Cyrus could call by name all the soldiers in his numerous | It imports greater perfection to know all things, than to be army: with divers other strange instances of like nature. And since the perfections of some so far exceed the measure of the most, why is it then unconceivable that divine perfection should so far surpass all, as that God may intend the affairs of the world, according to the several exigences of his creatures, without any ungrateful diversion to himself, or diminution to his felicity? And since they who partake of some, and but a small portion of perfection only, can be concerned in many affairs, with little trouble; why cannot he that comprehends all perfection, be concerned in all, without any? For though we have, in what hath been last said, endeavoured to represent it as not so unapprehensible as is pretended, that it may be also; we take it, in the meantime, as formerly sufficiently proved, that so it is; that God is a being absolutely perfect, or that in-plaint of inevidence in the latter? Is not that knowledge cludes eminently all perfection in himself.

VIII. Which general perfection of his being, as it modifies all his attributes, so we shall particularly take notice that it doth so as to those that have a more direct influence upon, and tend more fully to evince, his conversableness with men. As, first, his wisdom and knowledge (for we need not to be so curious as at present to distinguish them) must be omniscient. About which, if any place were left for rational doubt, it would be obvious to them to allege it who are of slower inclinations towards religion; and object, (against all applications to, or expectations from, him,) that if we be not sure he knows simply all things, so as wisely to consider them and resolve fitly about them, it will be no little difficulty to determine which he doth, and which not; or to be at a certainty, that this or that concernment of theirs, about which they might address themselves to him, be not among the unknown things. At least, we shall the less need to be curious in distinguishing, or to consider what things may be supposed rather than other, to be without the compass of his knowledge; if it appear that it universally encompasses all things, or that nothing can be without its reach. And because we suppose it already out of doubt, that the true notion of God imports a Being absolutely or every way perfect; nothing else can be doubted in this matter, but whether the knowledge of all things be a perfection.

ignorant of some-and here surely whosoever shall think the determination difficult, accounts the wit of man so exceeding great, that he discovers his own to be very little. For what can the pretence of evidence be in the former assertion? Was it necessary that he, in whose choice it was whether we should ever know any thing or no, should make us capable of knowing every thing belonging to his own being? Or will we adventure to be so assuming, as while we deny it to God that he knows all things, to attribute to ourselves that we do? But if we will think it not altogether unworthy of us to be ignorant of something, what is there of which we may with more probability, or with less disparagement be thought so, than the manner of God's knowing things? And what place is there for commore perfect, which so fully already comprehends all things, as upon that account to admit of no increase; than that which shall be every day growing, and have a continual succession of new objects emerging and coming into view before altogether unknown? And will not that be the case, if we suppose future contingencies to lie concealed from the penetrating eye of God? For whatsoever is future, will some time be present, and then we will allow such contingencies to be known to him. That is, that God may know them, when we ourselves can; and that nothing of that kind is known to him, which is not knowable some way or other to ourselves, at least successively, and one thing after another. We will perhaps allow that prerogative to God, in point of this knowledge, that he can know these things now fallen out, all at once; we, but by degrees; while yet there is not any one that is absolutely unknowable to us. But why should it be thought unreasonable, to attribute an excellency to the knowledge of God above ours; as well in respect of the manner of knowing, as the multitude of objects at once known? We will readily confess, in some creatures, an excellency of their visive faculty above our own; that they can see things in that darkness, wherein they are to us invisible. And will we not allow that to the eye of God, which is as a flame of fire, to be able to penetrate into the abstrusest darkness of futurity, though we know not the way how it The greatest difficulty that hath troubled some in this is done; when yet we know that whatsoever belongs to matter, hath been, How it is possible there should be any the most perfect being, must belong to his? And that certain knowledge of events yet to come, that depend upon knowledge of all things imports more perfection, than if a free and self-determining cause? But methinks weit were lessened by the ignorance of any thing. should not make a difficulty to acknowledge, that to Some, who have thought the certain foreknowledge of know these things, imports greater perfection than not to future contingencies not attributable to God, have reckoned know them; and then it would be very unreasonable, the matter sufficiently excused by this, That it no more because we cannot show how this or that thing was per- detracts from the divine omniscience, to state without the formed which manifestly is done, therefore to deny that it object of it things not possible, or that imply a contradicis done at all. It would be so highly unreasonable to tion (as they suppose these do) to be known; than it doth conclude against any act of God, from our ignorance of the from his omnipotency, that it cannot do what is impossimanner of it, that we should reckon it very absurd to con- ble, or that implies a contradiction to be done. But/ clude so, concerning any act of our own, or our ability against this there seems to lie this reasonable exception, thereto. What if it were hitherto an unknown thing, and that the two cases appear not sufficiently alike; inasmuch impossible to be determined, how the act of vision is per- as the supposition of the former will be found not to leave formed by us; were it a wise conclusion, that therefore we the blessed God equally_entitled to omnisciency, as the neither do nor can see? How much more rash and pre- latter to omnipotency. For all things should not be alike suming a confidence were it to reason thus concerning the the object of both; and why should not that be underdivine acts and perfections! Would we not in any such stood to signify the knowledge of simply all things, as well case be determined rather by that which is more evident, as this the power of doing simply all things? Or why should than by what is more obscure? As in the assigned in- all things, included in these two words, signify so very stance, we should have but these two propositions to diversely; that is, there properly all things, here some compare-That I do (or have such a perfection belonging things only? And why must we so difference the object to me that I can) see, and,―That whatsoever act I do or of omnisciency and omnipotency, as to make that so much can do, I am able to understand the course and method narrower than this? And then how is it all things, when of nature's operations therein-and thereupon to judge so great a number of things will be left excluded? which of these two is more evident. Wherein it may be Whereas from the object of omnipotency (that we may supposed there is no man in his wits, to whom the deter- prevent what would be replied) there will be no exclusion mination would not be easy. Accordingly, in the present of any thing: not of the things which are actually already case we have only these two assertions that can be in com-made; for they are still momently reproduced by the same petition, in point of evidence, between which we are to make a comparison, and a consequent judgment; viz. Whatsoever perfection belongs to a being absolutely perfect, enabling it to do this or that, the wit of man can comprehend the distinct way and manner of doing it; and,

