gains of his iniquity, whilst all around him are congratulating his prosperity, and know nothing of the dark contrivances by which he obtained it? What is that spirit in man, and how instructed, that can bear up against natural evils and infirmities, but sinks under the wounds of conscience, the grief of which no medicine can assuage, the torment of which no courage can endure? But I need not press the argument any farther, the fact is not disputed: it is allowed on all hands, that there is a general expectation of future judgment; but this, we are told, is the effect of weakness and superstition, and of fear where there is no cause of fear. The question then is, whether this common sense of nature is derived from weakness and infirmity of mind, or is indeed the result of right reason.

Now, if the opinion that prevails in the world, that sin shall be punished, is the mere effect of weakness and superstition, the opinion advanced in direct opposition to it must needs be well founded, and capable of being supported by good reasons. Let us hear then what reason can be offered in support of the opposite opinion, that sin shall not be punished. Now, whatever can be said in maintenance of this assertion must resolve itself into one or other of these propositions; either, that sin does not deserve to be punished; or, that God has no means of punishing it.

As to the first, no one has yet been found to be an advocate for wickedness: even those who seem unwilling to admit a state of future rewards and punishments, have never, that I know, made use of this plea, that sin deserves no punishment: on the contrary, the only reason why they think sin will not be punished hereafter, is, because they have no notion of any state after this. Could they be persuaded of this, they would not want to be told what the fate of sinners must be in another world. And it is worth observing, that all who believe another state after death, agree in believing that sin shall be punished in it; and that all who hope to escape punishment for their sins, hope utterly to be destroyed by death, and never to see life again so that, as to the merit of sin, there is but one opinion among men, that it deserves to be punished, though some persuade themselves there is no place in which it can be punished.

It being supposed then, that this proposition, sin deserves to be punished, is a maxim agreed to by the common reason of mankind; it is evidently a reason leading to this conclusion, that sin shall be punished. For what reason can be assigned why that should not be done, which our reason tells us is fit to be done? What should move God to act contrary to that which he himself has shown us to be proper, and becoming his wisdom and justice, by the light of that reason with which he has endowed us? What can be said to justify him in informing our judgments that sin ought to be punished, if he has determined in his own mind never to punish it? It must be great want of power or justice in God not to punish iniquity, after he has so strongly declared to every man's understanding the fitness of doing it.

Let us then consider the latter proposition, and see whether God has any means of punishing sin. And it is on this proposition that all the hopes of impunity are built: not that all who hope for impunity are so absurd as to suppose that God wants power to punish the wicked if he thinks fit to do it but they do suppose that, by his purpose in the creation of man, man has no relation to any state of being but in this life only; that when he dies, all his hopes and fears die with him; and that he is no farther capable of any sense, either of pleasure or of pain.

But by what principles of reason are men led into this supposition? That God might have provided another state after this, and ordained men to live in it either happily or miserably according to their deserts, no one can doubt, who does not doubt of the being of a God. If he has ordered it otherwise, it was because it seemed best to his wisdom: but how could it seem best to his wisdom to leave no means for making a distinction between virtue and vice, by a suitable distribution of rewards and punishments, and yet to teach us, by that reason which he has given us, that it is highly suitable to his wisdom and justice to make such distinction? That he does not make the distinction in this world, is evident to eye-sight: we see the wicked flourish and prosper, and the righteous struggling with sorrows and afflictions; of one sort many live to a good old age, and no harm happeneth unto them; of the other sort many

die in the flower of their youth, and go down to the grave in sorrow and if after this scene nothing remains, then is there no justice with the Most High; the wicked have the advantage, and the righteous has just cause of complaining that he cleansed his heart in vain, and washed his hands in innocence.' But can this be agreeable to his wisdom, who himself has taught us to think it disagreeable to all the rules of wisdom and justice? Is it possible to suppose that a God of truth and justice should teach us those lessons of justice which he never intended to fulfil that he should train us up in the expectation of rewards and punishments, and purpose never to dispense them? If this be, as it is, very absurd, the consequence must be, that he has appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness, and give to every man according to his works.' You see then that the common sense and expectation of mankind, with respect to the rewards and punishments of another life, is so far from being the effect of weakness and superstition, that it is the immediate result of that reason which God has given us so strong a result is it from our reason, that it is not possible to justify God and the methods of his providence by the reason which he has given us, without maintaining the certainty of a future state, in which sin shall be punished and righteousness rewarded.

