ly in fact it has always been found, that in those places where there has been little fenfe of God and Religion, or where the notions of Religion have been greatly debased and corrupted, fo as to have little effect upon the minds of men in their moral conduct, there the manners of men have been always most brutish and inhuman. And on the contrary, where men have had the justest and most lively sense of a 'Deity and a Providence, there all moral virtues between man and man have flourished, the most worthy and generous actions have been performed, and the manners of men been ever most human and civilized. I own indeed, that men's notions of Religion it felf may be fo much. depraved and perverted, by the craft of some, and the weakness of others, as to become the occafion of much mischief. And Superftition may fo far prevail over fome, as even to overwhelm the common principles of Morality in divers inftances. And on the other hand there may poffibly be found, now and then, a particular man of fo fingularly good a natural difpofition, as to behave himself with decency in `all the common offices of human life, without any previous reflecting upon the obligations of Religion, and whofe practice is there fore fore better than his principles. But now, as it would, in the first cafe, be very unreasonable to charge thofe evils upon Religion, which are occafioned purely by the corruption of it, and which if it were truly and fincerely practifed, it would entirely prevent: So in the fecond cafe, to form a general Argument of the useleffness or uncertainty of Religious Principles, from fome single instances, which happen but very rarely, would be equally abfurd and unreasonable. For what if a man now and then be found better than his principles? Is this any commendation of thofe principles, which, if pursued, would make him much worse than nature has made him? We are not to feek for truth in the uncertain and variable practices of men, but in plain and neceffary deductions from the nature of things, and fuch as the generality of men using their reafon, when they are under no prejudice, will naturally make. And in like manner, we can by no means conclude, that the principles of Atheism are either capable of producing, or even confiftent with, a perfect Morality, only because it may happen, that a' man, who by chance embraces them, may poffibly be fober and temperate, and may exercise the outward acts of justice or benefi cence, cence, gratitude or friendship in some particular inftances. The question then is not, Whether a particular thoughtful man may not fee the natural fitness and propriety of a great many moral actions, and accordingly practise them, abftractedly from all other confiderations, and without reflecting upon any future confequences, as the reward or punishment of them; nor Whether fome men may not hold inconfiftent principles, which, if duly attended to, in their confequences would naturally deftroy one another: But the question is, Whether, if the minds of men were not generally influenced by the apprehenfion of fomething diftinct from this principle of mere fitnefs and congruity of actions to the nature of things; that is, of fome Being upon whom the exiftence of things themselves, and confequently their natures and the congruity of one to another, depends, not by chance but wife defign, it could ever be poffible for the generality of mankind to have any fuch firm notions of moral good and evil, as to keep awake what we call natural Conscience in them, and fill them with hopes or fears according to the tenor of their actions. My meaning is, that, without the belief of a Su preme preme Intelligent Being, upon whom the nature of things depends, and who has a power of exacting from all free Agents a conformity of their actions to that law of nature which he has eftablish'd, and who will fome way or other take cognizance of them; such a law, fuppofed to arife merely from the fitness of things, would have but very little influence: it would be as ineffectual to the greatest part of mankind, as a human law without any Sanction annexed, or the apprehenfion of any Magistrate to put it in execution. It is poffible that some men may have that benevolence to fociety, and that generous fense of publick good, as to be a law unto themselves, and of their own accord may do what the best human law would direct them to. But what is this to the bulk of mankind? And even this cannot be expected where the notions of a Deity are excluded. We are to take human nature as it generally is, and to confider what fort of belief or perfuafion has the greatest and most universal influence over it. And if we do this, we shall find, that Infidelity in the first principles of Religion is utterly inconfiftent with a perfect Morality, and that upon these two accounts. 1. Because 1. Because, if there be no belief of a God and a Providence, nor. any expectation of future rewards and punishments from any invifible Being, there cannot, in the common sense of mankind, be any fufficient bond of morality between man and man. 2. Because if there be really a God that has any concern with us, or for us, a compleat morality must neceffarily have respect to him, as well as to our intercourfe with one another. 1. Because if there be no belief of a God and a Providence, nor any expectation of future rewards and punishments from any invifible Being, there cannot, in the common fenfe of mankind, be any fufficient bond of morality between man and man. If indeed the actions of men were directed only by sense or inftinct, as the actions of brutes are, and had no dependence upon any invifible principle in the mind, morality would then be nothing elfe but living according to that natural instinct, nor would any kind of faith or belief be neceffary to fuch actions. But this is not the morality of men endued with understanding and freedom of will; nor is it what gives them fuch a confcience of their own actions, as to raise any fatisfaction or |