prevail the most indispensable comforts, nay, the simplest necessaries of life could not be obtained, or obtained only in the most scanty and precarious manner. In a word, the human race could not subsist at all, or subsist but in insignificant numbers, and in a condition which might be well exchanged with that of the brutes. Those who exercise the power of civil government, then, do what is necessary to prevent such consequences. And. do we ask whence they derive the right to do so? Surely a mere statement of the import of the question is sufficient to show its absurdity in the sense in which it is asked for, let it be distinctly understood what is the object in proposing such enquiry. That object is not to ascertain the nature and origin of rights in general; this belongs to the province of the ethical writer. The political philosopher assumes that there are certain rights existing, which, though they may admit of resolution into the general element which constitutes all right, yet are not derived from other rights, but are themselves ultimate and original, and at once admitted to be such by the common sense of mankind, without doubt or question. The enquiry regarding the right of government, (as it has been conducted by Hobbes, Filmer, Locke, and others,) supposes that this right is not of that description, but may be resolved into some other right, more elementary-one more certainly and immediately acknowledged. But do any of those explanations that have been suggested supply what is wanted? Would it not, for instance, be as reasonable to ask, whence is derived the right of a father to coerce his children, or whence is derived the right of enforcing performance of a contract, as it is to ask whence is derived the right under question-the right, namely, of saving a community from the most horrible evils, and even from entire destruction-which right, nevertheless, has been supposed to be explained by resolution into some of these? To ask, then, whence the right of government is derived, can only be a rational question when implyingwhat are the circumstances which render government necessary? This question is answered by a description of the consequences that would follow if there were no government. To the question whence, under such circumstances, the right of government is derived, the answer is, that the right is underived, and immediate.

It is not denied by any one, we believe, that there are cases in which compulsion and restraint may be used, by virtue of rights belonging to every man originally and independently. Any one who is attacked in person or property, or beholds his neighbour so attacked, may by force repel the aggressor. Now, the truth is, that the right of government is not merely

analogous to this admitted primary right, but is truly a case of it; for every exercise of government-that is, every rightful exercise, (for nothing else is in question,)—may be resolved into a case of the mere repression of injury, or differs from the simplest and clearest case of this only in kind, and not in degree. Government compels a man to join in defence of the community from foreign aggression, and to contribute to schemes of public advantage. But is this any thing but restraining such individual from committing an injustice? Any man who refuses to bear his part in repelling an enemy of the community, or in forming a highway or other useful public work, says, in effect-I will subject all my neighbours to the harm and inconvenience which can only be avoided by combining for this object; or I will enjoy a deliverance from such harm and inconvenience at their expense, since they cannot deliver themselves without delivering me. A man who, however rigidly abstaining from positive injury to others, should act in this spirit-and every one who refused submission to government in the abstract, would be so acting-would be still committing injury only less in degree than the infliction of positive harm on others; and the right to restrain (or to compel which, in the case, is equivalent) exists in the same manner, though not, it may be, in so high a degree, as that to restrain him from robbing or murdering. The right of a government to compel its subjects to fight in defence of the country, to contribute to the upholding of courts of justice, roads, bridges,— all these rights are precisely the same in kind, though becoming successively weaker in degree.

But still, an important difficulty will seem to be left behind. Suppose a right to govern has been established, who possesses the right? The answer is not difficult. Take the case instanced by Mr Lieber of a mutiny on board a ship, in the course of which the captain and officers have been killed-surely there is a right to quell the mutiny-but who has the right? Any one that can-any one that first can-any one that best can. Government is a means to an absolutely indispensable end. To ask who shall assume the government-who shall originate a government -is to ask what means shall be used: the answer is, the best and readiest means under the circumstances. Whoever, to the best of his belief, uses those means, has a right to use them.

Of course, there will always be a variety of opinions as to what are the best means, either in particular cases, or as a general rule in all cases. One person will prefer one form of government, or mode of instituting a government, another person another form or mode; and, as matter of individual opinion, each will hold that no other than that which he approves can be properly

reckoned a rightful government; that is, that no other has the right to exercise the powers of government. But as long as there is no general agreement among mankind on these points, so long the best government that can be got under the circumstances of any given case, or the government actually established, will be allowed to be a rightful government, and entitled to exercise the functions usually belonging to such.

But in the very nature of the case it must always hold true, that as the end to which government is a means, is an end in which the whole community has an interest-one which must be attained at the cost of all, and by the concurrence, active or passive, of the greater part,-the choice of the means, so far as practicable, naturally belongs to the community; and, so far as the collective intelligence may be presumed to exceed that of any individuals, will be best exercised by the community. In this sense, the truth of Mr Lieber's doctrine of the sovereignty of society admits of no dispute.

