day, he will feel remorse of conscience for performing unnecessary labor on that day, while the first person feels none; and yet both may be living in all good conscience toward God. Still another person disbelieves in Saturday-observance and feels assured that the first day of the week was not appointed as a Sabbath to take the place of the abolished seventh-day Sabbath in any sense, but is merely a memorial day commemorating the resurrection of Christ, a day of rejoicing and of thanksgiving to God, but no more holy or sacred than any other day. This man would not consider it wrong in the nature of things to work on Sunday; and though he might on that day refrain from the performance of manual labor on account of the conscience of others or because of an adverse public sentiment, his own conscience would grant him personal liberty. This is not the place to discuss the theological character of these different positions; they are adduced merely to show the natural elasticity of the conscience under the influence of religious belief. A multitude of similar illustrations could easily be brought forward if necessary; but in the light of a proper understanding of the nature of conscience, Christians who carefully read the fourteenth chapter of Romans and the eighth chapter of First Cor

inthians will learn to respect the conscience of others and at the same time to refrain from all attempts to bind their own conscience-scruples upon their brethren.

Since conscience is subordinate to the authority of intellect as manifested in its relations to the religious instinct, we can not expect to find, as we have already observed, a practical uniform standard of morals among the various peoples and tribes outside of Christian influences. Nevertheless, we are not to understand that there is no uniformity whatever with respect to the greater questions of right and wrong. The laws governing human thought would naturally lead men to the recognition of certain principles which hold society together. Thus, the great principles of veracity, of justice, and of love are everywhere distinguished in the intellectual conception of men from falsehood, injustice, hatred, and cruelty. Therefore, stealing, lying, adultery, murder, etc. are generally conceded to be wrong, whatever the practises of a people may be. As Dr. Cocker has observed, "The savage Fijian regards theft, adultery, abduction, incendiarism, and treason as serious crimes." And Dr. Livingstone tells us that "on questioning intelligent men among the Backwains as to their former knowledge of good and

evil, of God, and of a future state, they have scouted the idea of any of them ever having been without a tolerably clear conception on all these subjects. Respecting their sense of right and wrong, they profess that nothing we indicate as sin ever appeared to them otherwise, except the statement that it was wrong to have more wives than one."1

We have only to attend to the facts in the case in order to establish beyond doubt that a native consciousness that certain actions are right and certain others in their very nature wrong exists in the soul of men, accompanied by a moral sensibility, called conscience, which imperatively demands conformity to the acknowledged standard. This is distinctly affirmed by the apostle Paul in that famous passage wherein he describes the operation of what is commonly called the moral faculty. "For when the Gentiles, which have not the law [the written revealed law of God], do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing

1 Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa, p. 153.

one another." Rom. 2:14, 15. By this means the entire heathen world rests under the consciousness of sin.

But while the various tribes of mankind have certain notions of right and wrong that coincide with the Christian standard, we must not suppose that among a people undeveloped in understanding these ideas appear so clearly defined as among an enlightened people. The intellectual state prevents a broad conception of these principles on the basis of a universal ideal; hence they are generally restricted in practise to people of their own tribe. A man might have a definite conception that the murder of one of his own family or tribe would constitute a serious crime, and at the same time feel no compunction of conscience whatever for the killing of an enemy or of one belonging to another tribe. In fact, he would be more apt to feel reproached by his conscience if he did not avenge himself upon an enemy. Even in Greece and Rome, with all of their boasted civilization and great philosophical teachers, the people never arose to the sublime conception of the brotherhood of all men, but the ethical standards of their moralists were given with especial reference to their own nation.

Mr. Darwin refers to a peculiar case described

by Dr. Landor, who acted as a magistrate in West Australia and who relates that a native on his farm, after losing one of his wives from disease, came and said that "he was going to a distant tribe to spear a woman, to satisfy his sense of duty to his wife. I told him that if he did so, I would send him to prison for life. He remained about the farm for some months, but got exceedingly thin, and complained that he could not rest or eat, that his wife's spirit was haunting him, because he had not taken a life for hers. I was inexorable, and assured him that nothing would save him if he did." The man finally disappeared for more than a year and afterwards returned in excellent condition, and one of his wives informed Dr. Landor that her husband had killed a woman belonging to a distant tribe.1

It seems strange any one could become so perverted in understanding as not to comprehend and feel that such an act is wrong; but we know that even among people who generally acknowledge murder to be sinful, under the influence of religious zeal and fanaticism the slaughter of innocent persons has taken place without any apparent feeling of regret or of remorse, but, on the other hand, with distinct evidences of the appro1 Descent of Man, p. 111.