242 SKETCH II. Principles and Progrefs of MORALITY. T HE fcience of morals, like other fciences, is in a very imperfect state among favages; and arrives at maturity among enlightened nations by very flow degrees. This progrefs points out the historical part, as first in order: but as that history would give little fatisfaction, without a rule for comparing the morals of different ages, and of different nations, I begin with the principles of morality, fuch as ought to govern at all times, and in all nations. The present sketch accordingly is divided into two parts. In the first, the principles are unfolded; and the fecond is altogether historical, THE hand of God is no where more visible, than in the nice adjustment of our internal frame to our fituation in this world. An animal is endued with a power of felf-motion; and in performing animal functions, requires not any external aid. This more especially is the case of man, the noblest of terrestrial beings. His heart beats, his blood circulates, his stomach digests, evacuations proceed, &c. &c. By what means? Not furely by the laws of mechanism, which are far from being adequate to fuch operations. The operations mentioned are effects of an internal power, bestow'd on man for preferving life. The power is exerted uniformly, and without interruption, independent of will, and without consciousness. Man is a being fufceptible of pleasure and pain: these generate defire to attain what is agreeable, and to fhun what is difagreeable; and he is enabled by other powers to gratify his defires. One power, termed inftinct, is exerted indeed with consciousness; but blindly, without will, and without intention to produce any effect. Brute animals act for the most part by instinct: hunger prompts them to eat, and cold, to take fhelter; knowingly indeed, but without exerting any act of will, and without forefight of what will happen. Infants of the human fpecies, little fuperior to brutes, are, like brutes, governed by instinct: they lay hold of the nipple, without knowing that fucking will fatisfy their hunger; and they weep when pained, without any view of relief *. Another power is governed by intention and will. In the progrefs from infancy to maturity, the mind opens to objects, with * Akin to thefe, are certain habitual acts done without thought, fuch as fnuffing or grinning. Cuftom enables one to move the fingers on an inftrument of mufic, without being directed by will: the motion is often too quick for an act of will. Some arrive at great perfection in the art of balancing: the flightest deviation from the just balance is inftantly redreffed: were a preceding act of will neceffary, it would be too late. An unexpected hollow in walking, occafions a violent fhock is not this evidence, that external motion is governed by the mind, frequently without confcioufnefs; and that in walking, the body is adjusted beforehand to what is expected? : out end, of defire and of averfion, the attaining or fhunning of which depend more or less on our own will. We are placed in a wide world, left to our own conduct; and we are by nature provided with a proper power for performing what we intend and will. The actions we perform by this power are termed voluntary. There still remain another species of actions, termed involuntary; as where we act by some irresistible motive against our will. An action may be voluntary, tho' done with reluctance; as where a man, to free himself from torturé, reveals the fecrets of his friend: his confeffion is voluntary, tho' drawn from him with great reluctance. But let us fuppofe, that after the firmeft refolution to reveal nothing, his mind is unhinged by exquisite torture; the discovery he makes may be justly termed involuntary : he speaks indeed; but he is compelled to it abfolutely against his will. Man is by his nature an accountable being, answerable for his conduct to God and man. In doing any action that wears a double face, he is prompted by his nature to explain the fame to his relations, his friends, his acquaintance; and above all, to those who have authority over him. He hopes for praise for every right action, and dreads blame for every one that is wrong. But for what fort of actions does he hold himself accountable? Not furely for an instinctive action, which is done blindly, without intention, and without will: neither for an involuntary action, because it is extorted from him against his will: and leaft of all, for actions done without confcioufnefs, fuch as those which preferve life. What only remain are voluntary actions, which are either right or wrong. Such actions are done wittingly and willingly : for these we must answer, if at all accountable; and for these every man in conscience holds himself bound to answer. And now more particularly upon voluntary actions. To intend and to will, tho' commonly held fynonymous, fignify different acts acts of the mind. Intention refpects the effect: Will refpects the action that is exerted for producing the effect. It is my intention, for example, to relieve my friend from distress: upon seeing him, it is my Will to give him a fum for his relief: the external act of giving follows; and my friend is relieved, which is the effect intended. But these internal acts, tho' in their nature different, are always united: I cannot will the means, without intending the effect; and I cannot intend the effect, without willing the Some effects of voluntary action follow neceffarily: A wound is an effect that neceffarily follows the stabbing a perfon with a dagger: death is a neceffary effect of throwing one down from the battlements of a high tower. Some effects are probable only: I labour in order to provide for my family; fight for my country to rescue it from oppreffors; take phyfic for my health. In fuch cafes, the event intended does not neceffarily nor always follow. A man, when he wills to act, must intend the necessary effect: a person who stabs, certainly intends to wound. But where the effect is probable only, a man may act without intending the effect that follows: a stone thrown by me at random into the market-place, may happen to wound a man without my intending it. One acts by instinct, without either will or intention: voluntary actions that neceffarily produce their effect, imply intention: voluntary actions, when the effect is probable only, are fometimes intended, fometimes not. Human actions are diftinguished from each other by certain qualities, termed right and wrong. But as these make the cornerstone of morality, they are referved to the following fection. *To incline, to refolve, to intend, to will, are acts of the mind relative to external action. These feveral acts are well understood; tho' they cannot be defined, being perfectly fimple. SECT. SECT. II. Divifion of Human Actions into RIGHT, WRONG, and INDIF FERENT. THE qualities of right and wrong in voluntary actions, are univerfally acknowledged as the foundation of morality; and yet philofophers have been strangely perplexed about them. The history of their various opinions, would fignify little but to darken the fubject: the reader will have more fatisfaction in feeing thefe qualities explained, without entering at all into controverfy. No perfon is ignorant of primary and fecondary qualities, a diftinction much infifted on by philofophers. Primary qualities, fuch as figure, cohesion, weight, are permanent qualities, that exist in a fubject whether perceived or not. Secondary qualities, fuch as colour, taste, fmell, depend on the percipient as much as on the subject, being nothing when not perceived. Beauty and uglinefs are qualities of the latter fort: they have no existence but when perceived; and, like all other fecondary qualities, they are perceived intuitively; having no dependence on reason nor on judgement, more than colour has, or smell, or taste (a). The qualities of right and wrong in voluntary actions, are secondary, like beauty and uglinefs, and the other fecondary qualities mentioned. Like them, they are objects of intuitive perception, and depend not in any degree on reafon or on judge |