m Plin. Nat. Hist. lib. 7. c. 25. Id. l. 7. c. 24. vid. et Xenoph. de Cyr. Pæd. 15. Who, though he expressly says he knew all the soldiers' names, but seems rather to mean it of their officers, (for, saith he, he reckoned it an ab

power: not of the actions and effects of free causes yet future; for, when they become actual, God doth certainly perform the part of the first cause, (even by common consent,) in order to their becoming so; which is certainly doing somewhat, though all be not agreed what that part

surd thing a mechanic should know the names of all his tools, &c. and a goneral not know the names of his captains under him, &c.) yet he saith the soldiers wondered as ovouaWV EVETEλNETÓ.

ways of knowing things which we know nothing of. To
my apprehension, that last-mentioned author doth with ill
success attempt an explication of God's manner of know-
ing this sort of things, by the far less intelligible notion of
the indivisibility of eternity, comprehending (as he says)
all the parts of time, not successively, but together. And
though he truly say that the Scotists' way of expressing
how future contingents are present to God, i. e. according
to their objective and intentional being only, affords us no
account why God knows them, (for which cause he rejects
it, and follows that of the Thomists, who will have them
to be present according to their real and actual existence,)
I should yet prefer the deficiency of the former way, be-
and conceive those words in the Divine Dialogues, as
good an explication of the manner of his knowledge, as the
case can admit, (which yet is but the Scotists' sense,)
"That the whole evolution of times and ages is so collect-
edly and presentificly represented to God at once, as if all
things and actions which ever were, are, or shall be, were
at this very instant, and so always really present and ex-
istent before him."' Which is no wonder the animadver-
sion and intellectual comprehension of God being abso-
lutely infinite, according to the truth of his idea. I do
therefore think upon a sober resolution in this matter,
"That it seems more safe to allow this privilege to the in-
finite understanding of God,P than to venture at all to cir-
cumscribe his omniscience: for though it may safely be
said that he knows not any thing that really implies a
contradiction to be known, yet we are not assured but that
may seem a contradiction to us, that is not so really in
itself." And when we have only human wit to contest
with in the case, reverence of this or that man, though both
in great vogue in that kind, needs not restrain us from
distinguishing between a mere seeming latent contradic-
tion, and a flat, downright, open one. Only as to that
instance of the commensurableness of the diagonal line of
a quadrate to one of the sides; whereas though there are
great difficulties on both sides, viz. that these are com-
mensurable, and that they are not; yet any man's judg-
ment would rather incline to the latter, as the easier part:
I should therefore also think it more safe to make choice
of that, as the parallel of the present difficulty. Upon
the whole, we may conclude that the knowledge of God
is every way perfect; and being so, extends to all our con-
cernments: and that nothing remains, upon that account,
to make us decline applying ourselves to religious con-
verses with him, or deny him the honour and entertain-
ment of a temple: for which we shall yet see further
cause, when we consider, next,

