his own fault.

"Religion is," in general, “profitable unto all things." Virtue, diligence, and induftry, joined with good temper and prudence, have ever been found the fureft road to profperity; and where men fail of attaining it, their want of fuccefs is far oftener owing to their having deviated from that road, than to their having encountered infuperable bars in it. Some, by being too artful, forfeit the reputation of probity. Some, by being too open, are accounted to fail in prudence. Others, by being fickle and changeable, are diftrufted by all. The cafe commonly is, that men feek to afcribe their difappointments to any caufe, rather than to their own misconduct ; and when they can devife no other caufe, they lay them to the charge of Providence. Their folly leads them into vices; their vices into misfortunes; and in their misfortunes they "murmur against Providence. They are doubly unjust towards their Creator. In their profperity they are apt to afcribe their fuccefs to their own diligence, rather than to his blefling; and in their adverfity, they impute their diftreffes to his providence, not to their own misbehaviour. Whereas, the truth is the very reverse of this. "Every good and every perfect gift cometh from above" and of evil and mifery, man is the author to himfelf.

. When from the condition of individuals, we look abroad to the public ftate of the world, we meet with more proofs of the truth of this affertion. We fee great focieties of men torn in pieces by inteftine diffenfions, tumults, and civil commotions. We fee mighty armies going forth, in formidable array, against each other, to cover the

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earth with blood, and to fill the air with the cries of widows and orphans. Sad evils thefe are, to which this miferable world is expofed But are these evils, I beseech you, to be imputed to God? → Was it he who fent forth flaughtering armies into the field, or who filled the peaceful city with masfacres and blood? Are thefe miferies any other, than the bitter fruit of men's violent and difor. derly paffions? Are they not clearly to be traced. to the ambition and vices of princes, to the quarrels of the great, and to the turbulence of the people? Let us lay them entirely out of the ac.. count, in thinking of Providence; and let us think only of the "foolishness of man" Did man control his paffions, and form his conduct according to the dictates of wifdom, humanity, and virtue, the earth would no longer be defolated by cruelty; and human focieties would live in order, harmony, and peace. In thofe fcenes of mifchief and violence which fill the world, let man behold, with fhame, the picture of his vices, his ignorance, and folly. Let him be humbled by the mortifying view of his own perverfenefs; but let not his heart fret against the Lord."

BLAIR.

SECTION

On difinterefied Friendship.

I AM informed that certain Greek writers (philofophers, it seems, in the opinion of their countrymen) have advanced fome very extraordinary, `pofitions relating to friendship; as, indeed, what

fubject is there, which thefe fubtle geniufes have not tortured with their fophiftry?

The authors to whom I refer, diffuade their dif ciples from entering into any strong attachments, as unavoidably creating fupernumerary difquietudes to thofe who engage in them; and, as every man has more than fufficient to call forth his folicitude, in? the courfe of his own affairs, it is a weakness they contend, anxiously to involve himfelf in the concerns of others. They recommend it alfo, in all connexions of this kind, to hold the bands of union: extremely loose; fo as always to have it in one's power to ftraiten or relax them, as circumstances and fituations fhall render moft expedient. They add, as a capital article of their doctrine, that "to live exempt from cares, is an effential ingredient to constitute human happiness: but an ingredient, however, which he, who voluntarily diftreffes. himfelf with cares, in which he has no neceffary. and perfonal intereft, must never hope to poffefs.".

I have been told likewife, that there is another fet of pretended philofophers, of the fame country, whofe tenets, concerning this fubject, are of a ftill more illiberal and ungenerous caft.

The propofition they attempt to establish, is, that "friendship is an affair of felf-intereft entirely; and that the proper motive for engaging in it, is, not in order to gratify the kind and benevolent affections, but for the benefit of that áffiftance and fupport which is to be derived from the connexion. Accordingly they affert, that those perfons are moft difpofed to have recourfe to auxiliary alliances of this kind, who are leaft qualified by nature, or fortune, to depend upon their own

ftrength and powers: the weaker fex, for inftance, being generally more inclined to engage in friendfhips, than the male part of our fpecies; and those who are depreffed by indigence, or labouring under misfortunes, than the wealthy and the profperous.

Excellent and obliging fages, thefe, undoubtedly! To ftrike out the friendly affections from the moral world, would be like extinguishing the fun in the natural: each of them being the fource of the best and most grateful satisfactions, that Heaven has conferred on the fons of men. But I fhould be glad to know, what the real value of this boasted exemption from care, which they promife their dif ciples, juftly amounts to? an exemption flattering to felf-love, I confefs; but which, upon many occurrences in human life, should be rejected with the utmoft difdain. For nothing, furely, can be more inconfiftent with a well-poifed and manly fpirit, than to decline engaging in any laudable action, or. to be difcouraged from perfevering in it, by an apprehenfion of the trouble and folicitude, with which it may probably be attended. Virtue herfelf, indeed, ought to be totally renounced, if it be right to avoid every poffible means that may be productive of uneafinefs: for who, that is actuated by her principles, can obferve the conduct of an oppofite character, without being affected with fome degree of fecret diffatisfaction? Are not the juft, the brave, and the good, neceffarily expofed to the difagreeable emotions of diflike and averfion, when they respectively meet with inftances of fraud, of cowardice, or of villainy? It is an effential property of every well-conftituted mind, to be affected with pain, or pleasure, according to

the nature of thofe moral appearances that prefent themselves to obfervation:

If fenfibility, therefore, be not incompatible with true wisdom, (and it furely is not, unless we fuppofe that philofophy deadens every finer feeling of our nature,) what just reafon can be affigned, why the sympathetic fufferings which may refult from friendship, fhould be a fufficient inducement for banishing that generous affection from the human breaft Extinguish all emotions of the heart, and what difference will remain, I do not fay between man and brute, but between man and a mere inanimate clod? Away then with thofe auftere philofophers, who reprefent virtue as hardening the foul against all the fofter impreffions of humanity! The fact, certainly, is much otherwife. A truly good man is, upon many occafions, extremely fufceptible of tender fentiments; and his heart expands with joy, or fhrinks with forrow, as good or ill fortune accompanies his friend. Upon the

whole, then, it may fairly be concluded, that, as in the cafe of virtue, fo in that of friendship, those painful fenfations, which may fometimes be produced by the one, as well as by the other, are equally infufficient grounds for excluding either of them from taking poffeffion of our bofoms.

They who infift that "utility is the firft and prevailing motive, which induces mankind to enter into particular friendships," appear to me to divest the affociation of its moft amiable and engaging principle. For, to a mind rightly difpofed, it is not fo much the benefits received, as the affectionate zeal from which they flow, that gives them their best and most valuable recommendation. It