding the effects of acts which the crown has confirmed; it must be finally determined, whether this fhould or should not be allowed; for a point of fuch importance should never remain queftionable.

Many doubtful points ought to be settled relative to the rules and maxims of their law, especially as they have affumed a power of extending parts not only of the common and ftatute laws of England, but of statutes made fince they had a diftinct legislature. It should also be determined, whether the crown can, or cannot, erect courts, without the concurrence of the Assembly.

There should be no military commander in chief in time of peace; the revenue fhould be raised by customs on trade, a stamp duty, a moderate landtax in lieu of quit-rents, and an excise.

A paper currency ought to be established, under proper regulations; for in colonies, where the balance of trade with the mother-country being against them, their filver money must conftantly decrease, a certain quantity of paper money is abfolutely neceffary.

It is also neceffary, that a revision fhould be made of the laws of trade; a proper improvement of which will produce greater advantages, both to the colonies and the mother country, than carrying the prefent laws into execution, which, however, is impoffible, especially with respect to thofe for confining the trade of the colonies to the mother-country? yet the trade might, by proper regulations, be fo confined; and it is of the utmost importance that it fhould be so.

It is certain, that the colonies should not export but to a British-market, and they should not import but from a Britifh-market; but, in the application of this principle, the prefent law directs, that they shall only export and import to and from Britain. Instead of this, Bri

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