is. Therefore they are, in the meantime, to be esteemed
within the object of omnipotency, or to be of the things
which God can do; viz. as the first cause virtually in-
cluding the power of the second. But more strictly; all
impossibility is either natural and absolute, or moral and
conditional. What is absolutely or naturally impossible,
or repugnant in itself, is not properly any thing. What-
soever simple being, not yet existent, we can form any
conception of, is producible, and so within the compass of
omnipotency; for there is no repugnancy in simplicity.
That wherein therefore we place natural impossibility, is
the inconsistency of being this thing, whose notion is such;
and another, wholly and entirely, whose notion is diverse,
at the same time, that which (more barbarously than insig-fore the contradictiousness and repugnancy of the latter;
nificantly) hath been wont to be called incompossibility.
But surely all things are properly enough said to be natu-
rally possible to God, while all simple beings are produci-
ble by him, of which any notion can be formed; yea, and
compounded, so as by their composition to result into a
third thing. So that it is not an exception, to say that it
is naturally impossible this thing should be another thing,
and yet be wholly itself still at once; that it should be
and not be, or be without itself. There is not within the
compass of actual or conceivable being, such a thing. Nor
is it reasonable to except such actions as are naturally pos-
sible to other agents, but not to him; as to walk, for in-
stance, or the like. Inasmuch as, though the excellency
of his nature permits not they should be done by him, yet
since their power of doing them proceeds wholly from him,
he hath it virtually and eminently in himself: as was for-
merly said of the infiniteness of his being. And for moral
impossibility, as to lie, to do an unjust act; that God never
does them, proceeds not from want of power, but an eter-
nal aversion of will. It cannot be said he is not able to
do such a thing, if he would; but so is his will qualified
and conditioned, by its own unchangeable rectitude, that
he most certainly never will; or such things as are in
themselves evil are never done by him, not through the
defect of natural power, but from the permanent stability
and fulness of all moral perfection. And it is not without
the compass of absolute omnipotency to do what is but
conditionally impossible, that absence of which restrictive
condition would rather bespeak impotency and imperfec-
tion, than omnipotency. Therefore the object of omnipo-
tence is simply all things; why not of omniscience as
well? It may be said, all things, as it signifies the object
of omniscience, is only restrained by the act or faculty,
signified therewith in the same word, so as to denote the
formal object of that faculty or act, viz. all knowable
things. But surely that act must suppose some agent,
whereto that knowable hath reference. Knowable! To
whom? To others, or to God himself? If we say the
former, it is indeed a great honour we put upon God, to
say he can know as much as others; if the latter, we
speak absurdly, and only say he can know all that he can
know. It were fairer to deny omniscience than so inter-
pret it. But if it be denied, what shall the pretence be?
Why, that it implies a contradiction future contingents
should be certainly known; for they are uncertain, and
nothing can be otherwise truly known than as it is.n