The right to assume or exercise the powers of government, involves the right to keep and maintain those powers as against all other persons who might seek to assume them. In other words, every government has a right to defend itself. On the other hand, as government is merely the means to an end, and as no person or number of persons have any obvious inherent right in preference to others, further than what power gives them, to choose or employ the means, it would be an absurdity to say, that because certain means have been used by certain persons at one time, no other means could be used by any other persons at another time: in other words, that a defective system of government cannot be changed. Still more absurd would it be to say this, if not only are the means inefficient, but the end reversed; i. e. if a government, whose right to act at all is merely a right to maintain justice, should maintain-not justice but injustice. In fact, the right to institute or maintain, and the right to overturn a government, arise from the same source. In either case, it is merely a right to prevent injustice, and to use the readiest practicable means for this purpose a right existing wherever the power exists and is bona fide exercised: for otherwise there can no right exist. If no one can have a right to overturn a government, no one can have a right originally to establish one.

The right to maintain, and the right to subvert a government, may indeed conflict. But so may any rights, if exercised mala fide, or under error. The receiver of a promise has a right to exact performance-the granter has a right to prevent him from exacting more. If they differ, either because they seek to overreach one another, or have severally misapprehended or

b

forgot the purport of the promise, their rights conflict; and if they have no umpire, they must determine the point by force. It is the same with respect to government. In all cases where we seek to determine whether a specified right exists or not, we have no other means of doing so but by considering whether the greatest good (or least evil) would arise from the right's being exercised or not exercised—that is, as it would be exercised in practice, and making every allowance for the want either of principle or knowledge in the agents. And, making allowance for both of these in the case in question, there is, in practice, sufficient checks against the abuse of the right on either hand-the right of governments to defend themselves, and of subjects to overturn them. Both of these rights must, therefore, be acknowledged to exist at once.

Returning now to our author, and passing from the substance to the mode of his exposition of the theory of the state, we cannot forbear saying, that, of all the performances of this na-. ture it has ever been our lot to notice, this of the present author is the most extraordinary. Were we called upon to form a theory of the manner in which this part of the work has been concocted, we should say, that at several different times, and at considerable intervals, he had composed as many separate, expositions of his doctrine, and had ultimately tagged all together in succession,-not, however, without some incidental intermixture of one with another. The effect, as might be supposed, would be strange enough, even if the author's views were presented in an apparently desultory and unconnected form. But, as if to make the matter absolutely ludicrous, there is a show of method, and of advancing by regular steps. Principles are stated-inferences drawn-results collected, and made the foundation on which remoter consequences are built. To give an adequate idea of the mode in which this is done, it would be necessary to quote the greater part of the fourth, fifth, and sixth books. Suffice it to say, that conclusions are sometimes mere repetitions of the premises in scarcely different words; sometimes totally unconnected with them; an enumeration of the results of a process of reasoning will include principles on which the reasoning was founded, or these principles shall be fairly deduced from the results. Should we have characterized this latter process as reasoning in a circle? No such thing. There is really no reasoning in the matter. Propositions there are in a circle; and apparently Mr Lieber has supposed, that to place one proposition after another, is to make the one an inference from the

other.

The remaining portion of the work we may describe as devo¬

ted generally to the consideration of Government, which the author sedulously attempts to distinguish from the State, and defines as follows:-' Government is that institution or contrivance through which the state-that is, jural society-acts in all cases in which it does not act by direct operation of its sovereignty.' In this part of the work there occur many valuable remarks, relative to the problems to be solved in constructing a government, and the comparative merits of such solutions as have been attempted; but we have still the same defects of arrangement and style, with which the author is in general so chargeable.

6

In enumerating the ways in which power has a tendency to enlarge itself, even without any systematic purpose on the part of those who hold it, the author well observes :- It is a psychological truth, that all power, however lawful, being resisted, 'the first feeling in those intrusted with it, is not that of regret ' at this resistance on account of the object they had in view, but of offence at the opposition itself. This again is not peculiar to one set of men or class of society, but without exception true of all. Monarchic power is not more offended at resistance ' than democratic or parental power.' The severity of all early 'penal laws arose from this source. The idea, the feeling was, "You have dared to disobey my power, you have rebelled against my authority;" not "you have offended against society, acted wrong, because my authority is for the common good. And again: Power imposes; power receives every where respect by its own character. However illegally acquired, the great action of power obtains homage. The success of usurpers • is in part founded upon this fact: the people revere power; so 'that usurpation itself becomes a new acquisition to further usurpation; it is the energy which manifests itself, and the capacity of action, thus proved, which overwhelms the beholder. This is of peculiar importance respecting the limitation of the executive, the depositary of this vast acting and imposing power, ' and the independence of the judiciary, which rarely has an op'portunity to act brilliantly, like the other branches.'

Speaking of the tests or criterions by which a good government may be known, Mr Lieber justly remarks:-' Here we have 'to guard ourselves against two errors. The high intellectual or 'social activity of a part of society may be, and often has been ' obtained by a sacrifice of the most essential interests of far the 'greater majority of the people. I speak of those brilliant governments which blind the superficial observer, such as that of Louis XIV. They have an equally dangerous effect upon the hasty observer of after times, who seizes only on what is striking, and does not suspect the sacrifices which were necessary to