with deep remorfe abhors himself, and is odious in his own eyes; and it gratifies the paffion, to indulge the thought that his guilt is beyond the poffibility of excufe. In the first case accordingly, remorfe forces upon me a conviction that I might have restrained my paffion, and ought to have restrained it. I will not give way to any excufe; because in a fit of remorfe it gives me pain to be excufed. In the other cafe, there being no remorfe, there is no difguife; and things appear in their true light. To illuftrate this reasoning, I observe, that passion warps my judgement of the actions of others, as well as of my own. Many examples are given in the chapter above quoted: join to these the following. My fervant aiming at a partridge, happens to shoot a favourite spaniel croffing the way unfeen. Inflamed with anger, I ftorm at his rashness, pronounce him guilty, and will liften to no excuse. When my paffion is spent, 1 become fenfible that it was merely accidental, and that the man is abfolutely innocent. The nurse overlays my only child, the long-expected heir to a great estate. It is with difficulty that I refrain from putting her to death: "The "wretch has murdered my infant, and deferves to be torn to

pieces." When my paffion subsides, I fee the matter in a very different light. The poor woman is inconfolable, and can fcarce believe that he is innocent: fhe bitterly reproaches herself for want of care and concern. But, upon cool reflection, both fhe and I are fenfible, that no perfon in found fleep has any felf-command; and that we cannot be answerable for any action of which we are not confcious. Thus, upon the whole, we find, that any impreffion we may occafionally have of being able to act in contradiction to motives, is the refult of paffion, not of found judge

ment.

The reader will obferve, that this fection is copied from Effays on Morality and Natural Religion. The ground-work is the fame: the alterations are only in the fuperftructure; and the fubject is abridged

abridged in order to adapt it to its present place. Part of the abridgement was published in the second edition of the Principles of Equity. But as law-books have little currency, the publishing the whole in one effay, will not, I hope, be thought improper.

1

I

APPENDIX.

Upon CHANCE and CONTINGENCY.

Hold it to be an intuitive propofition, That the Deity is the primary cause of all things; that with confummate wisdom he formed the great plan of government, which he carries on by laws fuited to the different natures of animate and inanimate beings; and that thefe laws, produce a regular chain of caufes and effects in the moral as well as the material world, admitting no events but what are comprehended in the original plan (a). Hence it clearly follows, that chance is excluded out of this world, that nothing can happen by accident, and that no event is arbitrary or contingent. This is the doctrine of the effay quoted; and, in my apprehenfion, well founded. But I cannot subscribe to what follows, viz. "That we have an impreffion of chance and contin(6 gency, which confequently must be delufive." I would not. willingly admit any delufion in the nature of man, where it is not made evident beyond contradiction; and I now fee clearly, that

(a) See Effays on Morality and Natural Religion, part 1..effay 3..

the.

the impreffion we have of chance and contingency, is not delufive, but perfectly consistent with the established plan.

The explanation of chance and contingency in the faid effay, fhall be given in the author's own words, as a proper text to reafon upon. In our ordinary train of thinking, it is certain "that all events appear not to us as neceffary. A multitude of events feem to be under our power to caufe or to prevent; and

we readily make a distinction betwixt events that are necessary, "i. e. that must be; and events that are contingent, i. e. that may "be, or may not be. This diftinction is void of truth: for all "things that fall out either in the material or moral world, are, as we have feen, alike neceffary, and alike the refult of fixed "laws. Yet, whatever conviction a philofopher may have of this, the diftinction betwixt things neceffary and things contingent, poffeffes his common train of thought, as much as it "poffeffes the most illiterate. We act univerfally upon that dif"tinction: nay it is in truth the cause of all the labour, care, “and industry, of mankind. I illustrate this doctrine by an example. Conftant experience hath taught us, that death is a ne"ceffary event. The human frame is not made to laft for ever "in its prefent condition; and no man thinks of more than a 66 temporary existence upon. this globe. But the particular time "of our death appears a contingent event. However certain it

be, that the time and manner of the death of each individual“is determined by a train of preceding caufes, and is no lefs: "fixed than the hour of the fun's rifing or fetting; yet no perfon is affected by this doctrine. In the care of prolonging life, we are directed by the fuppofed contingency of the time of death, which, to a certain term of years, we confider as depending in: a great measure on ourfelves, by caution against accidents, "due ufe of food, exercife, &c. These means are profecuted: "with the fame diligence as if there were in fact no neceffary

"traini

train of causes to fix the period of life. In fhort, whoever at"tends to his own practical ideas, whoever reflects upon the

meaning of the following words which occur in all languages, of things poible, contingent, that are in our power to caufe or prevent; whoever, 1 fay, reflects upon these words, will clearly fee, that they fuggeft certain perceptions or notions repugnant to the doctrine above established of univerfal neceffity."

In order to fhow that there is no repugnance, I begin with defining chance and contingency. The former is applied to events that have happened; the latter to future events. When we fay a thing has happened by chance, we do not mean that chance was the caufe; for no perfon ever thought that chance is a thing that can act, and by acting produce events: we only mean, that we are ignorant of the caufe, and that, for ought we fee, it might have happened or not happened, or have happened differently. Aiming at a bird, I shoot by chance a favourite spaniel: the meaning is not, that chance killed the dog, but that as to me the dog's death was accidental. With respect to contingency, future events that are variable, and the cause unknown, are faid to be contingent; changes of the weather, for example, whether it will be frost or thaw to-morrow, whether fair or foul. In a word, chance and contingency applied to events, mean not that fuch events happen without any cause, but only that we are ignorant of the cause.

It appears to me clear, that there is no fuch thing in human nature as a fenfe of contingency; or, in other words, a fenfe that any thing happens without a cause: such a sense would be grofsly delufive. True it is indeed, that our sense of a caufe is but cloudy and indistinct with refpect to certain events. Events that happen regularly, fuch as fummer and winter, rifing and setting of the fun, give us a distinct impreffion of a cause. The impreffion is lefs diftinct with respect to events lefs regular, fuch as al

terations

terations of the weather; and extremely indistinct with respect to events that seldom happen, and that happen without any known caufe. But with respect to no event whatever does our sense of a cause vanish altogether, and give place to a pofitive sense of contingency, that is, a sense of things happening without a caufe.

Chance and contingency thus explained, fuggeft not any perception or notion repugnant to the doctrine of univerfal neceffity ;: for my ignorance of a caufe, does not, even in my own apprehenfion, exclude a caufe. Defcending to particulars, I take the example mentioned in the text, viz. the uncertainty of the time of my death. Knowing that my life depends in fome measure on myself, I use all means to preserve it, by proper food, exercise, and care to prevent accidents. Nor is there any delufion here. I am moved to use these means by the defire I have to live: thefe means accordingly prove effectual to carry on my prefent existence to the appointed period; and in that view are fo many links in the great chain of caufes and effects. A burning coal falling from the grate upon the floor, wakes me from a found fleep. 1 start up to extinguifh the fire. The motive is irresistible: nor have I reason to refift, were it in my power; for I confider the extinction of the fire by my hand to be one of the means chofen by Providence for prolonging my life to its destined period.

Were there a chain of caufes and effects established entirely in-dependent on me, and were my life in no measure under my own power, it would indeed be fruitlefs for me to act; and the abfurdity of knowingly acting in vain, would be a prevailing motive for remaining at reft. Upon that fuppofition, the ignavia ratio of Chryfippus might take place; cui fi pareamus, nihil omnino agamus in vita*. But I act neceffarily when influenced by motives;,

* "The indolent principle; which if we were to follow, we should do nothing, "in life."