And it must be acknowledged, that to whom any thing is uncertain, it is a contradiction that to him it should be certainly known. But that such things are uncertain to God, needs other proof than I have met with, in what follows in that cited author, or elsewhere: all which will amount to no more than this, that such things as we cannot tell how God knows them, must needs be unknown to him. But since we are sure many such things have been certainly foretold by God, (and of them such as we may be also sure he never intended to effect,) we have reason enough to be confident that such things are not unknowable to him. And for the manner of his knowing them, it is better to profess ignorance about it, than attempt the explication thereof, either unintelligibly, as some have to no purpose, or dangerously and impiously, as others have adventured to do to very bad purpose. And it well becomes us to suppose an infinite understanding may have

IX. That his power is also omnipotent. Which (though the discourse of it have been occasionally somewhat mingled with that of the last) might be directly spoken of for the fuller eviction of that his conversableness with men, which religion and a temple do suppose. Nor indeed is it enough that he knows our concernments, except he can also provide effectually about them, and dispose of them to our advantage. And we cannot doubt but he, who could create us and such a world as this, can do so, even though he were supposed not omnipotent. But even that itself seems a very unreasonable supposition, that less than infinite power should suffice to the creation of any thing. For however liable it may be to controversy, what a second cause might do herein, being assisted by the infinite power of the first; it seems altogether unimaginable to us, how, though the power of all men were met in one, (which we can easily suppose to be a very vast power,) it could alone be sufficient to make the minutest atom arise into being out of nothing. And that all the matter of the universe hath been so produced, viz. out of nothing, it will be no great presumption to suppose already fully proved; in that though any such thing as necessary matter were admitted, yet its essential unalterableness would render it impossible it should be the matter of the universe. Therefore when we cannot devise what finite power can ever suffice (suppose it were never so much increased, but still finite) to the doing of that which we are sure is done, what is left

n Qualis res est talis est rei cognitio. Si itaque res sit incerta (puta incer--Strangius de Voluntate et Actionibus Dei, &c. 1. 3. c. 6. as he there obtum est hoc ne sit futurum, an non) non datur ulla certa ejus notitia. Quo- jects to himself. o Dr. More. malo enim fieri potest ut certo sciatur adfore, quod certo futurum non est, &c. p Of Bathymus, in the same Dialogues.

further insist, having no peculiar adversary (in this matter singly) to contend with, as indeed he would have had a hard province, who should have undertaken to contend against omnipotency.

us to suppose, but that the power which did it is simply infinite: much more when we consider, not only that something is actually produced out of nothing, but do also seriously contemplate the nature of the production! Which carries so much of amazing wonder in it, every where, that even the least and most minute things might serve for sufficient instances of the unlimited greatness of that power which made them; as would be seen if we did industriously set ourselves to compare the effects of divine power with those of human art and skill. As is the ingenious and pious observation of the most worthy Mr. Hook, who upon his viewing with his microscope the point of a small and very sharp needle, (than which we can-couragement that arises from so unlimited power and not conceive a smaller thing laboured by the hand of man,) takes notice of sundry sorts of natural things, "that have points many thousand times sharper: those of the hairs of insects, &c. that appearing broad, irregular, and uneven, having marks upon it of the rudeness and bungling of art. So unaccurate (saith he) it is in all its productions, even in those that seem most neat, that if examined truly with an organ more acute than that by which they were made, the more we see of their shape the less appearance will there be of their beauty. Whereas in the works of nature the deepest discoveries show us the greatest excellences; an evident argument that he that was the Author of these things, was no other than omnipotent, being able to include as great a variety of parts, in the yet smallest discernible point, as in the vaster bodies, (which comparatively are called also points,) such as the earth, sun, or planets." And I may add, when those appear but points, in comparison of his so much vaster work, how plainly doth that also argue to us the same thing? And let us strictly consider the matter. Omnipotency, as hath been said, imports a power of doing all things possible to be done, or indeed, simply all things; unto which passive power, an active one must necessarily correspond. That is, there is nothing in itself possible to be done, but it is also possible to some one or other to do it. If we should therefore suppose God not omnipotent, it would follow some one or other were able to do more than God. For though possibility do import a non-repugnancy in the thing to be done; yet it also connotes an ability in some agent to do it. Wherefore there is nothing possible which some agent cannot do. And if so, that agent must either be God, or some other. To say it is God, is what we intend. That is, there is nothing possible which God cannot do; or he can do all things. But to say it is some other, and not God, were to open the door to the above-mentioned horrid consequence; which no one that acknowledges a God (and we are not now discoursing with them who simply deny his being) would not both blush and tremble to

avow.

