city of enjoying happiness, or good, according to that variety of natures, which infinite Wif dom thought fit to make, is the very original and foundation of all Goodnefs; and to communicate this farther, according to those different improvements which Intelligent and Active Beings make, by virtue of that liberty of acting, which is effential to their nature, is a continuation of that Goodnefs So that, in comparison of all other Beings which are called good, we may truly fay, with our Saviour, that there is none good (that is originally and ef fentially fo) but God only.

Justice and Equity are nothing else but the application of the proper confequences of actions to the perfons acting; that is, a willing that the original and effential differences of things and actions, and their relations and fitneffes to one another, fhould be entirely preserved throughout. Now the Supreme Being, who knows all things, and understands all actions; that is, judges of them just as they are, will act accordingly, without partiality or respect of perfons; his infinite wisdom and power, setting him above all poffibility of being either deceived, or over-ruled in his acting. And for the fame reafon, Truth and Faithfulnefs are neceffarily Attributes of the fame di

vine Being, who can neither be mistaken in his designs, nor hindred from doing what he intends. And the like may be faid of all other moral perfections. For, in fhort, the want of, or failure in, any moral perfection, muft proceed, either from a defect of understanding, that is, from apprehending things to be otherwise than they really are; or from a want of power to act according to the nature of things; or from perverfeness of will difpofing him to act contrary to the true reafon, or nature and fitness of things; but an eternal, intelligent, independent Being, infinitely wife and powerful, can be liable to none of thefe; for the two first cafes are directly, and the last, by neceffary confequence, a contradiction to infinite Wisdom and Power.

From hence it follows, that the moral perfections of all Creatures must be finite and limited, and capable of continual improvement, according to the extent of their wisdom and power; but the moral perfections of the Supreme Being, or Firft caufe of all things, muft be infinite and abfolute. But then it does not from thence follow, that Goodness, Justice, Truth, and other moral perfections, are in their nature or kind, quite different things in the divine Being, from what they are in other rational

rational Beings, but only in degree. And this ought to be the more carefully observed, becaufe, if Goodness, Truth and Justice, and the like moral Attributes which we ascribe to God Almighty, be not the fame for kind, as they are in thofe Idea's which we frame of the like perfections in rational creatures, or in our abftracted reasonings about them from the nature of things; then it is in vain to reafon at all about them: Since, upon fuch fuppofition, when we fay, God is juft, or good, or true, we can have no meaning at all, because we have no notion or idea of any thing anfwering to the words we utter: And this would effectually deftroy the foundation, not only of Religion but of all Morality. It certainly takes away all manner of reasoning about the Divine Nature. For the natural Attributes of God, his Understanding and Power, are as much above us, as his moral Attributes or Perfections, and our Idea's of them as imperfect; fo that if we cannot reafon from the one, we cannot reason from the other.

Those men therefore, who pretend to magnify Reason so much, fhould confider very well what it is, before they admit fuch a fuppofition, which in effect deftroys all use of Reason

Reafon itself. For if true Reafon be nothing elfe but the real nature of things, and their relations and proportions to one another truly apprehended in the mind to be as they are in themselves, then it must be the same for kind in all Intelligent Beings; or else in effect the fame will be true and not true at the fame time, which is a plain contradiction. Of two dif ferent Minds or Understandings, which are of vaftly different abilities one above another, one may apprehend a great many more things, together with their natures, confequences and relations, than the other does, which is of less capacity, and fo can reafon further; but those things which both of them apprehend clearly, distinctly and truly, as they are in themselves, they must neceffarily fo far apprehend alike, or elfe there never could be any reasoning at all from the nature of things.

Upon this principle therefore, That true Reason, as far as it reaches, is of the fame kind in all intelligent Beings, Tully very juftly lays the foundation of the Law of Nature, which is nothing elfe but the Eternal Reafon of things, which must always be the fame as long as things themselves exift. And to this purpose are these and the like expreffions in

Since there is no

his first book De Legibus. thing more excellent than Reason, which is the fame in Man and in God, the first relation (or fociety) between God and Man, is, that of Reafon: And if reafon be common to both, right Reafon is fo: Which being the Law (of Nature) then there is a Law in which both agree. And again, Virtue (or moral Perfection) is the fame in Man as in the Divine Being. For Virtue is nothing else but nature advanced to its highest perfection. There is therefore (in this) a refemblance between God and Man. Now this is the fame, in effect, as to fay, that Man, in his most perfect ftate, is made after the image of God. And much to the fame purpofe in his fecond book De Legibus, he tells us, This is the judgment of the wifeft men

among

b Eft igitur, quoniam nihil eft ratione melius, eaque & in homine & in Deo, prima homini cum Deo rationis focietas. Inter quos autem Ratio, inter eofdem etiam recta ratio communis eft: Quæ cùm fit lex, lege quoque confociati homines cum Diis putandi fumus, &c.

e Jam verò virtus eadem in homine ac Deo eft, neque ullo alio ingenio præterea. Eft autem virtus nihil aliud quam in fe perfecta & ad fummum perducta natura. Eft igitur homini cum Deo fimilitudo, &c.

d Hanc igitur video fapientiffimorum fuiffe fententiam, legem neque hominum ingeniis excogitatam, neque fcitum

aliquod