function of the mind; and imaginatio for the receptivity (vis receptiva) of impressions, or for the passive perception." The power of combination he appropriates to the former: "quæ singula et simpliciter

many important observations upon the human soul, and made striking remarks thereon. More especially in the theory of the association of representations, which Melancthon and Ammerbach do not bring forward at all, he displays no ordinary knowledge." Transl. p. 343.

Philip Melancthon, a Reformer in Philosophy as well as in Religion, published, among other philosophical works, a book De Anima, 1540, in 8vo.

Vitus Amerbach, a learned author and Professor of Philosophy at Ingolstadt,—was born at Wedinguen in Bavaria, and died in 1557 at the age of seventy. He also published, amongst other works, one on the Soul-De Anima, libb. iv. Lugd. Bat. 1555, 8vo, and one on Natural Philosophy-De Philosophia Naturali, libb. vi. 8vo.

John Lewis Vives was born in 1492 at Valencia in Spain, died at Bruges, according to Thuanus in 1541: was first patronized by Henry VIII. of England, who made him preceptor in Latin to the Princess Mary, and afterwards persecuted by him for opposing his divorce. He was a follower of Erasmus and opponent of the Scholastic Philosophy. His works, which are of various kinds, theological, devotional, grammatical, critical, as well as philosophical, were printed at Basle in 1555, in two vols. fol. The Treatise De Anima et Vita is contained in vol. ii. p. 497-593. S. C.]

11 [Et quemadmodum in altrice facultate videre est inesse vim quandam, quæ cibum recipiat, aliam quæ contineat, aliam quæ conficiat, quæque distribuat et dispenset: ita in animis et hominum et brutorum est functio, quæ imagines sensibus impressas recipit, quæ inde Imaginativa dicitur: est quæ continet hæc, Memoria; quæ conficit, Phantasia: quæ distribuit ad assensum aut dissensum, Extrimatrix. Sunt enim spiritalia imagines Dei, corporalia vero spiritalium quædam veluti simulachra : ut mirandum non sit, ex corporalibus spiritalia colligi, ceu ab umbris aut picturis corpora expressa. Imaginativæ actio est in animo, quæ oculi in corpore, recipere imagines intuenda: estque velut orificium quoddam

acceperat imaginatio, ea conjungit et disjungit phantasia."1 And the law by which the thoughts are spontaneously presented follows thus; "quæ simul sunt a phantasia comprehensa, si alterutrum occurrat, solet secum alterum representare.” 13 To time therefore he subordinates all the other exciting causes of association. The soul proceeds "a causa ad ef

vasis, quod est Memoria. Phantasia verò conjungit et disjungit ea, quæ singula et simplicia Imaginatio acceperat. Equidem haud sum nescius, confundi duo hæc a plerisque, ut Imaginationem Phantasiam, et vice versa hanc Imaginationem nominent, et eandem esse functionem quidam arbitrentur. Sed nobis tum ad rem aptius, tum ad docendum accommodatius visum est ita partiri: propterea quod actiones videmus distinctas, unde facultates censentur. Tametsi nihil erit quandoque periculi, si istis utamur promiscue. Accedit his sensus, qui ab Aristotele communis dicitur, quo judicantur sensilia absentia: et discernuntur ea, quæ variorum sunt sensuum: hic sub Imaginationem et Phantasiam venire potest. Phantasia est mirifice expedita et libera: quicquid collibitum est, fingit, refingit, componit, devincit, dissolvit, res disjunctissimas connectit, conjunctissimas autem longissime separat. Itaque nisi regatur, et cohibeatur a ratione, haud secus animum percellit ac perturbat, quam procella mare. Jo. Ludovici Vivis, De Anima et Vita. Lib. I. Opera, Tom. II. p. 509. Basil. 1555. S. C.]

12 [Maasz, p. 344. Note. Vives De Anim. I. s. d. cogn. intern. Phantasia conjungit et disjungit ea, quæ singula et simpliciter, acceperat imaginatio. Imagination, according to Vives, says Maasz, is the capability of perceiving an impression. S. C.]

13 [De Anima I. sect. d. cited by Maasz in a note ibid. Vives proceeds thus-unde sedes illæ existunt in artificio memoriæ, quippe ad aspectum loci de eo venit in mentem, quod in loco scimus evenisse, aut situm esse: quando etiam cum voce aut sono aliquo quippiam contingit lætum, eodem sono audito delectamur: si triste tristamur. Quod in brutis quoque est annotare: quæ si quo sono vocata gratum aliquid accipiunt, rursum ad eundem sonum facile ac libenter accurrunt: sin cædantur, sonitum eundem deinceps reformidant, ex plagarum recordatione.-Lib. II. Opera, Tom. II. p. 519. S. C.]