Some indeed have so over-done the business here as to deny any intrinsical possibility of any thing, and say that things are only said to be possible, because God can do them; which is the same thing as thus to explain God's omnipotency; i. e. that he can do all things which he can do: and makes a chimera no more impossible in itself to be produced, than a not yet existent man. And the reason of the denial is, that what is only possible is nothing, and therefore can have nothing intrinsical to it; as if it were not sufficient to the intrinsical possibility of a thing, that its idea have no repugnancy in it. Yet entire and full possibility connotes a reference to the productive power of an agent; so that it is equally absurd to say that things are only possible, because there is no repugnancy in their ideas, as it is to say they are only possible, because some agent can do them; inasmuch as the entire possibility of their existence imports both that there is no repugnancy in their ideas, which if there be, they are every way nothing, (as hath been said before,) and also that there is a suffieient power to produce them. Therefore, whereas we might believe him sufficient every way for us, though we did not believe him simply omnipotent; how much more fully are we assured, when we consider that he is! Whereof also no place of doubt can remain, this being a most un questionable perfection, necessarily included in the notion of an absolutely perfect Being. But here we need not qin his Micographia.

* Δυναμένων μεν παντα, βουλομένωι δε τα αριςα. Phil. Jud. de Abr.

And now join herewith again, the boundlessness of his goodness, which upon the same ground of his absolute perfection, must be infinite also, and which it is of equal concernment to us to consider, that we may understand he not only can effectually provide about our concernments, but is most graciously inclined so to do. And then, what rational inducement is wanting to religion, and the dedication of a temple; if we consider the joint engoodness? Or what man would not become entirely devoted to him, who, by the one of these, we are assured, can do all things, and by the other, will do what is best? Nor therefore is there any thing immediately needful to our present purpose, the eviction of God's conversableness with men, more than hath been already said. That is, there is nothing else to be thought on, that hath any nearer influence thereon; the things that can be supposed to have such influence, being none else than his power, knowledge, and goodness, which have been particularly evinced from the creation of the world, both to have been in some former subject, and to have all originally met in a necessary being, that alone could be the Creator of it. Which necessary being, as it is such, appearing also to be infinite, and absolutely perfect; the influence of these cannot but the more abundantly appear to be such as can and may most sufficiently and fully correspond, both in general to the several exigencies of all creatures, and more especially to all the real necessities and reasonable desires of man: so that our main purpose seems already gained. Yet because it may be grateful when we are persuaded that things are so, to fortify (as much as we can) that persuasion, and because our persuasion concerning these attributes of God will be still liable to assault unless we acknowledge him every where present; (nor can it well be conceivable otherwise, how the influence of his knowledge, power, and goodness, can be so universal, as will be thought necessary to infer a universal obligation to religion;) it will be therefore requisite to add somewhat concerning his omnipresence, or because some, that love to be very strictly critical, will be apt to think that term restrictive of his presence to the universe, (as supposing to be present is relative to somewhat one may be said present unto, whereas they will say without the universe, is nothing,) we will rather choose to call it immensity. For though it would sufficiently answer our purpose, that his presence be universal to all his creatures; yet even this is to be proved by such arguments as will conclude him simply immense; which therefore will with the greater advantage infer the thing we intend. This part of divine perfection we will acknowledge to have been impugned, by some that have professed much devotedness to a Deity and religion: we will therefore charitably suppose that opposition to have been joined with inadvertency of the ill tendency of it; that is, how unwarrantably it would maim the notion of the former, and shake the foundations of the latter. Nor therefore ought that charity to be any allay to a just zeal for so great concerns.

It seems then, first, manifestly repugnant to the notion of an infinitely perfect Being, to suppose it less than simply immense. For, upon that supposition it must either be limited to some certain place, or excluded out of all. The latter of these would be most openly to deny it; as hath with irrefragable evidence been abundantly manifested by the most learned Dr. More, whereto it would be needless and vain to attempt to add any thing. Nor is that the thing pretended to by the sort of persons I now chiefly intend.

