SECTION III. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD. VISU CARENTEM MAGNA PARS VERI LATET. SEN. in Oedip. It is very reasonable to believe, that part of the pleasure, which happy minds shall enjoy in a future ftate, will arise from an enlarged contemplation of the Divine Wifdom in the government of the world, and a discovery of the fecret and amazing steps of Providence, from the beginning to the end of time. Nothing feems to be an entertainment more adapted to the nature of man, if we confider that curiofity is one of the strongest and most lafting appetites implanted in us, and that admiration is one of our most pleasing paffions; and what a perpetual fucceffion of enjoyments will be afforded to both these in a scene fo large and various as fhall then be laid open to our view in the fociety of fuperior fpirits, who perhaps will join with us in fo delightful a prospect! It It is not impoffible, on the contrary, that part of the punishment of such as are excluded from blifs, may confist not only in their being denied this privilege, but in having their appetites at the fame time. vaftly increased, without any fatisfaction afforded to them. In thefe, the vain purfuit of knowledge fhall, perhaps, add to their infelicity, and bewilder them into labyrinths of error, darkness, distraction, and uncertainty of every thing but their own evil ftate. Milton has thus reprefented the fallen Angels reasoning together in a kind of refpite from their torments, and creating to themselves a new difquiet amidst their very amusements : he could not properly have described the fports of condemned spirits, without that caft of horror and melancholy he has fo judiciously mingled with them. Others apart fat on a hill retir'd, In thoughts more elevate, and reason'd high In our present condition, which is a middle state, our minds are, as it were, chequered with truth and falfehood; and as our faculties are narrow, and our views imperfect, it is impoffible but our curiofity must meet with many repulses. The bufinefs of mankind in this life being rather to act than to know, their portion of knowledge is dealt to them accordingly. From hence it is, that the reason of the inquifitive has fo long been exercised with difficulties, in accounting for the promifcuous diftribution of good and evil to the virtuous and the wicked in this world. From hence come all thofe pathetical complaints of so many tragical events, which happen to the wife and the good; and of fuch furprising profperity, which is often the reward of the guilty and the foolish; that reafon is fometimes puzzled, and at a loss what to pronounce upon fo myfterious a difpenfation. Plato expreffes his abhorrence of fome fables of the Poets, which feem to reflect on the Gods as the authors of injustice; and lays it down as a principle, that, whatever is permitted to befal a just man, whether whether poverty, fickness, or any of those things which feem to be evils, fhall either in life or death conduce to his good. My reader will obferve how agreeable this maxim is to what we find delivered by a greater authority. Seneca has written a discourse purposely on this fubject; in which he takes pains, after the doctrine of the Stoicks, to fhew, that adversity is not in itself an evil; and mentions a noble saying of Demetrius, that nothing 'would be more unhappy than a man 'who had never known affliction.' He compares prosperity to the indulgence of a fond mother to a child, which often proves his ruin; but the affection of the Divine Being to that of a wife father, who would have his fons exercifed with labour, disappointment, and pain, that they may gather ftrength, and improve their fortitude. On this occafion the Philofopher rifes into that celebrated fentiment, that there is not on earth a spectacle more worthy the regard of a Creator intent on his works, than a brave man fuperior to his fufferings; to which he he adds, that it must be a pleasure to Jupiter himself to look down from heaven, and fee Cato amidst the ruins of his country preferving his integrity. This thought will appear yet more reafonable, if we confider human life as a ftate of probation, and adverfity as the poft of honour in it, affigned often to the best and most select spirits. But what I would chiefly infift on here, is, that we are not at present in a proper fituation to judge of the counfels by which Providence acts, fince but little arrives at our knowledge, and even that little we difcern imperfectly; or, according to the elegant figure in Holy Writ, 'We fee but in part, and as in a glafs 'darkly.' It is to be confidered, that Providence in its œconomy regards the whole fyftem of time and things together, fo that we cannot discover the beautiful connections between incidents which lie widely separate in time; and by losing fo many links of the chain, our reasonings become broken and imperfect. Thus those parts in the moral world, which have not an |