Prophet Micaba, who lived in the fame age with this Prophet Isaiah; which makes them the more remarkable. And that they are a prophecy, relating to the times of the Meffias, or kingdom of Chrift, as is evident, from that mention of the last days with which they are introduced, is, I fuppofe, generally agreed. And that they are intended, to fignify fuch a difpofition in mens minds, and fuch a state of things, when many people of different nations fhould be inquifitive about that revelation of the Will of God, which was to have its beginning among the people of the Jews, is plain from the words themselves. But my defign, at prefent, is not to enquire exactly, either into the particular time to which these words of the Prophets immediately refer, or into the particular manner in which they are most compleatly fulfilled, under the Gospel difpenfation; whether at the first promulgation of it, which begun from Jerusalem, or at the further bringing in of the rest of the Gentile world, with the more full and entire converfion of the Jews, to the Faith of Chrift: Which from many paffages, both of the Old and New Testament, is justly expected to be

accom

a Mic. iv. 29

accomplished one time or other, as the provi→ dence of God fhall make way for it.

What I now intend, is only to make use of the words with a more general view, as they exprefs a fincere defire in many different people, of being better informed in the mind and will of God, by fome particular Revelation from himself, than they could be by the mere natural light of their own minds, reflecting only upon the general works of Creation and Providence. And from viewing them in this light, I fhall take occafion to obferve the following particulars.

I. That every rational man, who believes. a God and a Providence governing the world, is under a natural obligation, to enquire whether God has made any particular Revelation of his will to men, which they are any way concerned to take notice of.

II. That whoever seriously makes this enqui ry, will find it reasonable to conclude, that fome Revelation may justly be expected from God, confidering the general state of mankind.

III. That if this be fo, then it is every man's duty, to use all the proper means he can, to find out what is true Revelation, and what is only pretended.

I. That every Rational man, who believes a God and a Providence governing the world, is under a natural obligation to enquire, whether God has made any particular Revelation of his will to men, which they are any way concerned to take notice of. This propofition may perhaps, at the first sight, seem to be altogether needlefs, as containing only an affertion, which no one will offer seriously to deny: But I am afraid, that in fact, much of that which goes under the name of Deism, in the world, has at the bottom no other foundation, but either what may be justly counted a virtual denial of this affertion, or what will in the end revert to downright Atheism; that is, fuch men as affect the name of Deifts, in oppofition to all revealed Religion, either mean nothing more than mere Atheism by it, but only to avoid, the trouble of confidering the force of fuch arguments, as lie ftrong against the plain denial of the Being of a God; and fo by feeming to allow them, they are willing to wave all oppofition of that kind: Or elfe, if they do in truth believe the Arguments for his Being, to be conclufive, and yet make no enquiry after his will, they must then believe his Existence only as a Speculative

point; which is indeed true in it self, but which, they think, does not put them under any obligation of acting one way or other, in confequence of it. This kind of Deism is, I confefs, but one remove from Atheism it felf; because, though it owns a God, who is the Governour of the natural world, yet at the fame time it confiders him, as having little or no concern for the moral world, or the actions of men, confider'd as moral or rational Agents; which is in consequence, a denying or not owning of his moral Attributes. Upon this confideration therefore, to convince fuch men of their obligation to enquire after the will of God, we must first defire them to confider, That Juftice, Goodness, Truth, and all moral perfections, are as effential to the notion of God, or Supreme Intelligent Being, as Wisdom or Power; for they are indeed the neceffary confequences of infinite Wisdom and Power. It cannot be denied, but that there are different things in the world, which have different powers and properties, different kinds and degrees of perfections; and from hence, in the very nature of things, arife different relations of one thing to another, and a fitness or unfitness, according as different things are applied or misapplied to one another. And

U 3

there

there is the fame natural difference, and natural confequence of that difference, fitness or unfitness, in all actions of every Being which can be properly called an Agent.

Now an infinitely wife Being, who preferves all these things in their proper natures, certainly knows all thefe different relations of things and actions, with their respective fitneffes and confequences; or else his underftanding would be imperfect and finite. And he does as evidently will that they should be as they are, because he preferves them in their Beings; and his will cannot be influenced by any wrong affection, raised by any temptation from without, to do otherwise than what he knows to be, that is, what really is, beft and fittest to be done; because he is independent and Omnipotent. So that Goodness, Juftice, Truth, and all moral perfections, must be in the Divine nature, unless we can suppose, that he wills the natures of things, to be as they are, and not to be as they are, at the same time, which is a manifeft contradiction.

Again, Goodness, in any Free or Rational Being, is nothing else but a will or difpofition, to communicate happiness or Good to other Beings, according to their Capacities. Now to communicate Being it self, and a Capa