And for the former, I would inquire, Is amplitude of essence no perfection? Or were the confining of this Being to the very minutest space we can imagine, no detraction from the perfection of it? What if the amplitude of that glorious and ever-blessed Essence were said to be only of that extent (may it be spoken with all reverence, and resentment of the unhappy necessity we have of ma8 Both in his Dialogues and Enchiridion Metaphys.

king so mean a supposition) as to have been confined unto | is, of a distinction of Maresius's to which he is replying, that one temple to which of old he chose to confine his for so occasionally comes in the discourse,) "viz. the inmore solemn worship; that he could be essentially pre-finity of the divine essence, is not so firm as is commonly sent, only here at once, and no where else; were this no thought." And that therefore it may be thought less firm, detraction? They that think him only to replenish and be he thinks fit to cast a slur upon it, by making it the docpresent by his essence in the highest heaven, (as some are trine of the Stoics, exprest by Virgil, Jovis omnia plena; wont to speak,) would they not confess it were a meaner (as if it must needs be false, because Virgil said it, though and much lower thought to suppose that presence circum-I could tell, if it were worth the while, where Virgil scribed within the so unconceivably narrower limits as the speaks more agreeably to his sense than ours, according walls of a house? If they would pretend to ascribe to to which he might as well have interpreted this passage, him some perfection beyond this, by supposing his essen- as divers texts of Scripture; and then his authority might tial presence commensurable to the vaster territory of the have been of some value;) and by Lucan, who helps, it highest heavens; even by the same supposition, should seems, to disgrace and spoil it; Jupiter est quodcunque they deny to him greater perfection than they ascribe. vides, quocunque moveris. He might, if he had a mind to For the perfection which in this kind they should ascribe, make it thought paganish, have quoted a good many more, were finite only; but that which they should deny, were but then there might have been some danger it should infinite. pass for a common notion. Next, he quotes some passages of the fathers that import dislike of it, about which we need not concern ourselves; for the question is not what this or that man thought. And then, for the positive account of his own judgment in the case, having recited divers texts out of the Bible that seemed as he apprehended to make against him, he would have us believe, that these all speak rather of God's providence and power. by which he concerns himself in all our works, words, and thoughts, wheresoever we live, than of the absolute infinity of his essence. And afterwards, That God is by his essence in the supreme heaven, where he inhabits the inaccessible light, but thence he sends out from himself a spirit, or a certain force, whither he pleases, by which he is truly present, and works there.

But proceed we to his reasons, which he saith are not to be contemned. We shall therefore not contemn them so far, as not to take notice of them; which trouble also the reader may please to be at, and afterward do as he thinks fit.

1. That no difference can be conceived between God and creatures, if God, as they commonly speak, be wholly, in every point, or do fill all the points of the universe with his whole essence: for so whatsoever at all is, will be God himself.