14

fectum, ab hoc ad instrumentum, a parte ad totum ;' thence to the place, from place to person, and from this to whatever preceded or followed, all as being parts of a total impression, each of which may recall the other. The apparent springs "saltus vel transitus etiam longissimos," 15 he explains by the same thought having been a component part of two or more total impressions. Thus "ex Scipione venio in cogitationem potentiæ Turcica, propter victorias ejus de Asia, in qua regnabat Antiochus." 16

But from Vives I pass at once to the source of his doctrines, and (as far as we can judge from the remains yet extant of Greek philosophy) as to the first, so to the fullest and most perfect enunciation of the associative principle, namely, to the writings of Aristotle; and of these in particular to the treatises De Anima, and "De Memoria," which last belongs to the series of essays entitled in the old translations Parva Naturalia. In as much as later writers have either deviated from, or added to his doctrines, they appear to me to have introduced either error or groundless supposition.

17

In the first place it is to be observed, that Aristotle's

14 [De Anima II. sect. d. mem. et record.—Cited by Maasz in a note, ibid. S. C.]

15 [Ibid. ibid. See Maasz, pp. 345-6. That the springs are only "apparent" is explained by Maasz, commenting on the words of Vives, Sunt (in phantasia) transitus quidam longissimi, immo saltus. S. C.]

16 [Cited by Maasz from the same place, p. 346. S. C.]

17 [This collection, тà μuρà кaλovμɛva þvoiká, which is connected with the treatise in three books, on the Soul, (as Trendelenburg distinctly shows in the Preface to his elaborate commentary on that work of Aristotle,) contains the books On Sense and Things Sensible, On Memory and Recollection, On Sleep, On Dreams, On Divination in Sleep, (кαе' vπνον,) On

positions on this subject are unmixed with fiction.18 The wise Stagyrite speaks of no successive particles propagating motion like billiard balls, as Hobbes;19 nor of nervous or animal spirits, where inanimate and irrational solids are thawed down, and distilled, or filtrated by ascension, into living and intelligent fluids, that etch and re-etch engravings on the brain, as the followers of Des Cartes, and the humoral pathologists in general; nor of an oscillating ether which was to effect the same service for the nerves of the brain considered as solid fibres, as the animal spirits perform for them under the notion of hollow tubes, as Hartley teaches―nor finally, (with yet more recent dreamers) of chemical compositions by elective affinity, or of an electric light at once the immediate object and the ultimate organ of inward vision, which rises to the brain

Length and Shortness of Life, On Youth and Old Age, On Respiration, and On Life and Death. S. C.]

18 [Maasz has also said, (p. 345) speaking of Vives, that, though he set forth correctly the theory of association, he yet did not exhibit it with such entire purity as Aristotle. Mr. Coleridge, however is comparing the wise Stagyrite with Hobbes, Des Cartes, Hartley and others-Maasz is comparing him with Vives-observing that this author not only came after Aristotle in perceiving and expressing the general law of imagination, but, what is the principal thing, did not state the theory of association so consistently and purely as the former, because he made exceptions to the same, which are such in appearance only: though he thinks it may be assumed in his favour, that his language is incorrect rather than his conception of the subject. Mr. Coleridge, on the other hand, is objecting to the physical dreams, which modern metaphysicians introduced into the survey of psychological facts delivered by the sager ancient. He imputes to them an error in principle, while Maasz remarks upon a statement at variance with a law correctly laid down. S. C.] 19 [See Human Nature, chaps. ii. and iii. Hobbes does not use the expressions in which Mr. C. describes his doctrine, but speaks much of motions produced in the brain by objects. S. C.]

like an Aurora Borealis, and there, disporting in various shapes, as the balance of plus and minus, or negative and positive, is destroyed or re-established,— images out both past and present. Aristotle delivers a just theory without pretending to an hypothesis; or in other words a comprehensive survey of the different facts, and of their relations to each other without supposition, that is, a fact placed under a number of facts, as their common support and explanation; though in the majority of instances these hypotheses or suppositions better deserve the name of ὑποποιησεῖς, or suffictions.20 He uses indeed the word Kivnosis, to express what we call representations or ideas, but he carefully distinguishes them from material motion, designating the latter always by annexing the words Ev TоTŲ, or кarà Tóπov.21 On the contrary in his trea

20 [The discussion of Maasz on the part performed by Aristotle in explaining the general law of the Imagination extends from p. 319 to p. 335, from sect. 90 to 94 inclusively. S. C.]

21 [See Maasz, p. 321. He refers generally to the treatise De Anima, Lib. II. Cap. iii. and in particular to the words in S. 3. Ενίοις δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινηTIKÓV. “But some, beside these things, have also the faculty of motion according to place."

In the third and fourth chapters of the first book the subject of motion, karà тóπоν, is discussed, and the opinions of other philosophers that it is properly attributable to the soul refuted. Sections 3 and 4 of Lib. I. cap. iii. speak distinctly on this point: and so do sections 8-11 of cap. iv. In the latter the philosopher says; "That the soul cannot possibly be harmony, neither can be turned about in a circle is manifest, from the aforesaid. But that it may be removed per accidens-contingently,-may so move itself, even as we have declared, is possible: inasmuch as that, in which it is, is capable of being moved, and that (in which it is) may be moved by the soul: but in no other way is it possible for the soul to be moved according to place."

Maasz discusses Aristotle's use of the term kinoic in sections 91-2, pp. 321-333. He observes that it was not unusual with