which are softest, and are least in their way, in despite and derogation of them, that hold them hardest to it. So that this colour of meliority and preeminence is a sign of enervation and weakness.

II.

"Cujus excellentia vel exsuperantia melior, id toto genere melius.** Appertaining to this are the forms: "Let us not "wander in generalities: Let us compare particular "with particular," &c. This appearance, though it seem of strength, and rather logical than rhetorical yet is very oft a fallax.

Sometime because some things are in kind very casual, which if they escape, prove excellent, so that the kind is inferior, because it is so subject to peril, but that which is excellent being proved is superior, as the blossom of March, and the blossom of May, whereof the French verse goeth:

Burgeon de Mars, enfans de Paris,

"Si un eschape, il en vaut dix."

So that the blossom of May is generally better than the blossom of March, and yet the best blossom of March is better than the best blossom of May. Sometimes because the nature of some kinds is to be more equal, and more indifferent, and not to have very distant degrees, as hath been noted in the warmer climates, the people are generally more wise, but in the northern climates the wits of chief are greater. So in many armies, if the matter should

*“That kind is altogether best, whose excellence or pre"eminence is best."

be tried by duel between two champions, the victory should go on the one side, and yet if it be tried by the gross, it would go on the other side: for excellencies go as it were by chance, but kinds go by a more certain nature, as by discipline in war.

Lastly, many kinds have much refuse, which countervail that which they have excellent, and therefore generally metal is more precious than stone; and yet a diamond is more precious than gold.

III.

"Quod ad veritatem refertur majus est quam quod ad opinionem. "Modus autem et probatio ejus quod ad opinionem pertinet "hæc est, quod quis si clam putaret fore facturus non esset."* So the Epicures say of the Stoics felicity placed in virtue; that it is like the felicity of a player, who if he were left of his auditory and their applause, he would straight be out of heart and countenance, and therefore they call virtue "bonum theatrale." But of riches the poet saith:

"Gaudia corde premens, vultu simulante pudorem.

The fallax of this colour is somewhat subtile, though the answer to the example be ready, for virtue is not

"That which hath a relation to truth is greater than that "which refers to opinion: but the measure and trial of that "which belongs to opinion is this: It is that which a man would "not do, if he thought it would not be known."

chosen "propter auram popularem." But contrariwise, “maxime omnium teipsum reverere," so as a virtuous man will be virtuous in "solitudine," and not only. in" theatro," though percase it will be more. strong by glory and fame, as an heat which is doubled by reflection; but that denieth the supposition, it doth not reprehend the fallax, whereof the reprehension is: Allow that virtue (such as is joined with labour and conflict,) would not be chosen but for fame and opinion, yet it followeth not, that the chief motive of the election should not be real and for it self, for fame may be only 66 causa im"pulsiva," and not "causa constituens, or efficiens." As if there were two horses, and the one would do better without the spur than the other: but again, the other with the spur would far exceed the doing of the former, giving him the spur also: yet the latter will be judged to be the better horse. And the form. as to say, 66 Tush, the life of this horse is but in, "the spur," will not serve as to a wise judgment: for since the ordinary instrument of horsemanship is the spur, and that it is no manner of impediment, nor burden, the horse is not to be accounted the less of, which will not do well without the spur, but rather the other is to be reckoned a delicacy, than a virtue : so glory and honour are the spurs to virtue: and although virtue would languish without them, yet. since they be always at hand to attend virtue, virtue is not to be said the less chosen for itself, because it needeth the spur of fame and reputation: and therefore that position," nota ejus rei quod propter opi

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"nionem et non propter veritatem eligitur, hæc est ; quod quis si, clam putaret fore, facturus non esset," is reprehended.

IV.

"Quod rem integram servat bonum, quod sine receptu est ma"lum. Nam se recipere non posse impotentiæ genus est, poten"tia autem bonum."*

Hereof Æsop framed the fable of the two frogs that consulted together in the time of drought, when many plashes that they had repaired to, were dry, what was to be done, and the one propounded to go down into a deep well, because it was like the water would not fail there; but the other answered, yea, but if it do fail, how shall we get up again. And the reason is, that human actions are so uncertain and subject to perils, as that seemeth the best course which hath most passages out of it. Appertaining to this persuasion, the forms are, you shall engage yourself, on the other side," tantum, quantum voles,

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sumes ex fortuna," &c. you shall keep the matter in your own hand. The reprehension of it is, that proceeding and resolving in all actions is necessary. For as he saith well, not to resolve, is to resolve, and many times it breeds as many necessities, and engageth as far in some other sort, as to resolve. So it is but the covetous man's disease, translated into power; for the covetous man will enjoy nothing, be

* "That which keeps a matter safe and entire is good; but "what is destitute and unprovided of retreat is bad: for whereas "all ability of acting is good, not to be able to withdraw one's "self is a kind of impotency.".

cause he will have his full store and possibility to enjoy the more; so by this reason, a man should execute nothing, because he should be still indifferent, and at liberty to execute any thing. Besides necessity and this same " jacta est alea," hath many times an advantage, because it awaketh the powers of the mind, and strengtheneth endeavour, " cæteris paret necessitate certe superiores istis.”

V.

"Quod ex pluribus constat et divisibilibus, est majus quam "quod ex paucioribus et magis unum: nam omnia per partes "considerata majora videntur, quare et pluralitas partium 'magnitudinem præ se fert: fortius autem operatur pluralitas "partium si ordo absit, nam inducit similitudinem infiniti, et "impedit comprehensionem."*

This colour seemeth palpable, for it is not plurality of parts, without majority of parts, that maketh the total greater, yet nevertheless, it often carries the mind away, yea, it deceiveth the sense; as it seemeth to the eye a shorter distance of way, if it be all dead, and continued, than if it have trees or buildings, or any other marks, whereby the eye may divide it. So when a great monied man hath divided his chests, and coins, and bags, he seemeth to himself richer

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* "That which consists of more parts, and those divisible, is greater, and more one than what is made up of fewer for all things when they are looked upon piece-meal seem greater; "when also a plurality of parts make a shew of a bulk consider"able, which a plurality of parts affects more strongly if they be "in no certain order; for it then resembles an infinity, and "hinders the comprehending of them."