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that durare is applied to the idea of hardness, as well as that of existence, we fee in Horace, epod. xvi. "ferro duravit fecula." But be that as it will, this is certain, that whoever purfues his own thoughts, will find them fometimes launch out beyond the extent of body into the infinity of space or expanfion; the idea whereof is diftinct and feparate from body, and all other things; which may (to those who please) be a fubject of farther meditation.

Time to du

ration is as place to expanfion.

§. 5. Time in general is to duration, as place to expanfion. They are fo much of thofe boundlefs oceans of eternity and immenfity, as is fet out and diftinguished from the reft, as it were by land-marks; and fo are made use of to denote the pofition of finite real beings, in respect one to another, in thofe uniform infinite oceans of duration and fpace. Thefe rightly confidered are only ideas of determinate distances, from certain known points fixed in diftinguishable fenfible things, and fuppofed to keep the fame diftance one from another, From fuch points fixed in fenfible beings' we reckon, and from them we measure our portions of those infinite quantities; which, fo confidered, are that which we call time and place. For duration and space being in themselves uniform and boundless, the order and pofition of things, without fuch known fettled points, would be loft in them; and all things would lie jumbled in an incurable confufion.

Time and

ken for fo

§. 6. Time and place, taken thus for place are ta determinate diftinguishable portions of those infinite abyffes of fpace and duration, fet out, or fuppofed to be diftinguished from the reft by marks, and known boundaries, have each of them a two-fold acceptation.

much of either, as are fet out by the exiftence and motion of bo

dies.

Firft, Time in general is commonly taken for fo much of infinite duration, as is measured by, and co-existent with the existence and motions of the great bodies of the universe, as far as we know any thing of them: and in this sense time begins and ends with the frame

I

of

of this fenfible world, as in thefe phrafes before-mentioned, before all time, or when time fhall be no more. Place likewife is taken fometimes for that portion of infinite space, which is poffeffed by, and comprehended within the material world; and is thereby diftinguished from the reft of expantion; though this may more pro perly be called extenfion, than place. Within thefe two are confined, and by the obfervable parts of them are measured and determined, the particular time or duration, and the particular extenfion and place, of all corporeal beings.

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Sometimes for fo much of either, as we design by measures ta

ken from the bulk or motion of bo

dies.

§. 7. Secondly, Sometimes the word time is used in a larger fenfe, and is applied to parts of that infinite duration, not that were really diftinguished and measured out by this real existence, and periodical motions of bodies that were appointed from the beginning to be for figns, and for feafons, and for days, and years, and are accordingly our measures of time: but fuch other portions too of that infinite uniform duration, which we, upon any occafion, do fuppofe equal to certain lengths of meafured time; and fo confider them as bounded and determined. For if we fhould fuppofe the creation, or fall of the angels, was at the beginning of the Julian period, we fhould fpeak properly enough, and fhould be understood, if we faid, it is a longer time fince the creation of angels, than the creation of the world, by feven thousand fix hundred and forty years: whereby we would mark out fo much of that undiftinguished duration, as we suppose equal to, and would have admitted feven thousand fix hundred and forty annual revolutions of the fun, moving at the rate it now does. And thus likewife we fometimes fpeak of place, diftance, or bulk, in the great inane beyond the confines of the world, when we confider fo much of that space as is equal to, or capable to receive a body of any affigned dimenfions, as a cubick foot; or do fuppofe a point in it at fuch a certain diftance from any part of the universe.

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They belong §. 8. Where and when are questions beto all beings. longing to all finite existences, and are by. us always reckoned from fome known parts of this fenfible world, and from fome certain epochs marked out to us by the motions obfervable in it. Without fome fuch fixed parts or periods, the order of things would be loft to our finite understandings, in the boundless invariable oceans of duration and expansion; which comprehend in them all finite beings, and in their full extent belong only to the Deity. And therefore we are not to wonder that we comprehend them not, and do fo often find our thoughts at a lofs, when we would confider them either abstractly in themfelves, or as any way attributed to the first incomprehenfible being. But when applied to any particular finite beings, the extenfion of any body is fo much of that infinite fpace, as the bulk of the body takes up. And place is the pofition of any body, when confidered at a certain distance from fome other. As the idea of the particular duration of any thing is an idea of that portion of infinite duration, which paffes during the existence of that thing; fo the time when the thing exifted is the idea of that space of duration which paffed between fome known and fixed period of duration, and the being of that thing. One shows the distance of the extremities of the bulk or existence of the fame thing, as that it is a foot fquare, or lafted two years; the other fhows the distance of it in place, or exiftence, from other fixed points of space or duration, as that it was in the middle of Lincoln's-inn-fields, or the first degree of Taurus, and in the year of our Lord 1671, or the 1000 year of the Julian period: all which diftances we meafure by pre-conceived ideas of certain lengths of space and duration, as inches, feet, miles, and degrees; and in the other, minutes, days, and years, &c.