Those of a contrary opinion may have perhaps some notion of an overruling fate and necessity, to which all things are subject; or if they go farther, and conceive that there is a rational Being at the head of nature, who is Author and Governor of all things, yet can they hardly allow him any thing but will, and power, and understanding; for moral attributes can never be discovered in the Deity by those who leave no room for the exercise of them, or rather who introduce a sort of government into the world inconsistent with all moral attributes and perfections. We are most certainly, if we can judge any thing from our own feeling and consciousness, accountable creatures; all our notions of right and wrong, of justice and equity, all our thoughts, reflexions, and forebodings of mind, conspire to fix the expectation on us, that one day we must give account of ourselves and our doings. Our natural notions of God point out to us our Judge; on our own part we find reason and freedom,

SHERL.

VOL. II.

G

which makes us fit subjects of judgment; on the part of God we find wisdom, and mercy, and justice, and every other perfection that may adorn the Judge of the universe and if after all we are not to be judged, there must be something very wrong in these notions of mankind. We cannot be mistaken in those relating to ourselves, those we feel to be true: the mistake then must be charged on our notions of the Deity, and we must cease to think him a moral agent, at whose hands no jus-, tice is to be expected: we must cease to think him good, who has tormented us in vain with the fears of futurity, and deluded us with false hopes of a better life; but has not himself so much regard to virtue or vice as to answer either our hopes or our fears. Judge now whether the expectations of futurity are the dreams of superstition, or the necessary result of thought and reason. But we have one step more to take, and to show,

Thirdly, that these common notions are the foundation of all religion, and therefore must be supposed and admitted in revealed religion, and cannot be contradicted by it.

Some there have been who, finding no hopes for impunity to sinners under the light of reason and nature, have taken shelter in revelation; not desiring to correct and reform their vices, but to enjoy them, and yet to hide them from the wrath to come. These are great extollers of the mercy and goodness of God displayed in the gospel, great assertors of the extensive and unbounded merits of the blood of Christ; so far as to think it a reproach to their Saviour for any one to teach that the hopes of Christians may be destroyed for sin, since Christ has died to make an atonement for it. Such as these are much pleased with the thought that they do great honor to God, by opening to the world the inexhaustible treasures of his mercy, the attribute in which he delights; and think they have some merit and service to plead on account of such pious labor. They imagine they pay great regard to our Redeemer, and are the only true believers in the efficacy of his death; the virtue of which was so great as to draw out the sting of sin, and leave all the pleasures of it behind to be enjoyed by the world.

But would these men consider, they would find that they are offering up to God the sacrifice of fools, whilst they divest him of wisdom and justice, and all other moral attributes, in com

pliment to his mercy; and represent him to the world as a goodnatured, indolent, inactive Being, unconcerned at what passes among his creatures, and prepared to receive to equal degrees of favor the righteous and the sinner. The image of such a Being as this carries with it no terror like to that which arises from the character of a tyrant and oppressor, and therefore does not equally shock the minds of men: but if we examine to the bottom, such a Being is as void of morality as a tyrant. For morality consists in a just distinction of good and evil, and in treating both according to the rules of equity; but he who is equally good to the righteous and the unrighteous, makes as little distinction between them as he who is equally severe to both. One is a good-natured immoral Being, the other a cruel one, but both equally void of justice and morality. This is the honor done to God by ascribing to him a blind mercy, that knows no distinction between the good and the evil. And like to it is the honor done to our blessed Redeemer by the forementioned doctrines, which do in truth make the Son of God to be the minister of sin, and establish the kingdom of darkness on the merits of the death of Christ.

It is beside my present purpose to show how inconsistent these notions are with the true doctrine of the gospel; and yet I cannot satisfy myself without observing that all the precepts, all the representations of Scripture, all the hopes and fears proposed to Christians, teach us another lesson, and confirm to us this great article of all religion, That God hath appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness.'

This is the gospel doctrine; nor can a true revelation possibly teach otherwise, for God cannot contradict himself, nor gainsay by his prophets that common light of reason which he has planted in men to be their guide and director. Natural religion is the foundation and support of revelation, which may supply the defects of nature, but can never overthrow the established principles of it; which may cast new light on the dictates of reason, but can never contradict them. I cannot listen to revelation but in consequence of the natural notion I have of God, of his being, his wisdom, power, and goodness: destroy then the principles of reason, and there is no room left for revelation. I see and feel the difference between good and evil,