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and fucceffors, for ever. It was abrogated by an act of William and Mary, anno 1688, on the following preamble, "That "it is not only a great oppreffion upon "the poorer fort, but a badge of flavery upon the whole people, expofing every "man's houfe to be entered into and "fearched at pleafure, by perfons un"known to him." Had the harm done by fuch a tax to our manufactures been at that time understood, it would have been urged as the capital reafon against it. Our late improvements in commercial politics have unfolded an important doctrine, That taxes are feldom indifferent to the public good; that frequently they are more oppreffive to the people, than beneficial to the fovereign; and, on the other hand, that they may be fo contrived, as to rival bounties in promoting industry, manufactures, and commerce. These different effects of taxes, have rendered the fubject not a little intricate.

It is an article of importance in government, to have it afcertained, what proportion of the annual income of a nation may be drawn from the people by taxes, without impoverishing them. An eighth part

is held to be too much; husbandry, commerce, and population, would fuffer. Davenant fays, that the Dutch pay to the public annually, the fourth part of the income of their country; and he adds, that their ftri&t oeconomy enables them to bear that immenfe load, without raising the price of labour fo high as to cut them out of the foreign market. It was probably fo in the days of Davenant; but, of late, matters are much altered: the dearness of living and of labour, has excluded all the Dutch manufactures from the foreign market. Till the French war in King William's reign, England paid in taxes but about a twentieth part of its annual income.

SECT. II.

Power of impofing Taxes.

THat to impofe taxes belongs to the fovereign, and to him only, is undoubted. But it has been doubted, whether even King and parliament, who pof

VOL. II.

Z z

fefs

fefs the fovereign authority in Britain, can legally impofe a tax without consent of the people. The celebrated Locke, in his effay on Government (a), lays down the following propofition as fundamental. "'Tis true, governments cannot be fup"ported without great charge; and 'tis

fit every one who enjoys his fhare of "protection should pay out of his estate "his proportion for the maintenance of it. "But ftill it must be with his own confent, i. e. the confent of the majority, "giving it either by themselves, or their "representatives chofen by them; for if

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any one shall claim a power to lay and "levy taxes on the people by his own au

thority, and without fuch consent of "the people, he thereby invades the fun"damental law of property, and fubverts "the end of government. For what pro. perty have I in that which another may

by right take when he pleafes to him"felf?" No author has reflected more honour on his native country, and on mankind, than Mr Locke. Yet no name is above truth; and I am obliged to obferve, tho' with regret, that in the forego

(a) Chap. 11. 140.

ing reasoning the right of impofing taxes is laid upon a very crazy foundation. It may indeed be faid with fome colour, that the freeholders virtually impower their representatives to tax them. But their vaffals and tenants, who have no vote in electing members of parliament, empower none to tax them: yet they are taxed like others; and fo are the vaffals and tenants of peers. Add to these an immense number of artifans, manufacturers, day-labourers, domeftics, &c. &c. with the whole female fex; and it will appear, that those who are represented in parliament, make not the hundreth part of the taxable people. But further, it is acknowledged by our author, that the majority of the Lords and Commons muft bind the minority. This circumftance might have opened his eyes for furely the minority in this cafe are bound without their confent nay, against their confent. That a state cannot tax its fubjects without their confent, is a rash propofition, totally fubverfive of government. Locke himself has fuggefted the folid foundation of taxes, tho' inadvertently he lays no weight on it. I borrow his own words: "That every

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one who enjoys his share of protection, "fhould pay out of his eftate his propor"tion for the maintenance of the govern

ment." The duties of sovereign and of fubject are reciprocal; and common juftice requires, that a fubject, or any perfon who is protected by a government, ought to pay for that protection. Similar instances without number of such reciprocal duties, occur in the laws of every civilized nation. A man calls for meat and drink in a tavern: is he not bound to pay, tho' he made no agreement beforehand? A man wafted over a river in a ferry-boat, must pay the common fare, though he made no promife. Nay, it is every man's intereft to pay for protection: government cannot fubfift without a public fund: and what will become of individuals, when left open to every rapacious invader? Thus taxes are implied in the very nature of government; and the interpofition of fovereign authority is only neceffary for determining the expediency of a tax; and the quota, if found expedient.

Many writers, misled by the refpectable authority of Locke, boldly maintain, that a British parliament cannot legally tax the American