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 He afterwards owns, that if a lawyer has not estate enough of his own, he is then allowed, by the laws of all wise legislators, to accept some gratuity from the party he pleads for; since no acquisition can be more just than that which proceeds from such honest labour, and is given by those for whom we have performed such important services; and who would certainly be very unworthy, if they failed to acknowledge them. Besides, as the time which a lawyer bestows upon other people's affairs prevents him from thinking of his own, it is not only just, but necessary, he should not lose by his profession.
[p] But Quintilian would have the lawyer, even in this
case, keep within very narrow bounds; and be very watchful in observing the person from whom he receives any gratuity, together with the quantity, and time during which he receives it. By which he seems to insinuate, that the poor should be served gratis, and that he should take but moderately even from the rich: in fine, that the lawyer should forbear receiving any gratuity, after he has acquired a reasonable fortune.
 He must never look upon what his clients offer him, as though it were a payment or a salary, but as a mark of friendship and acknowledgment; well knowing he does infinitely more for them than they do for him; and he must make this use of it, because a good office of that kind ought neither to be sold nor lost.
 At si res familiaris ampliùs [p] Sed tum quoque tenendus
[r] As to the custom of making agreements with clients, and taxing them in proportion to the nature of the cause, and the risque they run; it is, says Quintilian, an abominable kind of traffic, fitter for a pirate than an orator, and which even those who have but a slender love for virtue, will avoid.
Far therefore from the Bar, and so glorious a profession, says he in another place, be those mean and mercenary souls who make a trade of Eloquence, and think of nothing but sordid gain. The precepts, says he, which I give concerning this art, do not suit any person who would be capable of computing how much he shall gain by his labours and study.
If a heathen has such noble sentiments and expressions, how much more glorious and disinterested should the views of a lawyer be according to the principles of Christianity ? And indeed we see this spirit prevail among the lawyers of France. They are so delicate in this point, as to debar themselves from bringing any actions for payments of their fees; and this they carry so far, that they would disown any member of their profession, who should commence any suit, or retain his client's papers, in order to oblige him to make some acknowledgment for the assistance he had given him.
III. A DELICACY IN THE CHOICE OF CAUSES,
[s] As soon as we suppose the orator a worthy man, it is plain he can never undertake a cause he knows to be unjust. Justice and truth only have a right to the assistance of his voice. Guilt has no title to it, what
[r] Paciscendi quiden ille pira- hi quid studia referant computatuticus mos, & imponentium periculis rum. Quint. l. 1. C. 20, pretia procui abominanda negotia- [s] Non convenit ei quem ora: tio, etiam mediocriter improbis torein esse volumus, injusta cueri aberit.
scientem... Neque defendet omnes Neque enim nobis operis amor orator : idemque portum illum elo
nec, quia sit honesta atque quentiæ suæ salutarem, non etiam pulcherrima rerum eloquentia, pe- piratis patefaciet, duceturque in adtitur ipsa, sed ad vitem usum & vocationem maximè causâ. Quint. sordidum lucrum accingimur. ... 1. 12. 6. 7. Ne velim quidem lectorem dari mi
splendor or credit soever it may appear to have. His Eloquence is a sanctuary for virtue only, and a safe haven for all, except pirates.
[t] Before therefore a man discharges the function of a lawyer, let him perform that of a judge : let him raise a kind of domestic tribunal in his closet, and there carefully, and without prejudice, weigh and examine the arguments of his clients, and pronounce a severe judgment against them, in case it be necessary.
[u] If even, in the course of the affair, he happens, by a stricter enquiry into the title, to discover, that the cause he undertook, supposing it honest, is unjust; he then must give his client notice of it, and not abuse him any longer with vain hopes; and advise him not to prosecute a suit, which would prove very fatal to him, even though he should gain it. If he submits to his advice, he will do him great' service; if he despises it, he is unworthy of any farther assistance from his lawyer. IV. PRUDENCE AND 310 DERATION IN PLEADING.
These virtues are chiefly necessary on account of decency. There are certain polite and becoming rules in this point, which every orator and every gentleman should observe inviolably. It is not necessary to remark that it  would be inhumane to insult people in disgrace, when their very condition entides them to compassion, and who besides may be intortunate, without being criminal. [y] In general, our
[+] Sic causam perscrutatus, pro- şumus, beneficium est, ut non falpositis ante oculos omnibus quæ pro- lainus vanà spe litigantem. Neque sint noceant-ve, personam deinde in- est dignus operâ patroni, qui non duar judicis, fingatque apud se agi utitur consilio. Ib. c. 7. causam. Quint. l. 12. c. 8.