All the parts of extenfion are exten

fion: and all the parts of duration are duration.

§. 9. There is one thing more wherein fpace and duration have a great conformity; and that is, though they are justly reckoned amongst our fimple ideas, yet none of the diftinct ideas we have of either is without all manner of com

pofition;

pofition; it is the very nature of both of them to confift of parts: but their parts being all of the fame kind, and without the mixture of any other idea, hinder them not from having a place amongst simple ideas. Could the mind, as in number, come to fo fmall a part of extenfion or duration, as excluded divifibility, that would be, as it were, the indivifible unit, or idea; by repetition of which it would make its more enlarged ideas of extenfion and duration. But fince the mind is not able to frame an idea of any fpace without parts; instead thereof it makes ufe of the common measures, which by familiar use, in each country, have imprinted themselves on the memory (as inches and feet; or cubits and parafangs; and fo feconds, minutes, hours, days, and years in duration:) the mind makes use, I fay, of fuch ideas as thefe, as fimple ones; and these are the component parts of larger ideas, which the mind, upon occasion, makes by the addition of fuch known lengths

It has been objected to Mr. Locke, that if space confifts of parts, as it is confeffed in this place, he should not have reckoned it in the number of fimple ideas: because it seems to be inconfiftent with what he fays elsewhere, that a fimple idea is uncompounded, and contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance or conception of the mind, and is not diftinguishable into different ideas. It is farther objected, that Mr Locke has not given in the eleventh chapter of the fecond book, where he begins to speak of finiple ideas, an exact definition of what he underftands by the word fimple ideas. To thefe difficulties Mr. Locke anfwers thus: To begin with the last, he declares, that he has not treated his fubject in an order perfectly fcholaftic, having not had much familiarity with thofe fort of books during the writing of his, and not remembering at all the method in which they are written; and therefore his readers ought not to expect definitions regularly placed at the beginning of each new fubject. Mr. Locke contents himself to employ the principal terms that he uses, so that from his ufe of them the reader may eafily comprehend what he means by them. But with respect to the term fimple idea, he has had the good luck to define that in the place cited in the objection; and therefore there is no reafon to fupply that defect. The queftion then is to know, whether the idea of extenfion agrees with this definition? which will effectually agree to it, if it be understood in the fenfe which Mr. Locke had principally in his view: for that compofition which he defigned to exclude in that definition, was a compofition of different ideas in the mind, and not a compofition of the fame kind in a thing whofe effence confifts in having parts of the fame kind, where you can never come to a part entirely exempted from this compofition. So

that

lengths which it is acquainted with. On the other fide, the ordinary fmalleft measure we have of either is looked on as an unit in number, when the mind by divifion would reduce them into lefs fractions. Though on both fides, both in addition and divifion, either of space or duration, when the idea under confideration becomes very big or very fmall, its precife bulk becomes very obfcure and confufed; and it is the number of its repeated additions or divifions, that alone remains clear and diftinct, as will eafily appear to any one who will let his thoughts loofe in the vaft expanfion of space, or divifibility of matter. Every part of duration is duration too; and every part of extenfion is extension, both of them capable of addition or divifion in infinitum. But the leaft portions of either of them, whereof we have clear and diftinct ideas, may perhaps be fittest to be confidered by us, as the fimple ideas of that kind, out of which our complex modes of space,

that if the idea of extenfion confifts in having partes extra partes, (as the fchools fpeak) it is always, in the fense of Mr. Locke, a fimple idea; becaufe the idea of having partes extra partes cannot be refolved into two other ideas. For the remainder of the objection made to Mr. Locke, with refpect to the nature of extenfion, Mr. Locke was aware of it, as may be feen in §. 9. chap. 15. of the fecond book, where he fays, that the leaft portion of fpace or extenfion, whereof we have a clear and "diftinct idea, may perhaps be the fittest to be confidered by us as a fimple idea of that kind, out of which our complex modes of space and "extenfion are made up." So that, according to Mr. Locke, it may very fitly be called a fimple idea, fince it is the leaft idea of fpace that the mind can form to itself, and that cannot be divided by the mind into any lefs, whereof it has in itself any determined perception. From whence it follows, that it is to the mind one fimple idea; and that is fuficient to take away this objection: for it is not the defign of Mr. Locke, in this place, to difcourfe of any thing but concerning the idea of the mind. But if this is not fufficient to clear the difficulty, Mr. Locke hath nothing more to add, but that if the idea of extenfion is fo peculiar that it cannot ex actly agree with the definition that he has given of thofe fimple ideas, fo that it differs in fome manner from all others of that kind, he thinks it is better to leave it there expofed to this difficulty, than to make a new divifion in his favour. It is enough for Mr. Locke that his meaning can be understood. It is very common to obferve intelligible difcourses spoiled by too much fubtilty in nice divifions. We ought to put things together as well as we can, doctrinæ causâ; but, after all, several things will not be bundled up together under our terms and ways of fpeaking.

extenfion,

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