very ready to grant, with this Author, q" that "nothing but what is morally excellent can "have place in the Deity;" and that “unless "we be fatisfied that he is good, and cannot de"ceive us, there can be no real religious faith or "confidence;" and moreover, that, " if there "be really fome thing previous to Revelation, "fome antecedent demonftration of Reason "to affure us, that God is, and, withal, that "he is fo good, as not to deceive us; the "fame reason, if we will truft to it, will de"monftrate to us, that God is so good, as to "exceed the very best of us in Goodness?" Yet, notwithstanding, I can by no means deduce the fame general conclufion which this Author does in these words, After this manner, we can have no dread or fufpicion to render us uneafy: For it is MALICE only, and not GOODNESS, that can make us afraid. Indeed a good man, who always acts fincerely, according to his best understanding, and is ever ready to be governed by those principles of Religion, which the Highest and most unprejudiced reason will affure him are worthy of God, has no reason to be afraid of any deficiency in the Divine good

nefs

··9 lb. pag. 39.

nefs towards him, which is ever ready to compaffionate even all such mistakes as are purely involuntary. But what is this to a man, that having means of knowing God, yet either utterly denies, or takes no notice of his Being? All men indeed, by reason of their different degrees of understanding, cannot have equally perfect notions of the Nature of God and his Attributes: But there is no man who has attained to the use of his reafon, but he can evidently discover that he did not make himfelf: And I hope I have formerly shewn, that there is no man of fo remote a province, as to be out of the hearing of the name and actions of the great Governour of the world. The vifible Creation is a book open to all men, and every man carries his own Mind about him; and thefe grounds for the belief of a God and his Providence, are neither weak nor frivolous. Such a Belief, is so far from affuming an Opinion contrary to the appearance of things, or putting a lye upon the underftanding, or believing at a venture, and against our Reason, that if I fhould fay with the Pfalmift, that the Heavens declare the Glory of God, and the Firmament fheweth his handy work----and that there is neither speech nor language, where their voice is not heard;

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the reasoning of an heathen Author would bear teftimony to it, who tells us, that That man must be void of all mind or understanding himSelf, who thinks that there is no fuperior mind directing the wonderful order of the Heavenly bodies, and preferving the incredible conftancy of their motions, upon which the preservation and well-being of all things has fo great a dependence. And what the natural confequence arifing from hence is, we are told in another place by the fame Author, even where he is as much as may be discouraging all fuperftitions: That there is fome fupreme, excellent and eternal Being; and that the fame Being is to be had in the greatest reverence and admiration by all mankind, the beautiful frame of the world, and the order of the Heavenly bodies forces us to confefs. Now it is certain, that no man, who disputes against the Being of a God, can justly pretend

Coeleftium [for fo it should be read, and not Cœleftem] ergo admirabilem ordinem, incredibilemque conftantiam, ex qua confervatio & falus omnium omnis oritur, qui vacare mente putat, is ipfe mentis expers habendus eft. Cic. de Nat. ·Deor. l. 2. cap. 21.

s Effe præftantem aliquam æternamque naturam & eam fufpiciendam admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo mundi ordoque rerum cœleftium cogit confiteri. Cic. de Divinat. lib. 2. in fine.

pretend ignorance of his Being. Nor can the denial of his Being, confift with any kind of reverence or admiration of him; for the very first instance and foundation of all refpect which we can pay him, must be an acknowledgment of his Being. Let it then but be granted, that there are eternal and neceffary differences of things, and that the Will of God determines it felf always to act, according to the Eternal reafon and nature of things, and that all Rational creatures are naturally obliged to conform themselves in all their actions, to the eternal Rule of reason; it will from thence follow, that there are Unchangeable moral obligations, or Laws of nature, respecting man's behaviour towards the Supreme Being, whose creature and fubject he is, as well as towards his fellow creatures. And if right Reafon be the fame thing, though in infinitely higher degree, in God, as in other rational Beings; it must also neceffarily be his will, that all creatures should act according to their moral obligations: And confequently, as there are natural evil confequences attending upon the perverfion of the natural order of things, and manifeft evils and inconveniencies

both

↑ Primus deorum cultus eft Deos credere, &c. Vide Senec. Epift.95.

both to fociety and to private perfons, flowing from the tranfgreffion of the moral natural law; * fo it cannot be confiftent with the divine reafon, which is infinite wisdom, to make no difference between those that chufe to act agreeably to the moral nature of things, and those that wilfully act otherwise; that is, he cannot have the fame regard for those who difown his Being and Providence, as for those who own and obey him.

There is no occafion to fuppofe any Malice, or any defect of Goodness in the divine Nature, for making this difference, which the very nature of things makes: And it is far from being the perfection of Goodness, to make thofe equal, whofe merits, or moral actions, are unequal. And if this way of arguing, from the notion of God's goodness, were juft, then for the fame reason he ought never to suffer any man to be miserable, what ever his demerits are. But we fee in fact, that he has done it; and these miseries are real punishments upon mankind, for their wilful tranfgreffing the laws of Reason and Nature. So that we muft either deny that there is any Supreme mind governing the world, or believe it confiftent with his infinite goodness to punifh those, that is, fuffer them to be miserable,

who