[x] Adversus miseros inhumanus [u] Neque verò pudor obstet, est jocus. quominus susceptam, cum melior  * Lædere nunquam velimus, videretur, litem, cognitâ inter dis- longèque absit propositum illud, po. çeptandum iniquitate, dimittat, cùm tius anicum quam dictum perdidi. priùs litigatori dixerit verum. Nam Quint. 1. 6. $.4. & in hoc maximum, si æqui judices
! I am of opinion, that it ought to be read so, instial of ludere, as it is in all the editions.
raillery should be inoffensive; and we must take care
, and prudence in applying them, that distinguish an oralor, in this respect, from a buffoon. The latter uses them at all times, and without any occasion : whereas the orator does it seldom, and always for some reason essential to his cause, and never barely to raise [a] langhter; which is a very trifling kind of pleasure, and argues a mean genius.
[b]Repartees give occasion sometimes for delicate raillery; so much the more sprightly, as it is concise; and as it flies in an instant like a dart, piercing almost before perceived. These pleasantries, which are neither studied nor prepared, are much more graceful than those we bring from our closets, which often, for that very reason, appear frigid and puerile. Besides, the adversary has no reason to complain, because he brought the raillery upon himself, and can impute it to nothing but his own imprudence. [c]Ifhy do you bark ? said Philip one day to Catulus, alluding to his name, and the great noise he made in pleading : Because I see a thief, answered Catulus.
[d] Repartees of this kind require a great presence and celerity of mind, if we may use the expression; for they afford no time for reflection; and the blow
(z) Temporis ratio, & ipsius din lacessiti dicimus, quam quæ priores. cacitatis moderatio, & temperantia, Nam & ingenii celeritas major est & raritas dictorum, distinguit ora- quæ apparet in respondendo, & hutorem à scurrà : & quod nos cum manitatis est responsio. Videremur causâ dicimus, non ut ridiculi vide- enim quieturi fuisse, nisi essemus amur, sed ut proficiamus aliquid ; lacessiti. 2. de Orat. n. 230. jlli totum diem, & sine causà. 2. Quæsita, nec ex tempore ficta, de Orat. n. 2, 247.
sed domo allata, plerumque sunt [a] Risum quæsivit : qui est, frigida. Orat. n. 89. meà sententiâ, vel tenuissimus inge- [c] Catulus, dicenti Philippo, nii fructus. Ibid.
QUID LATRAS? FUREM, in[b] Dicacitas posita est in hâc ve- quit, VIDEO. 2. de Orat. n. 220. juri jaculatione verborum, & inclusa [d] Opus est imprimis ingenio breviter urbanitate. Quint. 1.6.c.4. veloci ac mobili, animo præsenti &
Ante illud facetè dictum hærere acri. Non enim cogitandum, sed debet, quam cogitari posse videatur. dicendum statim est, & propè sub 2. de Orat. n. 219.
conatu adversarii manus erigenda. Omnia probabiliora sunt, quæ Quint. 1. 6. c. S.
must be given the instant we are attacked. But they require great prudence and moderation. [C] For how much must a man be master of his temper, to suppress even in the very heat of action or debate, a smart saying and joke which starts up on a sudden, and might do us honour; but would at the same time offcnd persons whom we are obliged to treat with deference; The way to succeed in it, is to slight, and not pique ourselves upon so dangerous a talent; and to acquire a habit of speaking moderately and with caution, in conversation and common life.
If a lawyer is not allowed to use harsh and offensive raillery, with how much more reason ought he to abstain from gross language? If ] This is an inhumane kind of pleasure, unworthy of a gentleman, and which must necessarily disgust a prudent auditor. Yet some clients, often more solicitous to revenge than defend themselves, extort this kind of Eloquence from the orator: and are not pleased with him, if he does not dip his pen in the bitterest gall. But who is the lawyer, if he has any sentiments of honour or probity left, that would thus blindly gratify.the spleen and resentment of his client; become violent and passionate at his nod, and make himself the unworthy minister of another's foolish rage, from a sordid spirit of avarice or a mistaken desire of false glory?
V. WISE EMULATION REMOTE FROM MEAN AND
No place, in my opinion, is more proper to excite and cherish a lively and prudent emulation, than the Bar. It is a great concourse of people in whom the
[e] Hominibus facetis & dicaci- lunt quàm defensionem. Hoc quibus difficillimum est habere homi- dem quis hominum liberi modò sannum rationem & temporem, & ea guinis sustineat, petulansesse ad alquæ occurrant, cùm salsissimè dici terius arbitrium?... Orator à viro possint, tenere, 2. de Orat. n. 221. bono, in rabulam latratoremque
[f] Turpis voluptas, & inhu- convertitur, compositus, non ad mana, & nulli audientium bono animum judicis, sed ad stomachum grata ; à litigatoribus quidem fre- litigatoris. Quint. 1. 12. c. 9. quenter exigitur, qui ultionem ma