At the fame time, let not the moral fyftem be misapprehended, as if it were our duty, or even lawful, to profecute what upon the whole we reckon the most beneficial to fociety, balancing ill with good. The moral fenfe permits not a violation of any perfon's right, however trivial, whatever benefit may thereby acrue to another. A man, for example, in low circumftances, by denying a debt he owes to a rich mifer, faves himself and a hopeful family from ruin. In that cafe, the good effect far outweighs the ill, or rather has no counterbalance: but the moral fenfe permits not the debtor to balance ill with good; nor gives countenance to an unjust act, whatever benefit it may produce. And hence a maxim in which all moralifts agree, That we must not do ill to bring about even the greatest good; the final cause of which fhall be given below (a). SECT. IV. Principles of DUTY and of Having thus fhortly delineated the moral laws of our nature, we proceed to an article of great importance, which is, to enquire into the means provided by our Maker for compelling obedience to thefe laws. The moral fenfe is an unerring guide; but the most expert guide will not profit thofe who are not difpofed to follow. This confideration makes it evident, that to com (a) Sect. 7. L12 plete plete the moral fyftem, we ought to be endued with fome principle or propenfity, fome impulfive power, to enforce obedience to the laws dictated by the moral fenfe. The author of our nature leaves none of his works imperfect. In order to render us obfequious to the moral fenfe as our guide, he hath implanted in our nature the principles of duty, of benevolence, of rewards and punishments, and of reparation. It may poffibly be thought, that rewards and punishments, of which afterward, are fufficient of themselves to enforce the laws of nature, without neceffity of any other principle. Human laws, it is true, are enforc'd by these means; because no higher fanction is under command of a terrestrial legiflator. But the celestial legiflator, with power that knows no control, and benevolence that knows no bounds, hath enforc'd his laws by means no less remarkable for mildness than for efficacy: he employs no external compulfion; but, in order to engage our will on the right fide, hath in the breast of every individual established the principles of duty and of benevolence, which efficaciously excite us to obey the dictates of the moral sense. As the restraining, as well as active duties, are effential to fociety, our Maker has wifely ordered, that the principle which enforces these several duties, should be the most cogent of all that belong to our nature. Other principles may folicit, allure, or terrify; but the principle of duty affumes authority, commands, and must be obey'd. As one great purpose of fociety, is to furnish opportunities without end of mutual aid and fupport, nature feconding that purpofe, hath provided the principle of benevolence; which excites us to be kindly, beneficent, and generous. Nor ought it to escape obfervation, that the author of nature, attentive to our wants and to our well-being, hath endued us with a liberal portion of that principle. It enforces benevolence, not only to those we are con nected nected with, but to our neighbours, and even to those we are barely acquainted with. Providence is peculiarly attentive to objects in diftrefs, who require immediate aid and relief. To the general principle of benevolence, it hath fuperadded the paffion of pity, which in every feeling heart is irresistible. To make benevolence more extensive, would be fruitlefs, because here are objects in plenty to fill the most capacious mind. It would not be fruitless only, but hurtful to fociety: I fay hurtful; for inability to procure gratification, rendering benevolence a troublesome gueft, would weaken the principle itself, and attach us the more to felfishness, which we can always gratify. At the fame time, tho' there is not room for greater variety of particular objects, yet the faculty we have of uniting numberless individuals in one complex object, enlarges greatly the sphere of benevolence: by that faculty our country, our government, our religion, become objects of public fpirit, and of a lively affection. The individuals that compofe the group, confidered apart, may be too minute, or too distant, for our benevolence; but when comprehended in one great whole, accumulation makes them great, greatness renders them confpicuous; and affection, preserved entire and undivided, is bestow'd upon an abstract object, as upon one that is fingle and visible; but with much greater energy, being proportioned to its fuperior dignity and importance. Thus it appears, that the principle of benevolence is not too fparingly scattered among men. It is indeed made fubordinate to felf-interest, which is wifely ordered, as will afterward be made evident (a); but its power and extent are nicely proportioned to the limited capacity of man, and to his fituation in this world; fo as better to fufil its deftination, than if it were an overmatch for felf-interest, and for every other principle. (a) Sect. 7. SECT SECT. V. Laws refpecting REWARDS and PUNISHMENTS. Reflecting on the moral branch of our nature, qualifying us for fociety in a manner fuited to our capacity, we cannot overlook the hand of our Maker; for means fo finely adjusted to an important end, never happen by chance. It must however be acknowledged, that in many individuals, the principle of duty has not vigour nor authority fufficient to ftem every tide of unruly paffion by the vigilance of fome paffions, we are taken unguarded; deluded by the fly infinuations of others; or overwhelmed with the stormy impetuofity of a third fort. Moral evil is thus introduced, and much wrong is done. This new scene fuggests to us, that there must be some article ftill wanting, to complete the moral system. The means provided for directing us in the road of duty have been explained: but as in deviating from the road wrongs are committed, nothing hitherto has been faid, about redreffing fuch wrongs, nor about preventing the reiteration of them. To accomplish these important ends, there are added to the moral system, laws relative to rewards and punishments, and to reparation; of which in their order. Many animals are qualified for fociety by inftinct merely; fuch as beavers, fheep, monkeys, bees, rooks. But men are feldom led by instinct their actions are commonly prompted by passions; of which there is an endless variety, focial and selfish, benevolent and malevolent. And were every paffion equally intitled to grati fication, fication, man would be utterly unqualified for society: he would be a fhip without a rudder, obedient to every wind, and moving at random, without any ultimate destination. The faculty of reason would make no oppofition: for were there no fenfe of wrong, it would be reasonable to gratify every defire that harms not ourfelves and to talk of punishment would be abfurd; for punishment, in its very idea, implies fome wrong that ought to be redreffed. Hence the neceffity of the moral fenfe, to qualify us for fociety: by inftructing us in our duty, it renders us accountable for our conduct, and makes us susceptible of rewards and punishments. The moral sense fulfils another valuable purpose: it erects in man an unerring standard for the application and measure of rewards and punishments.. To complete the fyftem of rewards and punishments, it is neceffary that a provision be made, both of power and of willingnefs to reward and punish. The author of our nature hath provided amply for the former, by intitling every man to reward and punish as his native privilege. And he has provided for the latter, by a noted principle in our nature, prompting us to exercise the power. Impelled by that principle, we reward the virtuous with approbation and esteem, and punish the vicious with disapprobation and contempt. So prevalent is the principle, that we have great fatisfaction in rewarding, and no lefs in punishing. As to punishment in particular, an action done intentionally to produce mischief, is criminal, and merits punishment. Such an action, being disagreeable, raifes my refentment, even where I have no connection with the perfon injured; and the principle under confideration impells me to chaftife the delinquent with indignation and hatred. An injury done to myself raises my refentment to a higher tone: I am not satisfied with fo flight a punishment as indignation and hatred: the author must by my fuffer mischief, as great as he has made me fuffer. hand |