Again, they will however acknowledge omnipotency a perfection included in the notion of an absolutely perfect Being; therefore they will grant, he can create another world (for they do not pretend to believe this infinite; and if they did, by their supposition, they should give away their cause) at any the greatest distance we can conceive from this; therefore so far his power can extend itself. But what, his power without his being? What then is his power? something, or nothing? Nothing can do nothing; therefore not make a world. It is then some being; and whose being is it but his own? Is it a created being? That is to suppose him, first, impotent, and then to have created omnipotency, when he could do nothing. Whence by the way we may see to how little purpose that distinction can be applied in the present case of essential and virtual contact, where the essence and virtue cannot but be the same. But shall it be said, he must, in order to the creating such another world, locally move thither where he designs it? I ask then, But can he not at the same time create thousands of worlds at any distance from this round about it? No man can imagine this to be impossible to him that can do all things. Wherefore of such extent is his power, and consequently his being. Will they therefore say he can immensely, if he please, diffuse his being, but he voluntarily contracts it? It is answered, That is altogether impossible to a being, that is whatsoever it is by a simple and absolute necessity, for whatsoever it is necessarily, it is unalterably and eternally, or is pure act, and in a possibility to be nothing which it already is not. Therefore since God can every where exert his power, he is necessarily, already, every where: and hence, God's immensity is the true reason of his immobility; there being no imaginable space, which he doth not necessarily replenish. Whence also, the supposition of his being so confined (as was said) is immediately repugnant to the notion of a necessary being, as well as of an absolutely perfect, which hath been argued from it. We might moreover add, that upon the same supposition God might truly be said to have made a creature greater than himself, (for such this universe apparently were,) and that he can make one (as they must confess who deny him not to be omnipotent) most unconceivably greater than this universe now is. Nothing therefore seems more manifest than that God is immense, or (as we may express it) extrinsically infinite, with respect to place; as well as intrinsically, in respect to the plenitude of his perfection. Only it may be requisite to consider briefly what is said against it by the otherwise minded, that pretend not to deny his infinity in that other sense. Wherein that this discourse swell not beyond just bounds, their strength of argument, (for it will not be so seasonable here to discuss with them the texts of Scripture wont to be insisted on in this matter,) shall be viewed as it is collected and gathered up in one of them. And that shall be, Curcellæus, who gives it as succinctly and fully as any I have met with of that sort of men.

The doctrine itself we may take from him thus, First, On the negative part, by way of denial of what we have been hitherto asserting, he says, "The foundation," (that

9 De Vocibus Trinit. Ac.

t Unto which purpose speaks at large Volkelius de vera Relig. Quia enim Dei et potentia et sapientia ad res omnes extenditur, uti et potestas sive imperium; ideo ubique præsens, omniaque numine suo complere dicitur, &c. . 1. c. 27. Slichtingius Artic. de filio Dei. Ad. Ps. 139. 6, 7.

Answ. And that is most marvellous, that the in-being or one thing in another must needs take away all their difference, and confound them each with other; which sure would much rather argue them distinct. For certainly it cannot, without great impropriety, be said that any thing is in itself; and is both the container and contained. How were these thoughts in his mind? And these very notions which he opposes to each other, so as not to be confounded with his mind, and consequently with one another? So that it is a great wonder he was not of both opinions at once. And how did he think his soul to be in his body, which, though substantially united with it, (and that is somewhat more, as we will suppose he knew was commonly held, than to be intimately present,) was not yet the same thing? However, himself acknowledges the power and providence of God to be every where and then at least every thing must, it seems, be the very power and providence of God. But he thought, it may be, only of confuting the words of Lucan, and chastising his poetic liberty. And if he would have been at the pains to turn all their strains and raptures into propositions, and so have gravely fallen to confuting them, he might perhaps have found as proper an exercise for his logic as this. As for his talk of a whole, whereof we acknowledge no parts, (as if he imagined the divine essence to be compounded of such, he should have said so, and have proved it,) it is an absurd scheme of speech, which may be left to him, and them that use it, to make their best of.

2. No idolatry can be committed, if there be not the least point to be found, that is not wholly full of whole God: for whithersoever worship shall be directed, it shall be directed to God himself, who will be no less there than in heaven.

Answ. This proceeds upon the supposition that the former would be granted as soon as it should be heard, as Nec loquitur David de Spiritu Sancto, qui peculiaris quidem Dei Spiritus est, sed de Spiritu Dei simpliciter. Nec dicit Spiritum istum ubique re esse sed tantum docet nullum, esse locum, ad quem is nequeat pertingere, &c. So also F. Socin. Smalcius. And (though not altogether 80 expressly as the rest) Vorstius, Crellius, &c.

a self-evident principle, that whatsoever is in another, is most pure and holy God should be as much in the most that in which it is; and so his consequence were most un-nasty places as in heaven, &c. (I forbear to recite the rest deniable. But though we acknowledge God to be in every of this uncleanly argument, which is strong in nothing but thing, yet so to worship him in any thing, as if his essen- ill savour.) But for tial presence were confined thereto, while it ought to be conceived of as immense, this is idolatry: and therefore they who so conceive of it, as confined, (or tied in any respect, wherein he hath not so tied it himself,) are concerned to beware of running upon this rock.